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CHAPTER 1
COALITION GOVERNMENTS: FORMATION AND DURATION

This study examines the reasons responsible for the various formations and
durations of Israeli governments.1 What makes certain Israeli coalition governments
large, with many participating parties while others are established small?

Why do

particular coalition governments last longer in office than others? The significance of
these questions becomes apparent when we recognize that a coalition government’s
formation reflects various national and international political developments. Economic
circumstances, foreign policy, and immigration influx are among the various factors that
impact coalition politics and determine the extent of government partnerships. Coalition
government formation also expresses the structural constraints of the electoral institution.
The number of parties and their relative electoral strength may also determine the level of
cooperation, opposition, or parliamentary competition that can alter the formation of
governments.

Understanding the factors shaping governments’ formations can further help us
understand why particular ruling coalitions last longer in office than others. This study
addresses the institutional and political factors that shape the particular formation of a
coalition and explores the types of circumstances that contribute to coalition
governments’ early breakups or prolonged duration.

The examination of coalition

government formation and duration helps political strategists design enduring coalitions

1 B y coalition duration is meant the number o f days the alliance lasts in po w er before being dismantled and
replaced by a new government.
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capable of adapting to changes that are storming nations while taking institutional
constraints into consideration, thus contributing to a stable polity.

Coalition Form ation Debate
Past literatures examined variables responsible for the formation and duration of
particular coalitions.

Following William Riker’s infamous coalition theory in 1962,

researchers were divided between adherents and critics. Riker advocated the view that
coalitions form as the outcome of zero-sum games calculation (Riker, 1962). He viewed
parties as rational players aiming to achieve maximum power in the game play. Thus, the
sum calculation of all parties in a rational game, he maintained, contributes to the
formation of a coalition that includes the minimum possible number of partners. This
configuration, Riker believed, provided respective coalition members maximum benefits
by dividing resources among the least number of beneficiaries.

Riker’s followers sought to enrich his research program by widening its protective
belt, to use Lakatos’ terminology.2 Influential contributions to Riker’s theory were
elaborated by periodical publications associated with J. Harasanyi (1969), W. Wright
(1971), J. Dodd (1974), K. Strom (1984), and M. Laver and K. Shepsle (1990, 1996).
Their contributions to the research program focused on innovative aspects and measures,
which were associated with the costs and benefits to parties joining a particular coalition
formation. Party electoral seats, cabinet ministries, ministry budget allocations, and other

2 L akatos, Imre “P roofs and R efutations: The L ogic o f Mathematical D iscovery” Cambridge University.
1977.
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similar variables represented the foundations of parties’ strategies to join a particular
coalition formation.

An antithetical paradigm to Riker’s was associated with the work of Robert
Axelerod, whose “Conflict of Interest” (1970) prioritized the interest of social cleavages
over the benefits associated with the particular structure of a coalition. Political alliances,
Axelerod perceived, reflected shared interests between social groups, and was not merely
a product of parties’ sharing calculations. He asserted that coalitions needed to have
minimum common values and programs, and that governments are formed among
ideologically close networks (Axelerod, 1970). Contributions to Axelerod’s thesis were
made by various authors including S.M. Lipset and S. Rokhan (1967), A. DeSwan
(1973), A. Lipjhart (1977), I. Budge (1978), P. Warwick (1979), D. Baron (1993), and
Dunleavy (2001). Their research provided continuous support to the perspective that
parties reflect the political, economic, or social interest of respective classes, groups, or
cleavages in society and their decisions to join, defend, or abort a coalition are closely
linked with the momentum of social conflict and political change. Policy programs were
found to be among the best indicator of parties’ ideological positions in predicting
coalition formation (Budge 1978, 90, 94; Baron, 1993).

Follow-up research exposed shortcomings and faults in both paradigms. Mogens
Pedersen and Peter Mair, for example, found that electoral volatility in several countries
was associated with ideological detachment and the ideological commitment of declining
parties (Pedersen, 1990; Mair, 1983).

Pedersen and Mair cited Otto Kirchheimer’s
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assertion (1966) that ideology can no longer be taken as a determinant of a party’s
behaviors and coalition strategies. On the other hand, views associated with Lipset and
Rokhan’s work “Party Systems and Voter Alignments” (1967) proposed the contrary.
Studies by Michael Taylor and Michael Laver of twelve European countries between
1945 and 1971, as well as Abram De Swaan’s study of eight European democracies and
Israel between 1918 and 1972, found Riker’s theory of minimum winning formation was
contradicted in most cases (De Swaan, 1973; Taylor and Laver, 1972). Also, Arend
Lipjhart opposed Kirchheimer’s thesis on the basis that “parties’ policy preferences
cannot be ignored” (Lipjhart, 1984, p.53) and found that many oversized or “grand”
coalitions are often formed in pluralistic societies.

Synthetic research attempted to bridge both paradigms. Yet, these efforts often
provided a greater weight of variables that supported aspects of one paradigm over the
other. Mark Franklin and Thomas T. Mackie’s (1984) reassessment of parties’ size and
ideology, for example, found size to be a more significant explanatory variable in
coalition formation, although in specific countries the significance may be reversed
(Franklin & Mackie, 1984). Recent research, associated with the ‘Manifesto Project’ has
aimed at isolating indicators from party platforms that, along with size considerations,
orient coalition formation (Budge; 1993, 1994). Other synthetic research is found in the
work of Carol Mershon (1996, 2001), Itai Sened (1996), Martin Lanny and Randolph
Stevenson (2001) who predicted coalition formations based on both party’s size and
policy position while controlling for institutional variations.
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Coalition D uration Debate
Contemporary theoretical analysis of coalition politics has begun to demonstrate a
growing interest in formation predictions, as well as an even greater interest in coalition
stability analysis.

Starting with P. Warwick (1979) many theorists believe that the

question of coalition formation is fundamentally connected to that of coalition stability.
A party’s decision to join a particular coalition formation is necessarily linked with the
capacity of such a coalition to confront arising political and economic pressures, thus
avoiding early divisions and breakups. The research question thus became associated
with the question of what makes a particular alliance more durable than another. The
answer to this question was thought to provide additional insight into the rationale of
parties joining a particular coalition formation.

As was the case with formation research, the duration question polarized
researchers into various theoretical camps. The division was between those who
supported Riker’s styled coalition (Robertson, 1983; Mershon, 1996) and those who
advocated Axelerod’s styled coalition (Warwick, 1979), with each camp predicting
durability. Synthesizers also emerged (Lijphart, 1984; Ingelhart, 1987; Budge, 1990). The
challenge to both theoretical core assumptions, however, came with B.C. Browne., J. P.
Frendreis, and D.W. Gleiber’s milestone work "An 'Events' Approach to the Problem of
Cabinet Stability" in 1984 and was followed by supporting publications in 1986 and
1988. Browne and his co-authors found that the structure of any political alliance was
subject to permanent accumulative pressures due to randomly occurring events that,
throughout its life, undermine its duration.

Whether formed according to Riker or
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Axelerod’s model, coalitions age and dissolve as the probability of shocking events
increases with time. In this context, P. Warwick (1992) spectulated on the relevance of
coalitions’ structural formations with respect to duration.

J.D. Robertson (1983, 1984,

1986), G. King (1990), P. Warwick (1992, 94), Lupia and Strom (1995), Grofman and
Roozentaal(1997), Laver and Shepsle (1998, 1999), D. Baron (1998), and Diermeir and
Stevenson’s (1999)

respective studies rejected the idea that

coalition structural

formation is irrevalent in duration analysis. However, they disagreed over the extent to
which stmctural formation or events impact duration.

The “event” theories marked a turning point in the study of coalition behaviors;
the need to unify event and stmctural paradigms appeared urgent. Robertson, Warwick,
King and various authors took on this task.

In linking event to stmcture, Warwick

established causality between economic indicators and government stability (Warwick,
1992). Similarly, Robertson suggested that the economy is an important determinant of
stmctural behaviors (Robertson, 1983; 1984).

Finally, King established a unified

statistical model that combined both “event” and “stmctural” propositions in duration
analysis (King, Alt, Bums, and Laver 1990). In its turn, the unified model presents some
problems in the literature. These problems were associated with the questions of which
event(s) should be considered most critical in determining coalition behaviors. Do events
exhibit a pattern in their impact on duration or is each unique in its implication(s). as a
historian may suggest?
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Persisting Anomalies
In order to address these questions this study attempts to build bridges between
both formation and duration theories while strengthening core positions. We analyze
both coalition formation and duration perspectives by considering explanatory variables
common to both phenomena. Adopting coalitions as the unit of analysis, we distinguish
between structural and event variables.
ideological formation of the coalition.

We assess each in light of the size and
Then, we replicate our analysis in respect to

coalition duration, revealing variables that impact formation and, in turn, duration.3

Before applying our research design, however, we recognized important
shortcomings in most coalition studies, particularly their tendency to undermine
important historic, cultural, religious, political and institutional differences between
countries.

While we admit that democracies do share core values and institutional

dynamics, we believe that each maintains a unique set of attributes that often yield
peculiar political outcomes.

Taking Israel, for example, we instantly recognize the

dramatic prospect of the ongoing national conflict with the Arabs and the Palestinians,
the influence of Israel’s inner religious-secular-ethnic divisions, and the impact of
economic, industrial and technological transformations shaping Israeli politics (Arian,
1998). Historic transformations specific to a given democracy, particularly in light of
globalization and modem global integration, may diminish or exaggerate certain national
peculiarities and distinctively shape political momentum.4 In Israel, this became apparent

3 W e use two-stage quantitative statistical regression analysis in order to exam ine the formation then the
duration models.
4 Such a view supports Brow ne’s reasoning for having ‘event’ variables determining the various durations
o f coalitions in democracies (Browne 1984, 86).
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after 1969, when conquest of new territories, the development of mass industry, and the
increasing fragmentation of political parties marked a substantial shift in normal politics.5
Such transformation presented further complications to the generalizations associated
with coalition theories. Not only can we find important differences in the attributes of
democracies, but we can also recognize significant distinctions within the development of
each country’s political history.

Thus, we find ourselves compelled to reexamine coalition theories in light of the
peculiarities of each country, hoping to accumulate political knowledge about various
nations via this process and consequently to provide, through their common behaviors, a
mean to validate or reject aspects of coalition theories. This study begins this mission by
examining the behaviors of Israeli coalitions in light of changing institutional and
political circumstances.

We study Israeli coalition behaviors while projecting various

general theoretical propositions relevant to formation and duration analysis.
implement two analytical approaches:

quantitative and qualitative.

We

The former

incorporates the populations of 28 Israeli governments since independence in 1949
through 1999, in order to reveal a general pattern and relationship between the
independent and dependent variables; the latter includes eight coalitions evenly divided
between shortest and longest lived governments and distributed between the periods
before and after 1969, in order to reveal comparative behaviors.

5 Following the 1967 Six Day War, the Labor groups became further divided between “tenitorialists’, or those who
claimed national right to the new Occupied Territories, and the “peace camp”, or those who advocated the return of
conquered land in exchange for peace (Isaac, 1976, Perlmutter, 1985). The Labor party’s traditional influence
deteriorated in favor of the Right Likud party (Blazer and Sandler, 1990; Arian 1998). . Following an industrial surge,
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A Synthetic Research Design
Our study is divided into a two-stage design consisting first of formation and then
of duration variables. In the formation stage we aim at explaining the variant formation
in coalition size and ideology.

What makes particular coalitions form large, or

consensual, while others are small, or exclusive? Why do certain governments adopt
strong, narrow, or tight ideological policy positions while others lack such orientation,
incorporating wide-inclusive policy programs?

The answer to these questions will

provide some analytical perspective to the Riker vs. Axelerod debate as well as an
examination to the Lipjhart “consensual thesis” in pluralistic systems.

Riker’s view

asserts that coalitions will always form as minimum winning (Riker, 1962), Axelerod
projects that coalition ideological programs will always form tight (Axelerod, 1970), and
Lipjhart proposes that coalition in pluralistic Israel will always form large, expanding
beyond minimum winning requirements (Liphart, 1977; 1984).

Our explanatory variables are of two types: structural and event-based.

The

structural variable we introduce in this study is “coalition competition,” or the degree to
which there is an increased opportunity of rival coalitions to win a majority number of
seats in the Knesset. Because Israel has maintained a dominant party tradition, i.e., there
has been in each Knesset a party that maintained a substantially large number of seats and
to which the formation of government has been traditionally assigned, the change in the
dominant party’s power index to form winning coalitions has become the standard for
measuring competition.

The increase in the power of the dominant party to form a

labor disputes arose with increasing numbers of strikes. U.S. - Israeli alliance was fortified throughout the same
period.
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winning coalition undermines competition, while the decline of such

power fosters

parliamentary fractionalization and competition. How does competition impact coalition
formation and duration? Mershon proposed that competition makes coalitions expensive,
therefore, forming small and tight. This is particularly the case because parties in a
competitive environment can choose from various potential coalition formations forcing
the dominant party to make urgent concessions in budget and ministry allocation in favor
of joining parties. Dominant parties, therefore, have grown less capable of affording
large partnerships. By the same reasoning, Mershon thought that the cost associated with
dismantling a coalition increases with competition since the dominant party cannot
guarantee the reformation of a winning coalition. Mershon predicted that coalitions will,
therefore, last longer in power as structural competition increases (Mershon; 1996,2001).6

The other set of explanatory variables are event pressure variables, i.e., variables
associated with political, social, and economic change independent of institutional
structure. We propose two types of events: external and internal. The first is associated
with foreign policy issues such as annual severity of conflict, annual U.N. resolutions,
and annual foreign assistance; the second is associated with indicators such as the annual

6 Mershon’s m odel resem bles a free market in its supply-demand relationship having the dominant party
acting as the supplier o f a coalition and the minor parties as membership buyers. In situations where many
suppliers compete to sell to buyers (many dominant parties), suppliers grew desperate to sell membership at
low prices, jeopardizing profitability (forming expensive coalitions by providing maximum benefits to
minor partners). Because the coalition, under com petitive circumstances is costly to the dominant party, the
coalition is often formed small-tight. Continued com petition forces coalition suppliers to maintain low
membership cost, and therefore saves the coalition from early collapse (minor parties maintain rank and do
not defect to a competing coalition, due to their respective maximum profitability). The situation is totally
reversed when a supplier turn to be a m onopoly (no com petition), thus dictating prices (providing the least
possible benefits to minor partners by controlling m ost government resources). Such a situation increases
membership cost with the suppliers looking for greater profit by having more members (more supporters
with the least possible benefits at higher return to the m onopoly). The same situation provides the
monopoly supplier with the luxury to dismantle the partnership whenever a feasible enterprise emerges as a
more profitable alternative (more partners accepting low er benefits).
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number of immigrants entering the country relative to the total population, annual GDP
rate change, annual unemployment rate, annual number of strikers per strike, annual
inflation rate, and annual growth rate. The general theoretical perception is that event
pressure leads to political consensus, where political parties undermine their ideological
differences and unite to address obstacles confronting the nation. Robertson proposed
that event pressures, and economic pressure in particular, are responsible for larger
formations (Robertson; 1984, 1986).

Browne’s aging thesis predicted that event

pressures or “shocks” undermine the durability of the coalition (Browne; 1984, 1986).
Our design will allow us to examine these views while making the necessary distinction
between the variant impacts of the different event pressure variables on both the
formation and the duration of the government.

In the second duration stage analysis the dependent variables, analyzed in the first
formation stage analysis, become additional structural explanatory variables.

The

question we attempt to address in this stage is how the size and the ideological orientation
of a coalition determine its duration. If Riker was correct, one would expect that the
larger and ideologically wider coalitions are the least efficient, and therefore the less
durable. Efficiency implies that minimum-tight coalition is the most lasting coalition
while maximum-wide coalition is the least durable (confirming Mershon, 1996). If, on
the other hand, Liphart was correct, we should expect in Israel’s pluralist society the
contrary to be the case with larger inclusive (consensual) coalitions having longer
duration.
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Significance o f the Study
In formulating the various relationships existing between structural and event
independent variables with formation and duration dependent variables, this study
assesses the relevant strength of each relationship. What events and institutional settings
matter the most in government formation and, consequently, respective durability? The
answer to this question leads us to examine the relationship between government
formation and duration.

Does predicted formation lead to durable coalitions, or is

duration determination dependent on structural and event pressure changes? This study
will provide further assertion to the linkage existing between formation and duration
analyses.

It will show that a coalition government’s structural formation determines

duration (confirming Warwick, 1994). It will further demonstrate that event pressures,
responsible for particular government formation, may effect duration differently. For
example, this study reveals that internal event pressure responsible for small government
formation undermines duration. On the other hand, external pressure, associated with
larger coalition formation, may prolong government duration (contrary to Browne, 1984,
1986).

We recognize that the prospective validity and reliability of our study may change
between countries and across time within each country.

Many examinations of modem

political process have hinted at fundamental changes in the shape and behavioral pattern
of political alliances in democratic nations (Kirchheimer, 1966; Mair, 1983; Pedersen,
1990). In this study, we consider these views by careful analysis of the annual trends in
our variables. Early observations confirm the proposition that since the 1969 Israeli
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Knesset’s election, a serious shift has occurred in important variables.

Most

significantly, we noted, was the shift in structural competition among rival dominant
parties within the Israeli Knesset (Chapter 3). Since 1969, Israel witnessed a rapid
process of industrialization and territorial expansion, and its Knesset became further
fragmented providing the ground for serious competition among rival dominant parties
(Issac, 76; Perlemutter, 85; Arian; 98). Such situations instigate serious reconsideration
of our two-stage models. The question we ask is: what historic development, if any,
altered coalition behaviors in formation and duration perspectives?

In order to answer

this question, in this study our quantitative examination of 28 Israeli coalitions is
reconsidered by applying our model qualitatively to 13 coalitions formed before 1969 and
15 coalitions formed after (Chapters 5 and 6). In examining the general relationship
between independent and dependent variables for all 28 Israeli governments we first
implement a quantitative multiple linear regression analysis (OLS) and compare the
result to a robust regression analysis (Chapter 4).7 Then, in order to examine the impact
of historic developments in coalition behaviors, we divide our governments’ population
into two sets of coalitions that were formed before and after 1969 and implement a
qualitative case comparative study approach, as proposed by Alexander George (1969).
We compare coalition formation and duration before and after 1969 by selecting and
examining the two shortest and the two longest-lived coalitions in each time period.
Thus, while the quantitative approach provides us with a means to evaluate the general
application of our theoretical models, the qualitative approach allows us to highlight the

7 Both analyses are further discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
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comparative impact of historic developments on the formation and duration patterns of
Israeli coalitions.

D ata Sources
The data used in this study is compiled from various sources.

Coalitions’

ideological measures were based on documents (1949-1999) titled “the Principle
Guidelines of Government” and were primarily obtained from the Israeli Knesset
Archive. They were content coded according to Ian Budge’s 55 identified sub-policies
(Budge, 1993). Dominant Parties ideology (1949-1988) data were obtained from Essex
University, which was compiled by Ian Budge (Dataset CMPr3). Party manifestos from
1988 to 1999 were obtained from the Jerusalem Post and Israel Yearbook and Almanac
and were content coded using Ian Budge’s approach.

A third data set consisting of

information about duration, the various shuffles, defections, and changes in cabinets
(1945-1990) was also obtained from Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic
Governments in 20 Democracies (1945-1990)” (Budge, 1993); the data was updated to
1999 using Keesing’s Contemporary Archive. A fourth source of statistical data (19492003) was obtained from “Statistical Abstract of Israel”. The fifth data set consists of
foreign aid to Israel (1949-1999) and was obtained from the following authors: Clyde R.
Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, (May 11,
2000); Larry Q. Nowels, “Israel: An Overview of U.S. Foreign Assistance, Congressional
Research Service, (May 20, 1993); A. F. K. Organski, “The $36 billion bargain”, NY:
Colombia University Press, 1990. The sixth data set consists of war data by D. Singer’s
“Correlate of War Project” (1949-1992).

The data was updated using “The Jewish
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Online Research Center”.

“Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs” provided further

information and data regarding Israeli parties’ respective electoral strength and political
positions.

C hapter Summaries
The following chapters are divided as follows: Chapter 2, “Coalition Theories and
a Synthetic Model of Coalition Formation and Duration,” reviews the various research on
coalition formation and duration theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory
and its various sub-disciplines. It also considers ‘event’ theory as a competing theoretical
model to coalition research. Synthetic approaches are examined for their contributions
and shortcomings. An alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is
advanced. This theory argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis.
Structural analysis must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition
system while event analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs.
internal). The theory predicts coalitions’ structural formations and durations while taking
into consideration important national transformations.

It further provides means for

examining the ‘event aging thesis.’

Chapter 3, “Methodologies and Measurements” examines two methodological
approaches to evaluate the theory presented in chapter 2.

The first is a quantitative

method using multiple linear regression analysis. The second is a qualitative method
using comparative case study analysis. The purpose of having two methodologies is
related to the small number of cases being examined in this research. Such a shortcoming
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makes a quantitative examiniation difficut to verify.

An inductive comparative

qualitative approach, on the other hand, allows rigorous examination of cases studied and
provides further verification and/or refinement to theoretical assumptions.

This chapter

discusses the unit of analysis, independent, and dependent variables implemented in both
methods. It defines operational variables and measures employed in the quantitative
analysis. It further discusses the qualitative method, its various phases, the criteria of
case selections, and systematic case evaluation and comparison.

In Chapter 4 the data is quantitatively examined to reveal the relationship between
coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures.
The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel
was founded. Multiple linear and robust regression analyses were conducted to show the
significance of the model developed in chapter 2.

While the model was not found

significant, partly in light of low sample size, trend analysis showed that the dominant
party power index has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of
strikers per strike also increased over the years. These changes in trends have become
apparent since 1969.

In Chapter 5 a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition
formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to
examine the most evident variables associated with governments’ early breakups and
terminations.

The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided

between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide
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comparative evidence as to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred
following the 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include
economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness
of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure
variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition’s size, and
the coalition’s ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in
order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments.

A comparative qualitative analysis of longest duration governments, compared to
shortest duration governments, is made in Chapter 6. The variables analyzed in this
chapter are the same examined in Chapter 5. A comparative result of shortest vs. longest
duration governments are also provided.

Further comparison to quantitative vs.

qualitative analyses is also shown.

Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of our quantitative and qualitative data
analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings
appear to support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward
tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets and results in short duration
coalitions, particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election.
Economic and external pressures responsible for the formation of large coalitions before
1969 appear to have had the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many
contemporary minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969
period also appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition
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formations.

Supports to our duration hypothesis emerge in the significant negative

association existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government
duration. W hile competition is found to contradict long-duration proposition, large-sized
and wide-ideological coalitions are found to have conditional impact, contributing to
government longevity in situation of external threat. Supports to the ‘aging’ thesis also
demonstrate negative associations between economic as well as external ‘shocks’ and
government duration.

Our comparative examination of Israeli coalitions reveals a significant behavioral
shift following 1969’s Knesset election.

Increasing parliamentary fragmentation and

coalition competition marks the transformation. Throughout the ‘post-national’ period,
with the exception of grand alliances forming to repel external threat, coalitions have
gown more competitive and less tolerant of policy differences, forming narrow agendas
and smaller sized cabinets in response to domestic and external pressures. This
transformation appears to instigate shorter duration governments, and consequently,
instable polity.

The limitations of our proposition are due to the small number of cases studies
and to the cultural and political peculiarities of the country examined. The contribution
to the general coalition theory, however, shows that coalitions need to be examined in
light of important historic-national transformations. Theoretical models must take into
consideration the country’s level of national fragmentation arising as a consequence of
global transformation to reveal proper conclusions about coalition behaviors. Future
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studies, we propose, can analyze countries with similar ethnic-cultural-political attributes,
clustering them into levels of national fragmentation while taking global developments
into consideration.

The significance of such a proposition lies in forecasting the

formation of durable and stable post-national governments.
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CHAPTER 2
C O A LITIO N THEORIES AND A SYNTHETIC MODEL OF COALITION
FORMATION AND DURATION

This chapter reviews the various research on coalition formation and duration
theories. It discusses the main tenets of structural theory and its various sub-disciplines. It
also considers ‘event’ theory as a competing theoretical model to coalition research.
Synthetic approaches are examined in their contributions and shortcomings.

An

alternative synthetic theory of coalition formation and duration is advanced. This theory
argues that coalitions need to be examined as the unit of analysis. Structural analysis
must take into consideration the competitiveness of the coalition system while event
analysis must distinguish between the type of events (external vs. internal). The theory
predicts coalitions’ structural formations and durations. It further provides aspects for
examining the ‘event aging thesis.’
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Two Competing Structural Models of Coalition Behavior; Size vs. Ideology
The tendency towards a practical rationalism in conduct is
common to all civic strata.8

The question concerning the formation of stable, effective, and durable coalitions
is a classical research investigation approached in much of the comparative political
literature. Research questions concerning coalitions have evolved into various sub-fields
and many competing traditions. Most analyses, however, have been primarily focused on
two important attributes of coalition making. The first considers the question of how
coalitions are formed and the factors responsible for the emergence of one type of
coalition rather than another. The second focuses on coalition duration and the variables
leading to alliance stability and effective policy outcomes (Warwick, 1979, 94).

These traditions draw their analyses based on party behaviors. The first view can
be labeled the Rational-Efficient model, where coalition formation and duration are
strictly associated with the rationality of parties achieving and holding power (Wright,
1971, pp. 17-54; Harsanyi, 1969). The rationality of coalition formation and duration in
this model is found to be quantitatively calculable. The calculation is simply based on
the net benefit of parties joining or leaving a coalition. The total benefit to all parties in a
coalition determines both formation and duration of the alliance. The rest of this model’s
analysis, focusing on coalition duration, lies in determining the cost and gains of each
party joining or remaining in a coalition.

Parties’ electoral seats, cabinet ministries,

budget allocation, and other political resources represent the rational benefit-cost basis

8 Max Webber in JJ.R. Thomas, “Ideology and Elective Affinity”, S ociology, Vol. 19, N o. 1, p. 40,
February, 1985.
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for calculating coalition formation and duration (Riker, 1962; Dodd, 1976, 84; Strom,
1984; Laver and Shepsle 1990, 96).

William Riker’s influential theory of formation was based on the assumption that
coalitions form as the outcome of zero-sum games calculations, especially by coalition
leaders. He describes such a theoretical model as follow:

In n-person, zero-sum games, w here side-payments are perm itted, where players are
rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions
occu r... In social situations similar to n-person, zero-sum games with side-payments,
participants create coalitions just as large as they believe will ensure winning and no larger
(Riker, 1962, p. 32).

In other words it is considered irrational in this formulation to pay more for a cabinet
alliance than is required to win in parliament, with costs considered in allocating benefits
to coalition partners. Therefore rational leaders supposedly tend not to include more
partners than minimally necessary for victory.

The second view of coalition formation is associated with the Ideological-Interest
model. This tradition primarily draws on the concept that parties reflect the political,
economic, or social interest of particular classes, groups, or cleavages in society (Lipset
and Rokhan, 1967; Axlerod, 1970; de Swaan 1973; Lipjhart, 1977; Warwick, 1979;
Baron, 1993; Dunleavy, 2001). From this perspective, parties’ decisions to join, defend,
or abort a coalition are closely linked with the momentum of social conflict and political
change. The significance of a cleavage or a class in political life determines coalition
behavior. Thus, cleavages and classes of similar interests tend to push their respective
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parties to politically bond in order to confront parties representing antagonistic programs.
(Axlerod, 1970)

Calculating interests involves numerous sets of quantitative and

qualitative variables.

However, most ideological-interest coalition researchers have

attempted to find policy variables as indicators of parties’ coalition cohesion. (Budge
1978, 90, 94; Baron 1993)

The core assumption of both these traditions considers the party as the main
unitary actor in the political system.

It is either the party’s electoral rationality or

ideological position that largely determines its political alignment. Coalitions emerge as
the final outcomes of the various partisan electoral configurations or ideological
associations.

“Most policy-driven coalition theories,” suggest Budge and Laver, “of

course, operate on the basis that both the coalition that forms and its polity are in some
predictable form the objectives of parties within the system.” (Budge, 1993, p.499). Or as
Sartori puts it, “parties make for a ‘system,’ then, only when they are parts (in the plural);
and a party system is precisely the system o f interactions resulting from inter-party
competition” (Sartori, 1976, p.44).

Serious reconsideration of both theoretical paradigms has been made through the
years. This was most evident in S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan’s effort to revise the theories.
In their famous study “Party Systems and Voter Alignments” (1967), Lipset and Rokkan
advance the thesis that the western Democratic Party system of the 1960s resembled the
same cleavage structure of the 1920s. Lipset and Rokhan established the view that both
national and industrial revolutions of the 19th Century continued to shape the ideological
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straggle of the 20th Century. Their study suggested the “freezing hypothesis” in which the
same ideological considerations continued to determine partisan conflict throughout the
post W W II era. The Lipset and Rokhan analysis implied that the party continues to act as
an ideological agent for its respective social cleavage, and this role has not changed. In
other words, Lipset and Rokhan’s asserted that ideology remains the prominent vehicle of
coalition politics and, in their view, it remained premature to support Riker’s theory of
party politics based strictly on rational opportunity.

Several studies have challenged the Lipset and Rokkan findings. Most notable is
the literature questioning the fundamental structure of the party system and its rationality.
Lipset and Rokkan’s critics revived the view, proposed by Otto Kirchheimer, which
suggested that the western political party system was in a process of transformation
(Kirchheimer, 1966). Kirchheimer considered that parties in western democracies were
moving further away from ideological traditions and were adopting opportunistic
electoral strategies. He found evidence for this claim in the rise of what he called the
“catch-all party” where winning votes becomes the essence of party strategy in the
political process.

Several other authors found support for this view, such as Mogens Pedersen who
suggested that electoral volatility in several countries is a proof of ideological
detachment. Pedersen concluded that ideological detachment and electoral volatility are
the consequence of the parties’ declining ideological commitment. Parties no longer
commit to ideological programs and voters no longer identify with particular parties
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(Pedersen, 1990; Mair, 1983). Kirchheimer and Pedersen’s theses implied that a party’s
ideology can no longer be taken as a determinant of a party’s behaviors and coalition
strategies. Their model suggests that a greater consideration must be given to electoral
opportunistic factors and that the Rational-Efficient model is best suited for coalition
analysis.

However, the Rational-Efficient model also failed to provide a fully satisfactory
account of parties’ coalition behaviors. Riker’s minimum winning coalition theme, for
example, could not explain many collective formations and “deformations”.

Early

studies by Michael Taylor and Michael Laver of twelve European countries between
1945 and 1971, as well as Abram De Swaan’s study of eight European democracies and
Israel between 1918 and 1972 found Riker’s theory of minimum winning formation to be
contradicted in most cases (De Swaan, 1973, Taylor and Laver, 1972). Also, Lipjhart
opposed Kirchheimer’s thesis on the basis that “parties’ policy preferences cannot be
ignored. This means that parties are not pure power maximizers” (Lipjhart, 1984, p.53).
In Israel, for instance, religious parties in the past defected from a minimum winning
coalition in protest to the Prime Minister’s attending a symbolic ceremony on the
Sabbath.

The consequence was a prioritization of ideological principles or symbolic

politics despite the significant loss to the religious parties of cabinet seats and political
power in the government. And contrary to Riker’s model many coalitions exceeded the
minimum winning number of seats. At least seventeen Israeli governments exceeded the
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minimum wining coalition conditions out of a total of twenty-eight governments.9 In
fact, contrary to Riker’s rational-efficient model, Lipjhart found that many oversized or
“grand” coalitions are often formed. Grand coalitions, according to Lipjhart, are usually
formed in plural societies as to accommodate the diverse societal cleavages (Lipjhart,
1984).

Yet, both Lipjhart, and later, Ronald Inglehart admitted to the weakening

ideological commitments in favor of “value based politics” that required less
comprehensive ideological identification (Lipjhart, 1984; Inglehart, 1987).

Bridging Rational and Ideological Paradigms in a Unified Structural Model
Attempts to bridge both ideological and rational explanations to parties’ coalition
behaviors have been made throughout the years.

Most notable was the early work

presented by De Swaan in 1973 in which both ideological and size variables were
combined in analyzing coalition formation. De Swaan examined coalition governments
in nine democratic countries, including Israel, between the period of 1918 and 1970. He
investigated 108 coalition formations while considering major factors contributing to
their establishment. De Swaan focused on whether the coalitions confine to the size
principle as proposed by Riker or to the policy-closeness position as suggested by
Axelrod. De Swaan predicted that coalitions form as minimum winning. However, He
hypothesized that minimum winning requirement is conditioned by ideological closeness
among partner parties. His study suggested that the minimum winning conditions can be
violated in favor of ideological closeness between partners. De Swaan implemented

9 See chapter 3 “M ethodologies and Measures” for Israeli governm ents’ share o f seats in the Knesset (Table
3,2) A minimum winning coalition is a government with the minimum number o f seats necessary for a
Knesset majority.
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COAL as a statistical analysis method in order to reveal the impact of both ideological
and size variables.

De Swaan’s findings denied the Riker principle’s exclusive

explanatory power in coalition formation. As he concluded, “all theories that ignore the
actors’ policy positions and only take their weight into account fail to produce significant
result...” (De Swaan, 1973, p. 150). At the same time, he found that “policy distant
theory.. .produces results that are significant at a level of 3.7%: not entirely sufficient to
accept, yet too good to reject the theory” (De Swaan, 1973, p. 153).

De Swaan suggested that a ‘close coalition proposition’ was the best explanatory
synthesis of coalition formation. A close coalition, according to De Swan, is the coalition
that prioritizes common policy objectives between partners while attempting to achieve
the minimum size formation. De Swaan considered such a proposition to represent a
theoretical improvement for its ability to incorporate both minimum-winning variables as
well as closed coalition version of policy distance.

Nonetheless, De Swaan’s model

implied greater weight to policy distance variables; his final conclusion states that
“parliamentary majority coalitions tend to be closed among the policy scale and, in times
of normalcy, of minimal range” (De Swaan, 1973, p. 159)'

Mark Franklin and Thomas T. Mackie also attempted to reassess the importance
of size and ideology in the formation of governing coalitions (Franklin and Mackie,
1984). In their assessment of past coalition research theories they found fault with
previously implemented methodologies.

Particularly they considered that the

assumption, universe, and statistical analyses implemented by past researchers have been
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responsible for generating contradictory results. Thus, and in an effort to reveal aspects
of reconciliation between the various theories, Franklin and Mackie attempted to replicate
past studies while joining the common universe of data that existed between the previous
research studies.

Additional weighting variables were given to different countries with

varying numbers of coalition formations and party strengths. Both ideological and size
variables were recoded as to maintain uniform coded variables across the various studies.
Finally, a multiple regression analysis was conducted as to assess the best explanatory
variables for coalition formation.

In their assessment of previous research, Franklin and Mackie suggested that most
studies that proposed ideological closeness as the essence of coalition formation have
adopted erroneous assumptions.

This was particularly the case because in studying

ideological or Minimum Connected Winning theories (MCW), researchers deleted from
their analysis single party coalitions and gave others disproportional weights relative to
their respective electoral strengths or made subjective sampling selections. When
Franklin

and Mackie

corrected these

problems they found that “ideological

connectedness, as operationalized by MCW, has no special edge except when restrictive
assumptions are made about what to count as a political party, when a particular
weighting strategy is employed, or when the universe of countries is restricted” (Franklin
& Mackie, 1984, p. 683).

Through their improved data and coding techniques the

analysis yielded the proposition that the additive combination of both ideology and size
provided better explanation to coalition formation. Contrary to De Swaan they found size
to be a more significant explanatory variable in coalition formation.

Nonetheless,
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Franklin and Mackie considered that the choice of country was the most significant
determinant of how either ideology or size was to be considered. They claimed to have
discovered, “that in some countries either ideology or size proves to be much more
powerful than in others,” and they proposed that “if we could discover what it is about
these countries that make them different, this might provide us with powerful additional
variables with which to attack the problem of predicting coalition formations” (Franklin
& Mackie, 1984, p. 688).

Reacting to parties’ changing ideological commitments, more recent research has
attempted to replace the theme of party ideological proximity with parties’ policy
programs. (Budge; 1993, 94)

These research programs have come to be closely

associated with the ‘Manifesto Project’ that aims at revealing from parties’ platform
policy indicators that, along with size considerations, policy positions orient coalition
outlooks.

Among recent work linking size and policy considerations to coalition

behavior has been that of Carol Mershon (1996, 2001) and Itai Sened (1996). Both
Mershon and Sened associated

policy and electoral strength to parties’ coalition

behaviors. Also, Martin Lanny and Randolph Stevenson provide an empirical approach
that bridges and evaluates both size and policy variables while taking into consideration
institutional variations (Martin & Stevenson, 2001).

The Stability (Duration) Structural Models of Coalitions
Mershon has advanced an approach with the aim of revealing the causes behind
what she describes as the situational coexistence of government instability and stability in
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postwar Italy until 1992. Mershon noted that most Italian cabinets lasted less than two
years in power, yet the leading parties in the various governments remained the same.
This situation prompted Mershon to ask the question of “how can governments break up
at such low cost and with so little effect on alternation?” Mershon’s inquiry led her to
suggest the following proposition:

I argue that the costs o f making, breaking, and maintaining coalitions depend on political institutions
and on the array o f parties and voters in policy space. Institutional and spatial conditions structure
politicians’ opportunities and attempts to lower costs. Under som e conditions ... coalitions are cheap,
and politicians can easily make coalitions even cheaper. (Mershon, 1996, p. 534).

Mershon’s measurement of coalitions’ costs and benefits were measured as both
office and electoral costs. Office costs were measured as the parties’ proportional share
of cabinet relative to their share of Parliament.

The cost of coalition formation and

maintenance can be high when parties’ percentage shares of cabinet were shown to be
lower than that of Parliament. Electoral costs and benefits of breaking coalitions, on the
other hand, were measured as “mean changes of parties’ share of the vote between pairs
of consecutive elections...” (Mershon, 1996, p. 539). Mershon also considered policybased costs associated with coalitions’ formation, breaking and maintaining.

She

suggested that policy payoffs, indexed by participation in government, indicate policy
influence being gained or lost by parties.

After measuring the costs associated with the existence of Italian coalitions
Mershon revealed evidence supporting her proposition. She found that Italy’s coalitions
are costly to sustain, yet their formation and dissolution cause little damage. This
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conclusion was manifest in short-lived cabinets that at the same time closely resembled
incumbent governments. Mershon finally claimed to have found evidence that “particular
spatial and institutional conditions in Italy curbed the costs of assembling and
dismantling coalitions and encouraged strategies that lowered costs further” (Mershon,
1996, p. 549).

Similar to Mershon, Itai Sened proposed a theoretical model that “synthesizes the
office and policy approaches to coalition formation...” (Sened, 1996, p. 351). Sened’s
strategy was based on measuring the payoffs a party gets when joining a coalition.
According to Sened, these payoffs were “the distance between the government’s position
and the party’s ideal point in the policy-space and the share of the office-related payoffs
the party receives as a member of the government in oj^?ce”(Sened, 1996, p. 352). And
Sened hypothesized that coalition agreements are often reached as the trade between
“office-related side payments for policy compromises and vise versa” (Sened, 1996, p.
352). Sened’s model suggested the existence of a “structurally stable core (SSC)” where a
stable coalition is often formed after equilibrium between policy and office side payments
is reached.

Sened demonstrated his model by taking the formation of Israeli coalitions after
1992 election as evidence. First, Sened used parties’ manifestos and official publications
about the parties’ positions on different issues. He established policy space scales based
on two most salient issues in Israeli politics as revealed by Arian and Shamir’s public
opinion surveys: religion and security. After conducting factor analysis of ruling
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coalitions’ parties’ positions he constructed two Likert scales and plotted the core
position of parties on a policy space. Likewise, the position of the government was
plotted after coding Prime Minister’s presentations of the governments’ speeches. The
parties’ share of the Knesset was integrated into the plot. His comparison to different
time periods revealed that between 1948 and 1973 Labor captured an SSC position
resulting in a stable government. This situation was changed between 1977-1988 having
an empty SSC and resulting in unstable government. But following the election of 1992,
the Labor party was able to recapture the SSC position.

Synthetic Structural and Event Models of Coalition Behavior: Competing
Perspectives
The ideological (policy) and rational (size) debates suggest that the party’s
coalition behavior is neither purely ideological nor purely rational. The Mershon and
Sened studies suggest that a synthesis of both factors, perhaps conceptualized in policy
space, shapes party political behavior in coalitions. However, Mershon and Sened share
the same core assumptions as previous research. Particularly, they also adopt the view
that a party’s rationality or policy position is the sole basis for coalition behavior.
Mershon suggested that parties needed to be treated as unitary actors (Mershon, 1996,
539). Similar to previous research, contemporary work attempts to solve the theoretical
difficulties of predicting coalition behavior while relying on factors exclusively
associated with party characteristics.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

33
Since Kirchheimer it has become evident that the party is not a solitary agent, but
directly influenced by the changing political environment (see also Lipjhart, 1984 and
Ingelhart, 1987). The consequence is that parties become more submerged in unlikely
alliances where neither ideological nor rational interpretations are exclusively or even
jointly able to explain the phenomenon. Alliances between ideological opposites, such as
religious and left parties in Israel often generated strong and lasting coalitions.10 Other
coalitions in Israel have conformed to the minimum-winning model, while still others
tend toward the maximum winning model while having extended survival rates (Table
3.2).

Generally, the structural models in both ideological and rational versions have
continued to generate varying and often conflicting results. Theories aiming to predict
coalition formation have struggled to assert determining variables such as size or policy.
Furthermore, this debate has yielded different visions of which formation leads to a stable
or enduring partnership.

Anomalies, such as Israeli coalition behaviors, continue to

challenge the structuralists’ core assumptions. This matter was a reason for the rise of a
competing model with primary objective of explaining coalitions’ duration using
alternative explanatory variables.

Browne, Frenderis, and Gleiber (1984, 86,88) suggest that structural theories fail
to account for important variables that determine coalition behaviors. They propose that
the structure of the political system is subject to continuous pressure by randomly

10 This is best explained by W ebber’s “elective affinity” concept that he used in explaining the
submergence o f capitalist rationalism and Protestant ethics in the rise o f m odem capitalism.
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occurring events that, subsequently, determine the behaviors of the coalitions. In their
analysis of government durability they proposed a “...mathematical model of
governmental dissolution in which duration is solely a function of the appearance of
random events which trigger governmental collapse” (Frendreis, Gleiber, and Browne
1986, p.624) and found that “...stochastic elements are important, if not dominant, in
determining the downfall of cabinet governments” (Browne, Frendreis, and Gleiber,
1986, p. 644).

The Browne, Frenderis, and Gleiber studies suggested that regardless of how
efficient or well structured the coalition; events will continue to exert tremendous
pressure on the partners leading to its coalitional aging and eventually death. Unforeseen
wars, flow of refugees, economic crises, scandals, etc... are events that guarantee the
destruction of the best-structured coalition.

Critics of the “Event” model, however, point to the “unrealism” of ruling out
structural variables (Warwick, 1992). Warwick suggested that while events may have
significant impact on government stability, structural variables hold important
determinant power when events are controlled for (Warwick, 92, p. 875). He protested
the totality of the event model since “...to expunge causal factors from the analysis
totally - to treat durations as purely a function of random outside events - seems even
more unrealistic. If British governments normally remain in power longer than their
Italian counterparts...is surely due in part to systematic differences between the two...
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not simply because British governments face fewer or less difficult events” (Warwick,
1992, p. 875).

The “event” theories marked a turning point in the study of coalition behaviors.
As Warwick observed, however, their totality was problematic, and unifying them
appeared urgent. Robertson along Warwick and various authors took on this task. In
linking event to structure, Warwick established causality between economic indicators
and government stability (Warwick, 1992).

Similarly, Robertson suggested that the

economy is an important determinant of structural behaviors (Roberston, 1983; 1984).
Robertson examined the effect of rising prices and the loss of jobs on seventy-seven
coalitions in six European democracies (Robertson, 1983). His study establishes a linkage
between the structure and the outside economic environment, and suggests that “the
tenure of undersized and minimum winning coalitions is substantially and significantly
shortened by unemployment, while oversized coalitions are free from the effects of either
inflation or unemployment” (Robertson, 1983, p. 932). Not only did Robertson measure
the impact of the economy on government stability, but also attempted to examine such
impact on its formation (Robertson, 1986).

He proposed that economic pressure

contributes to the formation of oversized coalition, while the absence of economic
pressure fosters the formation of MWCs (Robertson, 1986, p. 533).

Finally, King established a unified statistical model that combined both “event”
and “structural” models in analyzing the durability of coalitions (King, Alt, Bums, and
Laver 1990).

King’s model combines recognition of stochastic element in cabinets’
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dissolution while establishing systematic predictable factors for governments’ durability.
The model permits the use of standard statistical methods in integrating both types of data
(event and structural).

In its turn, the unified model presents some problems in the literature. These
problems are associated with the questions of which event(s) should be considered most
critical in determining coalition behaviors? Are there patterns to these events in their
impacts on structural behaviors or is each event unique in its implication(s) as a historian
may suggest? Despite various efforts to address these questions (Laver, Shepsle, 1998),
they continued to require more rigorous analytical solutions. Laver and Shepsle argued
that the different government formations (in game-theoretical model) provide ground for
variation in impacts of “exogenous” shocks. They further suggest that the impact of
these shocks may weigh on the durability of the government (Laver, Shepsle, 1998,
1999). David Baron extended the research so as to account for various shocks, namely
government incomes and resources, on government formation, reformations, and
terminations (Baron, 1998). Last, but not least, was the work provided by Diermeir and
Stevenson in which they found support to the increasing hazard rate over government life
hypothesis (Diermeir and Stevenson, 1999).

Bernard Grofman and Peter Roozendaal present us with the most up-to-date
attempt to account and weight for both structural and event variables (Grofman,
Roozentaal, 1997). Roozendaal also suggests that the impact of both structural and event
variables on government durability can be summed in five categories:
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characteristics of party strength in the legislature; attributes of the government; overall
ideological structure of party competition; institutional features of the political process;
event: factors external to the legislature and government,(Roozendaal, 1997).

In the following section an attempt is made to develop a theoretical model that
synthesizes the structural (in both its ideological and size components) with the event
model (both external and internal events). The combined theoretical model will examine
a wide range of variables that account for structural restrains on parties’ behaviors; thus
avoiding to take parties as unitary free players, an assumption typical of most research.
Two structural restraining variables will be introduced: coalition ideological parameter,
coalition competition. As for event, the model will set the distinctions between important
event variables that impact coalition behaviors differently (internal vs. external events).
In addition, the synthesized model will provide a complete analysis of coalition behaviors
using time-dependent variables, thus allowing examination of coalition formation,
duration, and aging.

Finally, the model will provide a first step analysis toward

integrating comprehensive comparative coalition data from other countries to those of
Israel.

Unifying the Structural and Event Models
The Size and Ideological Parameters of Coalition Systems
Theory needs to sum up the various historical cases within a com prehensive analytical
framework. The objective o f the theory is to be able to identify and sort out the various causal
patterns associated with particular historic outcomes. Thus, it accounts for the differences in
the various historic outcomes. (George, 1969)
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Strom, Budge, and Laver point to an important fallacy in most coalition literature:
taking for granted the political party as a unitary free player in the political system
(Strom, Budge, Laver, 1994; also Laver and Garry, 2000). The question that needs to be
addressed is not only to what extent parties act ideologically, pragmatically or rationally
within a coalition but also the extent to which their actions are determined by the nature
of the existing coalition itself. While elaborate research has attempted to answer the first
question, in this study we suggest that coalition analysis should also consider the
characteristics and processes

o f the coalition itself, such as its

size, underlying

ideology, strength o f competing or challenger coalition (s), and the surrounding foreign
and domestic events. It is from this perspective that parties ’ coalition behaviors are often
derived.

The theoretical suggestion made here is that parties’ ideological closeness in
coalitions should be analyzed under evolving coalition rules. While subject

to

ideological or policy restraints, parties are willing to make rational calculations in order
to form and maintain coalitions. These calculations often violate ideological purity or
size principles and deviate from inter-party ideological proximity under the pretext of
political necessity. This violation usually takes place while forming a coalition between a
dominant party and “volatile” parties, i.e.,

parties that can potentially defect to an

ideologically opposite coalition (Baron, 1991). Mutual political needs force ideological
concessions.

As a consequence, new ideological parameters are established within

which all partners in a coalition can be contained.

Theoretically these ideological

parameters are set outside every party’s ideological core, yet they satisfy the best possible
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coalition outcome and the closest feasible ideological perspective relative to the dominant
party (Baron, 1991; Sened, 1996).

Thus, coalition theory must discover ideological parameters for potential coalitions
that account not only for ideological proximity but also for ideological differences among
coalitions’ constituents, and also account for political circumstances that cause conditions
of unlikely ideological bedfellows. These ideological parameters are thought to rank
among the primary determinants of parties’ behaviors in an alliance. The ideal coalition
is one that can set the most common ideological denominators among the parties and
establish a tight ideological or policy program, thus making parties’ participation in the
coalition consistent with their principles and more feasible to defend and maintain. A
realistic coalition under urgent electoral or political pressure, however, stretches its
parameters to accommodate opposing points of view of the various parties.

Thus,

parties’ participation in the coalition can become more costly and difficult to maintain
and defend.

This study suggests that there must be an interactive relationship between
pragmatic rationality and ideological parameters. (Sened, 1996; Mershon, 1996, 2001).
The proposition is that within a coalition a direct relationship exists between ideological
parameters and rational-efficiency that influences party behavior.

The ideal model

suggests that narrower ideological parameters result in the best rational outcomes that can
be produced through a small sized or “minimum winning” coalition (Riker, 1962). The
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pragmatic/realistic model, on the other hand, proposes that larger ideological parameters
may become necessary to accommodate a larger coalition.

The ideal model can be applied during periods of relatively low political pressure,
or whenever a coalition can be established without serious challenges from opposition
parties to form an alternative ruling alliance (predominant-coalition system) (Sartori, 67;
Elazar & Sandler, 90). The realistic model, on the other hand, can best be applied under
conditions of political pressure or to situations where the threat of the opposition forming
an alternative coalition is real (competitive-coalition system) (Sartori, 67; Elazar &
Sandler, 90). The consequence is that parties’ behaviors within a coalition-system are
determined by taking into consideration the competitiveness aspect of the coalition and
its surrounding political environment.

It was Arend Lipjhart who provided a similar rationale for the formation of
coalition-systems. Lijphart argued that nations that are politically homogenous tend to
produce a Westminster model for coalition formation. This coalition model, according to
Lipjhart, is characterized by its maximum efficiency and minimum winning formation.
Societies that are heterogeneous or plural, on the other hand, favor a consensus coalition
system characterized by the formation of grand sized alliances (Lijphart, 1984).
Lipjhart’s models are applied in this study to the ‘plurality of the parliamentary
coalitions’ rather than to society per se.

Whenever a plurality of possible coalition

formations is present, or competitiveness is high, we consider the consensus or even
preemptive (i.e., keep partners away from the competition) as the realistic model.
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Otherwise, the Westminster or the ‘ideal’ tight and minimum winning model is most
applicable.

In the formation process, and before the establishment of the coalition, the
weaknesses of parties’ ideological commitments make coalitions easier to establish.
Ideological constraints or parameters generate defined possibilities of various coalition
configurations. Potential coalitions can be determined relative to each country’s political
spectrum, such as having left-religious, right-religious, left-right, or left-right-religious
potential alliances, with each having a corresponding ideological parameter.11 Thus when
forming coalitions, ideological parameters are likely to be stretched whenever the size of
the coalition is enlarged or diversified. A party’s rational calculus in joining or abstaining
largely depends on such a structural combination.

If the seats controlled by the parties allow for potentially more than one winning
coalition configuration (realistic or competitive model), then competition can be fierce
between dominant parties to win volatile parties or parties that can be swayed to switch
coalition ranks. Under high competition, ideological parameters are thus stretched to
accommodate for diversity and larger size coalitions. In contrast, the absence of potential
winning competing coalition configurations relieves dominant parties of attracting
ideologically distant or opposite partners, making ideological concessions unnecessary
while predictably reducing the number of partners (Table 2.1). The presence or absence
of potential winning competing coalition is determined based on the relative size of the
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dominant parties and their respective capacities to form winning majorities in alliance
with other partners. Hypothetically, as long as no party controls a majority of the seats in
Parliament more than one winning coalition is possible to form. Yet, whenever the size
of the dominant party approaches that of majority seats the potential for competitors to
form winning coalitions decline (See chapter 3 for definitions and measures).

Table 2.1: Probability of Coalition Formation under Competition
Competitiveness

Coalition Size

Ideoloaical Parameter

High

Large

Wide

Low

Small

Tight

The same rationale that governs coalition formation determines parties’ behavior
within a coalition after its inception. In this study, we are further interested in parties’
behaviors contributing to coalition’s duration. Therefore, among our objectives is to
reveal factors leading to or preventing party’s defection from a coalition.

Combining both rational and ideological perspectives, this study implies that
parties’ behaviors within a coalition depend on the cost associated with participation. In
the best possible outcomes, if both size and ideological costs for participation in a
coalition are low, then probability of parties’ defection is also very low.

If the

ideological cost of alliance is low but accommodation is made in limiting the size of the
coalition, then the overall cost is endurable and parties’ probability of defection is low or

11 For ways parties are ideologically classified see Gabel, Matthew and Hubber, John, “Putting Parties in
Their Place: Inferring Party Left-Right Ideological Positions from Party M anifestos Data”, Am erican
Journal o f P olitical Science, V ol. 44, No. 1, pp. 9 4 -1 0 3 ,2 0 0 0 .
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moderate. By the same token, if the size of the coalition is large but accommodation is
made in limiting ideological parameters, the cost of participation is also endurable and
the probability of defection low or moderate.
increase and coalition stability is threatened.
further

demonstration

that

the

nature

Otherwise, defection possibility can

The confirmation of this rationalism is a
of the

coalition

(size,

ideology,

and

competitiveness) can to a large extent determine party behavior. Of course, factors such
as available and competitive alternative coalitions and dominant parties will also affect
these calculations.

Accounting for Effects of “Competition” in Coalition Behaviors
It has been previously suggested that the presence or absence of potentially
alternative coalition configurations reshape both ideological parameters and coalition
size. The increased potential of challenging coalitions theoretically increases the risk of
defection by centrist and minor parties.

Coalition competition forces ideological

moderation in order to accommodate the various members within the alliance that
includes potential defectors.

The result is a large accommodating coalition with

ideologically stretched parameters. These considerations also thereby are likely to affect
the duration of the government.

The coalition leader tries to minimize the risk of

defections as a consequence of having ideologically unaccommodating parameters,
thereby seeking to preclude unstable short duration governments.

This effort to

accommodate more partners, however, can run into difficulties as the partners themselves
seek to exact greater “side payments” or concessions for staying in the coalition. Thus,
the probability of being able to satisfy everyone would appear to go down with time.
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In contrast, the situation is reversed when the presence potential challenging
coalitions are reduced. While dominant parties still require the support of center and
volatile parties to form ruling coalitions, the threat of their defection is not serious.
Dominant party’s ability to substitute small sized parties without fearing a total
overthrow makes ideological tightness feasible if not a requirement for partnership.
Furthermore, since the dominant party is not in an immediate threat from a challenger,
the party is not pressured to enlarge the coalition partnership or to make serious policy or
ideological concessions. Under these circumstances, smaller size and tighter ideological
parameters theoretically extend coalition duration.

This discussion implies that coalition duration is largely determined by the cost
parties are willing to pay while considering the size and ideological parameter of the
coalition and the alternatives they perceive in rival potential coalitions (these might be
perceived as opportunity costs). The absence of potential challenging coalitions makes
the existing coalition more cost effective. It could be concluded from such a model,
therefore, that under conditions of coalition competition and high cost the difficulty of
maintaining accommodating alliances grows and government duration becomes shorter
than under circumstances where competition is absent and partners can be shed without
fear of lost power. The presence of a potential challenging coalition that could attract the
centrist and volatile parties, and the high or increasingly unacceptable price for
maintaining the current coalition, destabilizes it and shortens its life span. In contrast, the
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absence of a coalition challenge reduces the cost associated with maintaining the
coalition and would appear to maximize its duration.12

According to Mershon, however, the cost calculations must take into consideration
not only maintaining the coalition but also the cost associated with its termination
(Mershon, 1996, 2001). Mershon suggested that there are cheap coalitions and more
expensive ones. Cheap coalitions can be discarded and easily replaced by the dominant
party, while others are indispensable.

Mershon’s model provides significant

implications for coalition duration. Applying her model to the cases where coalition
competition is high suggests that a higher cost must be paid for dismantling coalitions
than under conditions of low competition, since the dominant party would risk losing
governance to the challenging alliance.13 This risk forces the dominant party to make the
most concessions possible in order to maintain and perpetuate its ruling alliance. In
contrast, the absence of coalition competition makes alliances relatively cheap and
replaceable. The dominant party grows intolerant and easily willing to dismantle and
form alternative coalitions.

Thus as a rival hypothesis, and contrary to the view of

Grofman and Roozendaal, it might be expected that coalition competition contributes to
longer coalition duration.

Furthermore, applying Lipjhart and later Mershon’s thesis suggests that the
existence of political pressure (coalition competition) forces ongoing coalitions to take
12 G rofm an and Van Roozendaal, “Toward a Theoretical E xplanation o f Premature Cabinet Termination’,
hypothesized that the greater num ber o f feasible alternative coalitions, the less durable, on average, will be
the present coalition. European Journal o f P olitical Research, 26, 1994, pp. 155-70.
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extreme measures to guarantee their duration. That is, coalitions are more likely to form
accommodating the largest possible partnership. Therefore, it is expected that under the
condition o f com petition coalitions are likely to form having wide ideological parameters
and large size partnership.

It is also likely that coalitions with larger size and wider

ideological param eter w ill be form ed often jeopardizing their durability. On the other

hand, the absence of coalition competition reduces the ideological and political cost of
ousting coalition partners, since every smaller partner is replaceable. Smaller participants
would have to abide by the narrowness of the coalition’s ideological parameters and
platform or risk a forced withdrawal from the coalition. Therefore, under these
circumstances - the absence o f coalition competition - it is expected that coalitions
w ould be fo rm ed having narrow ideological param eters and sm all-sized partnership. It

is expected that the absence of coalition competition would in general reduce the
durability of the coalitions. Yet, the tighter is the ideology and the smaller is the coalition
(the more efficient) the more durable it is expected to be (Figure 2.1).14

Accounting for “events” in Coalition’s Behaviors
Thus far we have considered the structural impact on coalition behaviors. What
remains is the “event” variable that has been widely seen as important factor shaping the
coalition system and duration in particular (Frendreis, Gleiber, and Browne, 1984,86,88;
King, 1990, Warwick 1992).

13 See chapter 3 “M ethodologies and Measures” for a further discussion o f how leaders o f dominant parties
in Israel are named to form governments.
14 Through a multiple linear regression analysis the association o f every independent variable with the
dependent variable can be calculated, while controlling for other variables.
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As has been noted in literature review, the unified model, while resolving major
anomalies in the structural theories, introduces new challenges to coalition theories.
These challenges are related to the issue of “weighting” events as they impact the
structure. The question is whether a general theory is possible to establish, factor, and
predict “event” impact on coalition structure whenever it occurs. While efforts have been
made to meet challenges, particularly in the later work of Laver and Shepsly (1998) and
through their debate with Warwick, major obstacles remain.15

Whether event or structure is a more significant factor in the process of coalition
formation and maintenance is disputable. Lupia and Strom (1995) analyzed the various
structural ‘legislative and electoral’ constraints as well as event ‘exogenous shock’
variables on coalition termination. They found evidence that decision to terminate the
coalition “result from the party leaders’ rational responses to the constraints of legislative
and electoral institutions and the anticipated feelings of the electorate” (Lupia and Strom,
1995, p. 648). Lupia and Strom thus undermined the ‘event’ in favor of ‘structural’
variables and electoral politics. Diermeier and Stevenson’s work, on the other hand, is a
further effort to resolve the anomaly between both the structure and event models (1999).
Their study reaffirms earlier hypotheses that events become more hazardous as the life of
a government is prolonged (1999). Thus, they establish distinctions between earlier and
later weight of events on structural formation and termination.

They conclude that

15 See Warwick’s response to Laver and Shepsle. Warwick, P. “Getting the Assumptions Right: A Reply to
Laver and Shepsle”, British Journal o f Political Science, V ol. 29, No. 2, pp. 4 0 2 -4 1 2 ,1 9 9 9 . A lso Laver
and Shepsle’s response. Laver, M., Shepsle, K. “Government Formation and Survival: A Rejoinder to
Warwick’s Reply” British Journal o f Political Science, V ol. 29, N o. 2, pp. 412-415, 1999.
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coalitions a re more capable structurally in handling the challenges o f earlier events in
their life, but less so as they age.

This study adopts Diermeier and Stevenson’s hypotheses; however, it suggests that
a major issue remains unresolved. While accounting for government aging, the question
is which events matter most in structural formation, duration, and aging? Research is still
in its early stage in accounting for various ‘event’ variables.

Nevertheless

‘event’

variables appear to deepen the divisions in structural frameworks, but the impact of
external conflicts on coalition durability can vary across time and between political
systems, such as in Britain as opposed to Germany, Japan, or Israel. Likewise if we
consider domestic discontent with government conduct or the outbreak of political
scandals, their impact may vary considerably in the coalition systems from one country to
another.

When it comes to religious issues, for example, Israeli and Lebanese governments
are sometimes extremely sensitive and the implications of religious related action can
immediately determine the fate of a particular coalition at a particular moment. At least
five Israeli coalition governments collapsed as a direct consequence of disputes between
partners over religious issues, policies, and events.16

In France the coalition system is

generally less sensitive to changes in ‘religious events’ compared to the flow of
im m igration

into the country, another event variable that presents a major distinction in

impact on coalition behavior. Israel, Canada, and Australia have either consistently or at

16 See Table 3_1 under ‘End R eason’ o f coalition. Information was com piled from K eesing Contemporary
Archives.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

49

times striven to attract immigrants, and the inflow may prove stabilizing to coalitions,
while the same event(s) may emerge as troubling for coalitions in France, Japan or
Germany where immigration has been a more divisive political issue. Thus, what was
presented by Lijphart as a ‘structural model’ of coalition systems may prove insufficient
in light of politically charged policies or events.17

This line of reasoning suggests that it is premature for ‘event’ research to conduct a
general analysis before making the necessary distinction between the various ‘events’
driven coalition systems. But how is it possible that a theoretical distinction be advanced
in this domain? In this study we propose that first a “country” analysis effort is required
before a general clustering of coalition systems is made. In other words, research must
focus on gathering event-structure variation data in separate democracies as a step toward
system categorization and conclusively a general coalition theory.
appears as a starting point for event theory building.

The case study

18

The theoretical contribution of this study, therefore, is to provide an examination of
whether a distinction exists between ‘internal-domestic events’ and ‘external-foreign
events’ and their interactive influence on the structural behaviors of coalitions in one
specific democracy.

Recognizing Israel’s unique geo-cultural situation and tradition,

using Israel as a case study and implementing comparative analysis between the various

17 Lijphart distinguished between two structural coalition m odels. One is typical o f nations that are
politically homogenous (Westminster model) and the second is established by societies that are
heterogeneous or plural (Consensual model) (Lijphart, 1984). Each o f these m odels provides distinct
coalition formations.
18 See Hary Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in F.I. Greenstein and N.W . Polsby,
eds., Handbook o f Political Science, Vol. 7, (Reading, MA: A ddison-W esley), pp. 7 9 -1 3 8 ,1 9 7 5 .

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

50
Israeli cabinets we identify ‘internal and extemal-event’ variables’ impact on coalition
behavior.

Early theorization was made by J. Robertson in order to account for intemalevents’ impact on coalition formation (Robertson, 1986). Robertson’s study suggested
that minimum-sized coalitions are usually formed under conditions free from economic
“event pressure.” In his analysis, event pressure refers to the situation of economic stress
resulting in the increase of inflation and unemployment. Such a pressure is considered
polarizing because it instigates greater divisions between the socio-political strata within
the country. Oversized coalitions, on the other hand, are likely to form under conditions
of domestic economic pressure.

In other words, Roberston’s study theorizes that

‘dom estic pressures’ press coalition toward consensualism and therefore larger size
structural formation.

The Robertson thesis has ideological-structural implications,

suggesting that ‘domestic pressures ’ force coalition toward consensualism and therefore
wider-ideological agendas. Furthermore, according to our earlier logic, maintaining the

coalition under condition of domestic pressures appears pressing though potentially
relatively

difficult

and

costly;

‘Dom estic

pressu res’ push

coalitions

toward

consensualism and therefore stability and durability, though with lower overall durability
than when such pressures do not exist.

The question remains whether extemal-events have similar impact on coalition
formation and duration. Can a hypothesis be established that ‘external pressu res’, such
as external conflict (-) and foreign aid (+), press coalition tow ard consensualism and
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therefore larger size structural formation and wider ideological agendas? Furthermore,
can it be maintained that 'external pressures ’ push coalition toward consensualism and
therefore stability and durability that could have otherwise been greatly undermined? To
answer these questions we develop and examine a synthetic structural-event model of
coalition formation and duration.

A Synthetic Structural-Event Model of Coalition Formation and Duration
A.

Coalition Formation Model: Predicting Size and Ideological Parameter

Coalition competition determines conditions of cabinet formation.

Parties’

rationality in forming alliances is mostly based on the calculation of relative party
strength in parliament or system competitiveness. Equally important are the political
conditions of the country both externally and internally. Parties must weigh domestic and
foreign political pressures to establish the consequences of particular formation. These
conditions (independent variables) as they relate to the dependent variable and
particularly to duration are shown in Figure 2.5.

Hypothesis 1: High coalition competition presses toward wide-ideological parameter
and large-sized cabinets (Figure 2.1).

This research predicts that coalition competition can be captured in the relative
power index of dominant party to form winning coalitions. The increase in the power
index of a dominant party to form winning coalitions indicates a decrease in the ability of
rival coalitions to form. Thus, whenever the dominant party’s power index increases
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competition decreases.19 Ideological parameter is defined as the ideological distance
between dominant party and the coalition’s policy objectives (See Chapter 3 for
definition and measure). Coalition size is defined as the number of seats partner parties
control in the Knesset.

Again the logic of Hypothesis 1 flows from our discussion of ‘cost analysis’
thesis advanced by Mershon (1996, 2001).

The high cost to the dominant party of

defection under competition requires the formation of accommodating grand and
ideologically wide coalitions. Alternatively the decline of coalition competition provides
the dominant party with a different strategy and more options for alliance formation.
Thus, dominant parties afford the formation of efficient alliance keeping both policies
and side-payments to a minimum. Therefore, as coalition competition declines, it is
preferable for a dominant party with the absence of a challenger to form a minimum
winning tight durable ruling alliance. (Figure 2.1).

Hypothesis 2: Domestic and Foreign E vents’ pressure generates dom estic pressure on
coalitions toward consensualism and therefore large form ation and wide ideological
param eter (Figure 2.1).

19 S ee Chapter 3 “M ethodologies and Measures” for further discussion, definition, and measures.
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Figure 2.1; Coalition Formation Linear Synthetic Model

Ideological
Parameter
Formation
Parliamentary
Competitiveness

Event
Coalition Size
Formation

Events’ pressures considered are either domestic or external. Domestic events
which put pressure on the political system are: economic; such as decline in GDP annual
rate, increase in annual strikers and strikes, and increase in annual unemployment rate; or
social, such as increase in annual immigration rate. External events are captured in terms
of annual increase in the severity of external conflict and in the decline of foreign aid
receipts or prospects (Figure 2.2).

The logic of these hypotheses flows from our previous discussion, which suggested
that ‘event pressure’ creates conditions of consensualism and therefore expanded or
grand alliances. For example, external conflicts often unify loyal and opposition groups
against foreign threat. Internal ideological differences become less significant relative to
the gain of having more unity in coalitions of grand size. The null hypotheses, however,
may indicate that ‘event pressure’ intensifies the divergence in policy positions, thus
excreting pressure toward smaller and narrower alliances as it becomes more difficult and
ultimately infeasible to bridge the ideological or policy preference gaps in forming
governments.
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Figure 2.2% Internal and External Event Pressure Impact on Structural Formation

Internal Event Pressure
Annual change Increase in % GDP (-)
Annual % of Unemployment (+'
Annual % o f# of strikers per strike (+)
Annual % of immigrants per population (+)
External Event Pressure
Annual Severity of External Conflict (+)
Annual Foreign Aid (-)

Internal Event Pressure
Annual change increase in % GDP (-)
Annual % of Unemployment (+)'
Annual % of # of strikers per strike (+)
Annual % of immigrants per population (+)

deological
Parameter

External Event Pressure
Annual Severity of External Conflict (+)y
Annual Foreign Aid (-)
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B. Coalition Duration Model
Coalition’s durability appears fundamentally to be a function of two primary factors:
a, event and b. structure. In other words, a coalition would last longer in power if it was
most efficiently formed around a small sized and ideologically similar core (reducing
defection) while taking into consideration both systematic and event factors at hand. As
has been discussed in the literature there has been increasing interest in this theoretical
area, particularly after the introduction of event variables (Lupia and Strom, 1995; Laver,
Shepsle, 1998, 1999; Baron, 1998; Diermeir and Stevenson, 1999; Martin and Stevenson,
2001; Grofman and Roozentaal, 1997; Roozentaal 1998; Sened 1996; Mershon 1996,
2001).

In order to determine both event and structural variables we need to control for the
‘aging theme’ as advocated by Laver and Shepsle (1998) as well as by Diermeir and
Stevenson (1999). It is suggested that ‘coalitions are more capable structurally to the
challenges of earlier events in their life, but less so as they age’ (Laver & Shepsle 98;
Diermeir & Stevenson 99).

Controlling for ‘aging’ is possible by examining and

comparing first year events and structural impacts on duration and those in later years
after formation. Again the rational argument proposed that coalitions that are efficiently
formed would be more durable than those that violate efficiency formation as proposed in
previous discussion (Warwick, 1992).
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Hypothesis 3: Increase in events’ pressure yields short coalition durations (Figure 2.2).
Yet the im pact o f increasing event pressure is most significant in shortening the duration
o f coalitions a s they age. Again events considered are external and domestic and their

impact on coalition duration is demonstrated in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3: Interna! and External Event Pressure Impact on Coalition Duration

Internal Event Pressure
Annual change increase in % GDP (+)
Annual % of Unemployment (-)
Annual % of # of strikers per strike (-)

Duration

Annual % of immigrants per population (-)
External Event Pressure
Annual Severity of External Conflict (-)
Annual Foreign Aid (+)

The null hypothesis will confirm that event pressure presses toward greater
consensualism and therefore longer duration. For example, external war or conflict may
provide reasons for the various political groups to set ideological differences aside and
align together against foreign threats.

Such a situation may prolong government life

rather than shortening it.

Coalition competition also is an important structural variable to consider in
durational analysis. As has been advanced by Mershon’s argument we examine the thesis
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that coalitions are more valuable to dominant parties to maintain or costly to lose at
higher levels of competition. Contrary to Grofman and Roozendaal (1997), under
competition dominant parties will make significant concessions and efforts to maintain
the coalition and not risk losing power in favor of a rival alliance. Alternatively, when
competition declines the risk of dismantling and forming a coalition is reduced, so is the
expected duration of the ruling alliance.

Hypothesis 4: Increase in coalition competition contributes to long coalition durations
(Figure 2.4).

Alternatively, the null hypothesis would suggest that increase in competition
increase the incentives for partners to break away for greater rewards by joining
alternative coalition and therefore shorten duration.

In addition to competition, coalition’s size and ideological parameter are
significant structural variables that impact durability.

Adopting the efficiency model

suggests that the best formation is the least costly in term of policy concessions or size of
side-payments.

Efficiency implies that minimum-tight coalition is the most lasting

coalition while maximum-wide coalition is the least durable.

Hypothesis 5: Wide ideological param eter shortens coalition duration (Figure 2.4).
Hypothesis 6: Large size coalition shortens coalition its respective duration (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4; Coalition Formation and Duration; Linear Synthetic Model

Ideological
Parameter
Formation

Event Pressure

Duration

Competitiveness

Size Formation

Summary;

A Structural-Event Synthetic Model of Coalition Formation and

Duration

In sum, coalition literature has struggled to construct theoretical models
predicting coalition behaviors and outcomes.

Most significant were two competing

paradigms rationalizing coalition formation and duration: the ideological policy-interest
and the rational-efficiency models. The first expressed the party as a representative of a
particular group of people struggling to achieve policy or philosophical objectives.
Within this framework coalitions tend to form between ideologically close parties with
similar objectives and policy intentions.

The second view presented the party as an

electoral opportunist agency which aims to achieve maximum gains in the electoral
process and through the ruling coalition. From this perspective, coalitions form in order
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to achieve the maximum possible collective benefit that no single party can accomplish
alone. Excessive or unnecessary payments diminish these returns.

Both competing paradigms are found somewhat lacking. The ideological-interest
model has been considerably weakened due to the prospect of “catch-all-party”
phenomena. Literature, particularly after the post-War II era, points toward weakening
party identification and broadening voters’ volatility in many countries. 20 Parties have
become less doctrinaire and more vaguely positioned in order to attract voters. On the
other hand, rational-efficient model literature failed to explain seemingly irrational
patterns in coalition formations around the world.

The occasional lack of minimum

winning coalitions in various ruling governments provides serious opposition to this
model.

In this study, it is suggested that the problem with the literature can be found in
party analysis. Each approach builds on the party’s rationality basis for coalition
formulation and maintenance.

Alternatively, for purposes of explaining seeming

anomalies in existing theory, this study attempts to analyze the coalition on its own terms.
First, the parties in the coalitions are not treated as pure unitary rational or ideological
agents. Rather, the parties are studied within the context of an overall ideological and
rational coalition system, tending toward or away from compromise. It is proposed that
not only does the party shape the framework of the coalition, but also the nature of the

20 M ogens N. Pedersen “E lectoral Volatility in W estern Europe, 1948-1977” in Peter Mair “The W est
European Party System ” O xford: Oxford University Press, 1990. p. 195. A lso, Peter Mair “Adaptation and
Control” in H. Daalder and P. Mair “Western European Party System s” B everly Hills: Sage, 1983, pp. 405430.
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coalition itself, the exogenous events in the environment, and the level of inter-party
electoral competition determine parties’ behaviors. The size and ideological parameters
of the coalition also dictate its duration, i.e., determine the extent to which parties are
willing to stretch their compromises and not defect.

Second, this study implies that the impact of compromises on coalition duration
varies with respect to political pressure of various sorts, arising from party competition
and from emerging internal or external politically charged events.

In other words,

coalition compromises under conditions of coalition competition impact duration
differently than under conditions of reduced or absent competition, since the costs and
risks associated with compromise vary relative to the presence of coalition competition.
Contrary to a hegemonic situation (predominant coalition-system), under competition the
relative and perceived cost of coalition compromise is reduced relative to the gains.

It is hypothesized that under a predominant coalition system, the condition where
one dominant party is capable of leading the formation of a ruling alliance, minimumtight ideological parameters contribute to durable coalitions.

Under a competitive

coalition system, the condition where at least one rival dominant party is capable of
forming a competing coalition consensual-wide ideological parameters and large-sized
cabinets are often formed, thus undermining durability.

Coalition competition increases the pressure for political concession by dominant
party as to accommodate partners both ideologically and through forming larger
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alliances. By the same reasoning, coalition competition makes it more difficult and risky
for a dominant party to dismantle a coalition. Breaking a coalition may boost the chance
of the opposition to form a ruling alliance. Therefore, it is theoretically suggested that
coalition competition, while widening coalitions, also contributes to longer duration.21

In addition to coalition competition, political events determine formation and effect
duration. Two distinct event variables are proposed: external and internal pressures.
Both are suggested to press the coalition to be formed on an accommodative basis, i.e.,
larger by size and wider by ideology. The impacts of these events increase progressively
as they emerge after coalition formation. The more the coalition ages in power the more
these events can become factors in shortening its duration. As has been argued in the
literature, events will continue to accumulate “shocks” against the coalition making them
with time less sustainable and more divisive. From this hypothesis another hypothetical
conclusion could be drawn suggesting that more efficient coalitions shall be more
resistant over time to events changes. Thus we would expect that the longest lasting
coalitions to be the smallest in size.

This synthetic model of coalition behavior can best be applied to democratic
systems where coalition formations are necessary for ruling alliances. Distinctions must
be made, however, as to whether the party system is predominant or competitive.
Another important discrimination must be made as to categorize the system being
domestically or externally event-sensitive.

The model could then be applied to each

21 See Chapter 3 for further discussion definition and measure for coalition competition.
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situation differently (this distinction shall be made more evident in the following
chapter). This research study aims at examining this theoretical model within the context
of the Israeli party system, since we can apply both propositions to Israeli coalition
behaviors. The Israeli party system always dependent to some extent on coalitions was
predominant before 1969 and since has become multi-polar or competitive.

Israel’s case represents a challenge for coalition theories in multi-party
democracies for two other important reasons. First, Israel’s coalition politics synthesize
both Eastern and Western cultural and political traditions. The political loyalty to
religious authority by many Israeli parties, for example, reflects something of Eastern
cultural-political practices, while the dominance of Labor and bourgeois secular politics
mirror Western practice. Second, Israeli politics, while sharing essential characteristics
of the Western democratic model, also maintains exceptional characteristics. Such
characteristics pertain to Israel’s foreign policy that uniquely shapes parties’ ideology and
coalition behaviors and to the tendency to exclude certain parties, most notably among
Arab parties, from coalitions or cabinet participation. Israel foreign policy is peculiar for
having an unresolved national component that continues to be expressed in the unsettled
Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli national claims.

In the case of Israel we examine hypotheses 1 to 6 within two historic periods
(pre-1969 vs. post-1969) that set different political formulations to the Israel’s coalition
structure and events. Israel’s ideological landscape has been divided on Left-Right and
Hawkish-Dovish ideological spectra. After 1967 the ‘external’ (Hawkish-Dovish)
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dimension began to greatly impact the ‘internal’ (Left-Right) dimension of party ideology
(Issac, 76; Perlemutter, 85; Arian; 98).

Among the direct effects has been the

fragmentation of the Israeli Left in favor of rival Right and Religious parties. During the
Seventh Knesset of 1969, the Israeli political party and coalition systems transformed
from a Labor-dominant toward a competitive formation.

Two approaches are proposed in chapter 3, “Methodologies and Measures,” in order to
examine the underlying hypotheses of coalition formation and duration: quantitative and
qualitative. We implement a quantitative analysis to examine the linear relationships that
have been established in the theoretical model. However, the shortcoming of having a
small sample size of Israeli coalitions (N=28) and the dramatic transformation of Israel
after 1969 compels us to implement an additional qualitative comparative approach for
verification, possible theoretical refinement, and alternative measures.
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CHAPTER 3
M ETHODOLOGIES AND MEASUREMENTS

T h is ch ap ter

examines tw o

m eth o d o lo g ic a l

approaches to

ev a lu a te the theory p resen ted in

chapter 2. The first is a quantitative method using multiple linear regression analysis. The
se c o n d is a q u a lita tiv e m eth od u sin g co m p a ra tiv e c a se stud y an a ly sis. T h e p u rp ose o f h a v in g tw o
m e th o d o lo g ie s m eth od s is related to the sm all num ber o f

cases b ein g

ex a m in ed in this research.

S u c h a sh o rtco m in g m ak es a q uan titative ex a m in a tio n d iffic u lt to v erify. A n in d u ctiv e qualitative
approach, on th e other hand, a llo w s rig o ro u s ex a m in a tio n o f ca ses stu d ied and p ro v id es further
v er ifica tio n an d/or refin em en t to th eoretical a ssu m p tio n s.
a n a ly sis,

T h is chapter d isc u sse s the unit o f

in d ep en d en t, and d ep en d en t variables im p lem en ted in b oth m eth o d s. It d efin es

op eration al variab les and m easu res e m p lo y e d in the q uan titative a n a ly sis. It further d isc u sse s the
q u alitative m eth od , its various p h a ses, th e criteria o f ca se se le c tio n s and sy stem a tic ca se
ev a lu a tio n and com p arison .

Unit of Analysis:
This study provides an analysis of party behaviors based on the systematic
characteristics of the coalition system.
operate.

It establishes the universe in which parties

Hence, parties’ behaviors become significantly a function of coalitions’

structures and the events shaping them. Therefore, ruling coalitions are recognized as the
unit of analysis while parties are considered players within those units.
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After a general election the president of the country names the head of the party
that received most votes in the election to establish a government.22 The President also
names the party leader to form a government if a previous government collapses. In the
event that the party leader failes to form a coalition, the President can name the head of
the second dominant party to form it. In case neither is successful the President may call
a new national election.23

Each coalition government represents the joining of various Israeli parties that
agree to govern the country while commanding a majority of seats in the Knesset.
During formation process, the dominant party engages in negotitions with other smaller
parties to convince them to join the coalition.

In its package are offers that usually

combine policy proposals, ministrial seat incentives, as well as budgetary allocation for
each ministry. Israeli religious parties, for example, has conditioned their participation in
the coalition to their control over Ministry of Religious Affairs. Beside the carrots the
dominant party may demostrate sticks that threaten non participating smaller parties in
diverting funds and isolating supporters.

A successful coalition building leads to a

cabinet agreement which primarily provides a general policy proposal and a distribution
of ministrial seats along with respective budget allocation.

The coalition must then be presented to the entire Knesset to receive a vote of
confidence. It is essential that the coalition commands the majority of the Knesset’s seats
22 This process has been relatively changed with the introduction of the second ballots in 1996 where the public began
to cast their votes directly to the Prime Minister. The president was obliged to name the prime minister elect to form
the government. However, the second ballot system was abandoned in the 2003 election. This was institutionalized
following an increasing concern in the Knesset that the Second Ballot has caused greater fragmentation to the electoral
system contrary to what was intended.
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to win and retain confidence. A new government is said to be officially formed when it
receives the confidence of the majority of Knesset’s members or MKs’votes.24

Many events can disturb the coalition’s life after formation.

The least is

abstention of some coalition members from voting when a no-confidence vote is
presented against the government. On some occasions coalition members may resign
either individually or by entire parties. Most threatening occasions occur when one or
many parties Pullout from the coalition reducing its command of the Knesset to a
minority stand. Changes in political circumistances can also lead the Prime Minister to
dissolve the cabinet and/or Knesset and call for either a new election or a new
government. Terminating the government may take only a small party withdawing or a
prime minister demanding its dissolution. A government’s life is officially over and the
coalition is considered dead when a new government is inaugurated.

Various studies suggest different ways to define a ruling coalition among political
parties.

Strict definitions suggest that a ruling coalition is established each time an

individual cabinet member leaves or enters the alliance (Budge, 1990).

Loose

definitions, on the other hand, establish that a ruling coalition remains the same when
dominant parties or the Prime Minister are not changed (Mershon, 1996).

Both

definitions have advantages and disadvantages. Strict definitions provide a larger N-size
to analyze but too many basically identical cases, particularly in policy domain. On the

23 See www.mfa.gov.il. Official Foreign M inistry website for detail illustration of government formation processes.

24 Israeli Knesset: w w w .knesset.gov.il, 2003. Knesset consists o f 120 MKs. The government can be
dissolved when a vote o f no-conftdence receive a majority o f votes.
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other hand, loose definitions diminish the number of cases to analyze while providing
essential policy differences to consider.

According to the strict definition of a coalition there could be over 60 Israeli
ruling alliances between 1949 and 1999, marked by ministers’ resignation and/or
appointments in addition to government inaugurations by the Knesset.

The loose

definition, on the other hand, suggests that Israel witnessed only eleven Prime Ministers,
and therefore eleven coalition governments.

This study adopts the definition officially established by Israel, listing twentyeight Israeli ruling coalitions between 1949 and 1999 (Table 3.1).25 Each of these
coalitions was inaugurated in the Knesset. Inauguration entails the presentation of the
coalition’s policy guidelines along with members of the new cabinet.

The Knesset’s

confidence vote to the coalition establishes the formation of the new government (see
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il).

In determining the life duration of a ruling coalition authors have disagreed over
the issue of government termination (Gorman and Rosendale, 1997). Again, strict and
loose definitions are relevant to this issue. Lose definition considers the resignation of a
Minister as a termination while strict definition suggests only the change of the entire
cabinet along with the Prime Minister as condition for a dissolution (Budge 1990 vs.
Mershon 1996). Additional complications are introduced such as the consideration of
care-taker government and the changes that occur within it, the death of the Prime
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Minister, the establishment of an emergency government, etc... For the purpose of our
analysis the termination date of the coalition is considered to be that day when a new
ruling coalition is inaugurated by the Knesset (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Characteristics of Israeli Governments 1949-1999

1
2
3
4
5
6

Begins
3/10/1949
10/30/1950
10/7/1951
12/23/1952
1/7/1954
6/29/1955

Ends
10/29/1950
10/6/1951
12/22/1952
1/6/1954
6/28/1955
11/1/1955

Prime
Minister
Ben-Gurion
Ben-Gurion
Ben-Gurion
Ben-Gurion
Shared
Shared

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

11/2/1955
1/6/1958
12/6/1959
11/2/1961
6/24/1963
12/22/1964
1/10/1966
3/17/1969
12/15/1969

1/5/1958
12/5/1959
11/1/1961
6/23/1963
12/21/1964
1/9/1966
3/16/1969
12/14/1969
3/5/1974

Ben-Gurion
Ben-Gurion
Ben-Gurion
Ben-Gurion
Eshkol
Eshkol
Eshkol
Meir
Meir

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

3/6/1974
6/3/1974
6/19/1977
8/5/1981
10/10/1983
9/13/1984
10/20/1986
12/22/1988
6/11/1990
7/13/1992
11/22/1995
6/18/1996
7/7/1999

6/2/1974
6/18/1977
8/4/1981
10/9/1983
9/12/1984
10/19/1986
12/21/1988
6/10/1990
7/12/1992
11/21/1995
6/17/1996
7/6/1999
3/7/2001

Meir
Rabin
Begin
Begin
Shamir
Peres
Shamir
Shamir
Shamir
Rabin
Peres
Netanyahu
Barak

Gov

Begins
Reason
Election 1
Election 2

Care taker
Election 3
Election 4
Election 5

Election 6
Election 7
Election 8
Election 9
Election 10
Election 11
Election 12
Election 13
Election 14
Election 15

Ends Reason26
Religious issues/Economic problems
Religious issues
Religious issues
Resignation of PM
Resignation of General Zionists
election
Dispute with Ahdut Avoda over German
weapons
Religious issues
Levon Affairs
Resignation of PM
Levon Affairs/Labor split
Electoral Opportunity
Death of PM
Election
Election
P.M
Resignation,
Internal
Labor
disputes
Religious issues
Election
Resignation of PM/Economic crisis
Weakness of Government
Agreement
Election
Peace question
Peace question
PM killed
Election/Peace question
Election/Peace question
Peace question

23 Israeli Knesset: w w w .knesset.gov.il, 2003.
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Days
599
342
442
380
538
126
796
709
688
599
547
383
1162
273
1553
90
1112
1507
796
338
768
794
536
760
1194
206
1113
609
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Dependent Variables:
Three dependent variables are analyzed in two stages. In the first stage, coalition
formation analysis is performed in which the dependent variables considered are coalition
size and coalition ideological parameter. Coalition size is simply the number of Knesset
seats controlled by the coalition upon inauguration. For our qualitative analysis, the size
of the coalition can be considered either large or small. A small coalition is the coalition
that is established by the minimum number of seats necessary for a Knesset majority.
Another word for a small coalition is minimum winning coalition or MWC.

97

An Israeli

MWC requires the least possible number of parties in control of the least possible
majority seats.

When additional parties join the coalition, making their presence

unnecessary for the control of a minimum winning requirements (excessive), the coalition
can no longer be regarded as MWC.

Therefore, we consider a MWC to be the ruling

alliance with the minimum required parties to achieve simple majority. In contrast to
MWC, a large coalition (LWC) is that which exceeds the minimum winning requirement
with more parties than needed included in the alliance. Eleven Israeli governments were
established as minimum winning coalitions while seventeen were larger than minimum
formations (Table 3.2).

26 Based on events as covered by Keesing’s Contemporary Archives 1949-1999.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

70

T able 3.2: Size and Ideological Param eters of the Israeli Governments 1949-1999.
SEATS

SIZE

73
73
65
87
87
63
80
80

LWC
LWC
MWC
LWC
LWC
MWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
MWC
MWC
MWC
MWC
MWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
MWC
MWC
MWC
MWC
LWC

Government

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

86
66
66
66
73
104
102

68
61

68
57
60
96
96
90
56
62
58
62
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Coalition
Ideology28
L-C-R
L-C-R
L-R
L-C
L-C
L-R
L-C
L-C
L-C-R
L-R
L-R
L-R
L-R
L-R
L-R
L-R
L-R
RT-C-R
RT-C-R
RT-C-R
L-RT-R
RT-L-R
RT-L-R
RT-R
L

L
RT-R
L-C-R

Ideological
Closeness29
3
3
2
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
1
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
3

Ideological
Parameter
W
W

T
W
W
T
W
W

w
w
w
w
w
w
w
T
T
T
T
T
W
W

w
T
T
T
T
W

Coalition ideological parameter, on the other hand, represents the ideological
distance between the dominant party policy position and that of the coalition as a whole
after formation.

In our quantitative approach we content code dominant parties’

manifestos and government’s policy guidelines in order to determine the distance

27 An Israeli MWC requires the least possible number o f parties in control o f the least possible majority
seats. When additional parties join the coalition making their presence unnecessary for the control o f a
minimum winning requirements the coalition is no longer regarded as MWC.
28 Governments’ composition of parties ideologically identified as Left (L) Right (Rt) Center (C) or Religious (R).
This classification is provided by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAHhyd0).
29 Ideological Closeness Index of coalition is developed by Ian Budge where 1 indicates very close while 6 very wide.
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between them as being the ideological parameter (see below for measurement and
definition). 30

In the qualitative section ideological parameters are said to be tight or wide.
Israeli coalitions are formed by a partnership of parties that are categorized as left, center,
right, or religious.

The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides ideological

categorization of Israeli parties and ruling coalitions since 1949. Budge provides an
ideological closeness index of Israeli parties within each government.

We consider

ideological parameter of the coalition to be tight (T) whenever Budge’s ideological
closeness index scores less than 3; otherwise the coalition is said to be wide (W) (Table
3.2).

In the second stage the durational analysis is conducted in which the dependent
variable considered is the number of days the coalition lasts in power. As has been
discussed, the count begins in the day the government is inaugurated and runs until the
day it is replaced by an alternate. In the qualitative case study we examine the shortest
vs. the longest-lived Israeli coalitions in order to compare explanatory variables (see
below for further examination of case selection criteria).

30 Similar approach in measurement was made by Sened, Itai "A M odel o f Coalition Formation: Theory and
Evidence", the Journal o f Politics, vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 350-72, 1996.
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Independent Variables:
In order to explain cabinet formations two types of independent or explanatory
variables are considered.

The first are structural, i.e., variables that are measurable

through the institutional structure of the government. In this case it is the dominant
party’s power index which is obtained by measuring the power of the dominant party to
form a winning coalition while considering the various possible partnerships.

Party

power index is established after every national election.

Whenever the dominant party’s control of the Knesset increases we assume that
coalition competition decreases. The power growth of the dominant party decreases the
opportunity for rival coalitions to be formed.

We used Banzhaf’s power index (see

Banzhaf Power Index in Appendix B) that calculates the power of the dominant party to
form winning coalitions within the Knesset (See below for measures).31 To confirm the
validity of our measure we also established a “feasibility” of coalition formation table
showing the ideological coalitions that were potentially possible along party ideology
(Table 3.3). This was done by listing all Israeli political parties that have won Knesset’s
entries since 1949 (Table 3.10). Then, we grouped the parties as left, religious, right, or
anti-system parties as established by International Almanac o f International History as
well as Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For each ideological category we added the
number of seats each camp could have “feasibly” controlled in the Knesset, not including
anti-system parties, as listed in Table 3.3. (See below for further discussion) We

31 Banzhaf power index provides a % power o f each party’s ability to form a winning majority among a
population o f parties based on the number o f seats each party controls. The formula for calculating the
power is provided in the Appendix.
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projected ‘feasible’ alliances which add the religious parties to either the left or the right
camps.

Table 33% Knesset Seats by Ideologically Feasible Coalitions and Dominant Party
32

Power Index 1949-1999'

71*
66*
67*
74*

Reiiaious
20
17
17
18
18
17
20

Anti-System)**i
6
8
8
3
5
5

72*

Riaht-Reliaious
43
46
45
43
52
48
55
58
63*
64*
62*
65*
59

66*

68*

9

79*

58

10

CO
CD

15
17
13
13
18
16
23
27

Left-Reliaious
91*
83*
84*
92*
81*
84*
78*
71*
*

23
29
28
25
34
67* 31
58 35
56 43
46
51
52 51
53 49
50 47
56 43
43 45
52 31
«

1 1 /1 /8 8

6/23/92
5/29/96
5/20/99

Left Riqht

CO
CD

Date
1/25/49
7/30/51
7/26/55
11/3/59
8/15/61
10/28/65
10/28/69
12/31/73
5/17/77
6/30/81
6/23/84

65*
66*
68*

6

6
6

4

5
5
5

Power
0.855
0.876
0.843
0.927
0.831
0.847
0.993
0.812
0.715
0.561
0.606
0.548
0.743
0.548
0.585

* A “feasible” winning coalition with more than 60 seats (50%) o f the Knesset.
** A nti-System parties consist o f non-Zionist parties primarily communist and /

Both measures reflect similar conclusions suggesting that the larger a “feasible”
coalition, the greater is the power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition and,
therefore, the lower coalition competition.33 Table 3.3 shows that ‘feasible’ winning
alliances control of Knesset’s seats grow as the power of the dominant party to form
winning coalitions increase. Competition increase as indicated by the ability of both the

32 We categorized Israeli parties as left, right, or religious based on the description provided by International
Almanac of International History, 2nd Edition, 1982.
33 The only exception o f this pattern occurred in 1969 election. In 1969 election almost all left oriented parties joined
the Alignment (56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. N o left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand
coalition bloc. Therefore when Benzhaf power index calculation is made without taking into consideration potential
ideological partners it scores high. However, if ideological consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have
only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance short o f a ruling majority.
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right and the left to form winning coalitions while the power of the dominant party
declines particularly since 1977 Knesset election.

For the qualitative case study analysis coalition competition is said to be low
when dominant party’s power index to form a winning coalition scores above 80 or when
an ideological alliance is capable of controlling a majority of the seats. As indicated in
table 3.3 alliances of left-parties were practically capable of forming governments
throughout pre-1969 without needing the support of outside ideological camps. These
situations indicate low-level of ideological competition within the Knesset before 1969
election. Additional indications of low competition are often observed in the low
occurrence of defection from parties’ ranks. At low competition, defection from parties
and by parties from alliances is hardly rewarding because it does not impact the overall
balance of power within the Knesset. In contrast, coalition competition is said to be high
when dominant party’s power index to form a winning coalition scores low, i.e., below
80 or when an ideological alliance is not capable of controlling a majority of seats in the
Knesset. At high competition defection from party ranks or by parties from coalitions
can be rewarding due to the increasing values of defectors in tilting the balance of power
in favor of one Knesset’s pole rather than another.

The second set of variables considered in analysis of coalition formation are event
pressures, i.e., variables that vary on yearly bases relative to internal and external
political developments [See below for further illustration of variables and measures].
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These variables account for a variety of “internal” and “external” political events that
present pressure on structrual variation during alliance formation (see chapter 2).

Event variables are considered in the 1st stage analysis, i.e., the formation analysis
based on developments a year prior to government’s inauguration. What are the impacts
of prior events on the formational structure of the government? This study considers the
following variables as a source for explaining size and ideological formations of
governments: annual severity of external conflict, annual foreign aid, annual percentage
change in Gross Domestic Product, annual percentage of immigrants relative to
population, annual percentage of unemployment, annual percentage of strikers per
strikes. [See Appendix C :Data Structure].

In the quantitative study various “event

pressures” are also included: United Nations resolutions, inflation rate, and economic
growth.

In the 2nd stage durational analysis event pressure variables are combined with
formative variables, i.e., coalition size and ideology parameter, as to determine their
combined impact on the durability of the government (Figure 2.4). In order to assess the
variation of structrual vs. event variables on the duration of governments as they age we
examine the model in stages. First we examine duration based on first year events
following government formation. Second, we examine duation based on events that
proceeded govememnt termination. This makes our structural independent variables act
as control variables for comparison. The contrast will establish the different significance
of structural vs. event variables on duration as coalition ages in power.
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Finally we examine our hypotheses based on pre-1969 vs. post-1969 Israeli
coalitions. Our rationale for this comparison is provided in Chapter 1 and 2 where we
establish grounds for introducing such a controlled comparison design.

Measuring Ruling Coalitions’ Ideologies:
Definition: Coalition ideology is defined in this study as the combined ideological
policies taken by a coalition on domestic-liberal and extemal-peace positions (C) as
expressed in the Principle Guidelines o f the Government.

Upon its formation every Israeli government is required to present a policy
statement to the Knesset entitled “The Principle Guidelines of the Government” (PGG).
This statement represents an actual agreement drafted by a coalition of political parties
who have agreed either to support or to share the new cabinet. In his inauguration speech
in 1999 Mr. Barak defined the PGG as follow: “the guidelines constitute the identity card
of the government, the principles of its policy and its declaration of intent.”34 By
agreeing to the PGG, it becomes binding for the parties in the coalition to support every
government policy that is inspired by the PGG. Violation to these policy principles can
invite immediate fragmentation in the coalition and may lead to the collapse of the
government.

This makes the PGG a major source that underlines the government’s

political program and coalition’s ideology.

34 Speech by Prime Minister Ehud Barak during the Presentation of the 28th Government to the Knesset
Jerusalem, July 6, 1999.
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In this study, a content coding is conducted for government guidelines using Ian
Budge’s approach to coding party platforms/5 For governments that adopted previous
governments’ PGG, the speech of Prime Minister’s speech upon introducing the
government are coded and added to the previous PGG. Budge coded party platforms as
they emerge in newspapers or publications of their respective parties. The coding was
aimed to reveal the saliency of policy issues that were emphasized and prioritized by
political parties throughout electoral campaigns. Budge’s coding scheme provided seven
general policy domains: External Relations, Freedom and Democracy, Government,
Economy, Welfare and Quality of Life, Fabric of Society, and Social Groups. Each
domain was divided into various defined categories for the total sum of 54 sub-domains
[See Appendix A for definitions].36 We made adjustments to the sub-domains as they
relate to the particular circumstances of Israeli politics. For example, we replaced
Budge’s sub-domain “favorable mention of European community” with what we thought
a category related to Israel’s case as “favorable mention of Jewish community”.
Furthermore, we inserted the following significant Israeli sub-policies: (609) immigration
and settlement, (610) support of religious laws (611) same as (610) but negative, and
(612) Jerusalem.37

35 Ian Budge, David Robertson, Derek Hearl “Ideology, Strategy and Party Change” (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987).
36 Dataset CMPr3 (Author A Volkens), Comparative Manifestos Project, Science Center Berlin, Research Unit
Institutions and Social Change (Director H-D Klingemann) in cooperation with the Manifesto Research Group
(Chairman I Budge). The dataset is also referred to as SN3437- Comparative Manifestos Project: Programmatic
Profiles of Political Parties in Twenty Countries, 1945-1988. Description of the data and method of order is available
online at http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/fmdingData/snDescription.asp?sn=3437.
37 Inter coder reliability test w as m ade by having two university students content-coding the same five
PGG texts that were randomly selected. My content coding agreed with that o f the students over 90% of

the times.
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Because Israeli politics is highly partisan, both cabinet and the Knesset tend to be
driven by the same ruling coalition agenda (Asher, 1998). For this reason, the PGG
represents not only the program of the cabinet, but it sets the scope of the legislative
agenda in the Knesset. For example, when the Likud-led coalition began to rule Israel in
1977 its PGG prioritized the support of religious institutions among other objectives.
This was also reflected in its legislative activities in the Knesset. The legislative agenda
was highly religious and the religious institutions received its highest financial support
from the government through out this period.

Since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, twenty-eight coalition
governments have adopted twenty-two PGGs.

Most PGGs were authored by newly

emerging coalitions reflecting the new political policy direction of the government.
Coalitions that underwent minor changes in their formation or policy programs,
particularly during the life of the same Knesset, occasionally adopted the same program
of the previous coalition. This makes the formation of new PGG an indicator of major
changes in the policy objectives of the emerging coalitions and, therefore, of the
government’s programs (Table 3.4).

38 In 1976/77 Under the Labor government Ministry of Religious Affairs received annual budget of only 208.2
millions. Since 1977 Likud government, the ministry’s budget continued to be annually doubling until it reached 1615
millions in 1980/81. See Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics under Government Expenditure.
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Table 3.4: Government Guidelines 1949-1999
G ov
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

D ocum ent
D ate
3/9/1949
10/30/1950
10/7/1951
10/23/1952
1/7/1954
6/29/1955

D o c u m e n t T itle
B asic Principles of G overnm ent Guidelines
B asic Principles of G overnm ent Guidelines30
B asic O utlines of th e Policy of the G overnm ent
B asic Principles of G overnm ent Program
B asic Principles of G overnm ent Program 40
B asic Principles of G overnm ent Program 41

Source
Israel G overnm ent Yearbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949
Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949
Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, Israel Office of Information, 1951
Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, Israel Office of Information, 1955
Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, Israel Office of Information, 1955
Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, Israel Office of Information, 1955
Israel K n esset Archive, 1955

11/2/1955

B asic Principles of G overnm ent Program

9

1/7/1958
12/17/1959

B enn G urion's S ta te m en t to the K nesset42
B asic Principles of G overnm ent Program

10
11
12

11/2/1961
6/24/1963
10/22/1964

P resen tatio n of New G overnm ent and Its Policy43
S ta te m en t to th e K n esset by P.M. Eshkol44
S ta te m en t to th e K n esset by P.M. Eshkol45

Israel K n esset Archive, 1959

13
14

B asic Principles of th e New G overnm ent's Program m e
C om position a n d Program of th e New G overnm ent46
T he Basic Principles of th e New G overnm ent47
B asic Principles of the G overnm ent

Israel K n esset Archive, 1966
Major K n esset D ebates, 1948-1981
Israel G overnm ent Yearbook, 1969
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974

A ddress in th e K n e sset by P.M. Rabin48
B asic G uidelines of th e G overnm ent40
T h e Coalition A greem ent50

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977

8

15

1/12/1966
3/17/1969
12/15/1969

16
17

3/10/1974
5/3/1974

18
19
20

6/20/1977

21
22
23
24
25

5/8/1981
10/10/1983
9/13/1984
10/20/1986
12/22/1988
6/11/1990
7/13/1992

Principle G uidelines of the G overnm ent of Israel51
B asic Policy G uidelines of th e G overnm ent's Program 52
S ta te m en t in th e K n esset by P.M. D esignate Sham ir53
B asic Policy G uidelines of the G overnm ent's Program 54
T he Policy G uidelines of the New G overnm ent55
Principle G uidelines of the G overnm ent of Israel58

Israel K n esset Archive, 1955
Israel K n esset Archive, 1959
Israel K nesset Archive, 1959
Israel K n esset Archive, 1959

Je ru sa lem Post, 1981
Israel K n esset Archive, 1983
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1986
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988
Israel G overnm ent P re ss Office, 1990
Israel K n esset Archive, 1992

39 Previous was adopted with no adjustment as presented by Gurion on Nov.l, 1950, See Keesing Contemporary
Archives, December 2-9, 1950, p.1131a.
40 Previous was adopted with no adjustment as presented by Shared. See Sharett's speech on January 25, 1954 to the
Knesset. Israel Government Yearbook p. 18.
41 A caretaker government was formed with no new guidelines. See Keesing: July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308a
42 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Gurion. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Jan. 25-Febl,
1958, p. 15990
43 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Gurion. See Israel Knesset Archive, 1961, Translated.
44 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Eshkol. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Volume 1-2:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH0dxd0
45 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Eshkol. See Statement to the Knesset by P.M Eshkol in
Hebrew 1964, p. 675. Also see Keesing Contemporary Archive, online
http://keesings.gvpi.net/keesing/country3055.htm. Volume 11/January 1965/Israel
46 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Mrs. Meir. See Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, Netanel
Lorch, University Press of America, pp. 1650-1653
47 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Mrs. Meir. See online Volume 1-2:
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH0dxd0. Also available in Hebrew, Israel Knesset Archive, 1974
48 See online Volume 1-3: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH0elg0. Also available in Hebrew, Israel Knesset
Archive, 1974.
49 See Israel Foreign Policy, 1977
50 See The Jerusalem Post, Thursday, August 6, 1981.
51 Translated to English from Hebrew.
52 Previous was adopted without adjustment. See Israel Foreign Policy, 1984.
53 Previous was adopted with adjustment as presented by Shamir, See Israel Foreign Policy, pp. 515-521.
54 See Israel Foreign Policy, 1988. p. 1-4
55 See the Jerusalem Post, Tuesday, June 12, 1990.
56 Same as 1995 Peres's Guidelines. Translated from Hebrew to English
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26

11/22/1995

B asic P olicy G uidelines of the Israel G overnm ent57

27
28

6/18/1996
7/7/1999

T h e N ew G overnm ent's Guidelines58
B asic G uidelines of th e 28th G overnm ent of Israel59

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995
G overnm ent P re ss Office, 1996
G overnm ent Printing Office, 1999

A rectangular data matrix was established where each Israeli ruling coalition was
content-coded according to its respective coalition guideline. The data matrix was
established where the unit of analysis was the coalition (case) entered in the rows while
the sub-policy domains were entered in the columns (variables).

Sentences in the

document were coded according to each sub-policy domain. We then counted the
sentences as they fell in their respective sub-policy category. Then, we calculated for
each government the mean percentage of each sub-policy out of all sub-policies. These
mean scores were entered in the database as proportional sub-policy factors. The sums of
these sub-policies were then calculated as to determine the factor of each of the seven
major domain policies (See Appendix A).

A new variable was added as an indicator of coalition’s “liberalism”. This
variable subtracted conservative sub-policies from liberal sub-policies. We implement
Patterson’s definition of “liberal” policies being those which propose active role for
government in area of economic security and a lesser role in area upholding traditional
values, whereas conservative policies seek the contrary (Patterson, 2002, p. 172). We also
established a similar variable as a peace policy indicator. This variable subtracted all
“security” from those of “peace” oriented sub-policies. Our operational definitions of

57 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs online: Volume 15: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mja/go.asp7MFAH01dt0. Also available
in Hebrew, Knesset Archive, 1995.
58 The Jerusalem Post, Tuesday, June 18,1996.
59 See http://www.laborisrael.org/govemme.htm
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security sub-policies are the sentences that stress defense, security, strength, and antiterrorism in contrast to peace oriented policies that emphasize conflict settlement,
negotiation, concession, cooperation, and mutual recognition. Each of these sub-policies
is numbered as shown in the formulas below (definitions are provided by Budge in the
Content Coding Appendix A).

!

LC (X) = 201 + 202 + 301 - 302 - 401 + 504 - 505 + 506 - 507 - 601 + 602 - 603 + 604
- 605 + 606 + 607 - 608 - 610 + 611 - 612 + 701 - 702 + 703 - 704 + 705 + 706 (Table
3.5).60

LC is the coalition liberal (X) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
PC (Y) = 101 - 102 + 103 - 104 +105 + 106 (Table 3.6).
PC is the coalition peace (Y) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
Then C(LC, PC) or coalition ideology is the government’s joint position on the
liberal-peace dimensional space.

60 See Content Coding Appendix on the general coding frame and definitions.
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Table 3.5: Sub-Policies Codes Considered in Liberalism Score Calculation.
201

202
301
3 02
4Q1
5 04
5 05
5 06
5 07
601
6 02
6 03
6 04
605
606
6 07
608
6 10
611
6 12
701
702
703
704
705
706

Freedom and D om estic Human Rights
Democracy
Decentralization: Positive
Decentralization: Negative
E n terp rise

Social Services Expansion: Positive
Social Services Expansion: Negative
Education Pro-Expansion
Education Anti-Expansion
Defense of National Way of Life: Positive
Defense of National Way of Life; Negative
Traditional Morality: Positive
Traditional morality: Negative
Law and Order
National Effort of Social Harmony
Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: positive
Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization: negative
Support o f Religious Laws: Positive
Support of Religious Laws: Negative
Jerusalem
Labor Groups: Positive
Labor Groups: Negative
Agriculture and Farmers
Other Economic Groups
Underprivileged Minority Groups
Non-economic DemoFigureic Groups

Table 3.6: Sub-Policies Codes Considered in ‘Peace’ Score Calculation.
101
102
103
104
105
106

Foreign Special Relationships: Positive
Foreign Special Relationships: Negative
Decolonization
Military and Security: Positive
Demilitarization
Peace

Based on our above calculations, each ruling coalition’s ideology was plotted on a
Liberalism-Peace dimensional space (Figure 3.1). This plot illustrates the distributions of
the Israeli governments on the Peace-Liberal ideological scale. Among the most peace
oriented Israeli governments was the 16th coalition scoring 46.58 (Table 3.8).

This

government was initially a national unity headed by Golda Meir, but soon became a left-
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leaning coalition. The government position was the establishment of peace with Arab
states and the end of hostility. The government adopted the Rogers Plan (the peace
initiative of the U.S. Secretary of State) which proposed the formula ‘land for peace.’
Yet, it was among the shortest lived government in Israel’s coalition history. Among the
most liberal governments were the first two established in Israel. Both of these
governments were Labor dominated and headed by David Ben Gurion. These
governments strongly leaned toward early social idealism (Table 3.8).

Figure 3.1: Government’s Ideology 1949-1999
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Measuring Dominant Party Ideology in Ruling Coalitions

Definition: Dominant party ideology is defined in this study as the ideological
policies taken by a dominant party in a ruling coalition on domestic-liberal and extemalpeace positions (P) as expressed in the party ’$ election platform.

We implement Budge’s party platform data in order to determine parties’
ideology. Budge’s ideological closeness approach suggests that parties’ emphases on
policies determine their corresponding ideologies. As has been previously discussed,
Budge coded party platforms as they emerge in newspapers or in publications. The
coding was aimed to reveal the saliency of policy issues that were emphasized and
prioritized by political parties throughout electoral campaigns. Budge’s coding scheme
provided the same seven general policy domains in twenty democracies examined
including Israel. Each domain was divided into various defined categories for the total
sum of 54 sub-domains [See Content Coding Appendix A for definitions].61

61 Note that our content coding method for PGG is the same as that used by Budge with respect to party platforms.
However, while we inserted new sub-policy categories specific to Israel in our PGG coding (108, 609,610, 611,and
612) Budge did not have them in his party platform data. This is because Budge aimed at providing general policy
categories common to most democracies. These added categories, however, do not present discrepancies between both
data sets when calculating ideological position in Israel in either the PGG or party platform. Our aim is not to merge
the data sets but rather to calculate ideological positions of governments and parties. The ideological position formula
we implement accounts for all possible sub-policies that contribute to either peace or liberalism positions. Budge’s
party platform data, while not specifically including the sub-policy categories we added, incorporate them in other
categories that our formula accounts for as well. For example, our formula subtracts traditional morality (604) in
measuring liberalism (LC or LP). In Budge’s coding scheme religious laws (610) —a category that we established —is
incorporated under traditional morality (604). Thus, when we calculate ideological liberalism (LC or LP) the same
result will be found whether we subtract 604 that incorporate 610 in Budge’s data or we subtract 604 and 610 that are
separately established in our content coding. The only reason we present these additional categories is to establish a
database particular to Israel that accounts for its peculiarities in future studies.
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Budge’s dataset ends in 1988. We updated Budge’s data as follow: Dominant
parties in coalitions publish their respective policy platforms in various journals,
magazines, and newspapers. Israel Government Yearbook has consistently published
major Israeli parties’ platforms. The intention of this study is to conduct a content
analysis of the dominant Israeli parties within the ruling coalitions and to later calculate
coalition’s ideological parameter. Using the same content coding approach implemented
by Budge, we coded dominant parties’ platforms from 1988 until 1999 (Table 3.7).62
These documents are very typical of those implemented by Budge’s study.63

Table 3.7: Dominant Party Platforms 1992-1999
Election
1992
1992
1996
1996
1999
1999

Party
Labor

Likud
Labor
Likud
Labor
Likud

Document
Party Guide for the Perplexed Voter64
Party Guide for the Perplexed Voter65
Platform for Elections to the 14th Knesset66
1996 Likud Party Platform67
1999 Electoral Platform66
The Only Peace That Will Hold69

Source
Jerusalem Post
Jerusalem Post

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jerusalem Post
Jerusalem Post

A data matrix was established where the unit of analysis was the party (case)
entered in the rows while the sub-policy domains were entered in the columns (variables).
All sentences in the document were coded according to each sub-policy domain. We

62 Inter coder reliability test was made by having two university students content-coding the same five PGG
texts that were randomly selected. My content coding agreed with that o f the students over 85% of the
times.
63 Description of the documents, data, and method used by Budge is available online at http://www.dataarchive.ac.uk/fmdingData/snDescription.asp?sn=3437.
64 Jerusalem Post Supplement - Election 1992
55 ibid. This document, however, was not used in our analysis because the Likud didn’t form a government.
66 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online a t:www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH01 fuO.
67 The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE) later became the Jewish Virtual Library, “ 1996 Likud Party
Platform” http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Politics/likud.html. This was an official translation from the Likud Party
platform, chapter 1.
Jerusalem Post, “1999 Electoral Platforms” 1999 Election Supplement. We also coded and added the Jerusalem
Post’s interview with Barak “Netanyahu is living the Truman Show” (1999 Election Supplement).
69 We coded but didn’t added this document in our analysis because Likud was not part of the Government. This
document was an election interview with Netanyahu conducted by Jerusalem Post “The Only Peace that will Hold is a
Peace we Can Defend” (1999 Election Supplement).
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counted the sentences as they fell in their respective sub-policy category.

Then, we

calculated, for each party, the mean percentage of each sub-policy out of all sub-policies.
These mean scores were entered in the database as proportional sub-policy factors. For
example, a party platform with ten sentences emphasizing “need for strong military” out
of a total of 100 sentences receives .1 or 10% factor for the sub-policy category of
“military and security: positive” (104).

Sub-policies are grouped into seven general domain policies.

One of these

general domain policies, for example, is ‘external relations’ which include ‘military and
security: positive” in addition to others sub-policies such as ‘decolonization’ (see Content
Coding Appendix A).

‘Liberalism’ is a variable we calculate based on our sub-policy scores.

This

variable subtracts conservative sub-policies from liberal sub-policies. We established a
similar variable as a peace policy indicator. This variable subtracts all security from
those of peace oriented sub-policies in the same manner we conducted our calculation of
the coalition ideology.

LP (X) = 201 + 202 + 301 - 302 - 401 + 504 - 505 + 506 - 507 - 601

+ 602 -

- 605 + 606 + 607 - 6 0 8 - 6 1 0 + 611 - 612 + 701 - 702 + 703 - 704 + 705+ 706.70

LP is the party liberal (X) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
PP (Y) = 101 - 102 + 103 - 104 +105 + 106.
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PP is the party peace (Y) ideological position (Figure 3.2).
Then P(LP, PP) or party ideology is the party’s joint position on the liberal-peace
dimensional space.

Based on our above calculations, each dominant party ideology was plotted on a
Liberalism-Peace dimensional space (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2: Dominant Party Ideology 1949-1999
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Figure 3.2 shows each dominant party’s ideological position based on the content
coding of its election platform. For example, among the most ‘dovish’ Israeli dominant
parties ever to emerge was Mapai under Ben Gurion during the 7th government in 1955.

70 See Content Coding Appendix on the general coding frame.
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The party’s platform consistently proposed the achievement of peace with Arabs. The
party scored over 30 on the ‘peace’ scale (Table 3.8). The dominant party under the 20th
and 19th governments, on the other hand, was the most conservative. The Likud was the
dominant party under Begin then Shamir respectively scoring -57 on the liberal scale
(Table 3.8).71

Measuring Coalition Ideological Parameters
Definition: A coalition ideological parameter (I) is defined as the distance between the
ruling coalition’s ideology (C) and that of the dominant party (P).

IL(X)= CL - PL
IL is the liberal (X) ideological parameter of each coalition.
IP(Y) = CP - PP
IP is the peace (Y) ideological parameter of each coalition.

Then, the overall coalition ideological parameter or I (IL, IP) is IL + IP and it is
calculated as the distance between two points: d = *J(x2 - x l ) 2 + ( y 2 - y l ) 2 or I as the
distance between P and C:

I =

tJ ( P P - C P ) 2 + ( P L - C L ) 2

(Figure 3.3). Each Israeli

government has an ideological parameter being the distance between its PGG and the
dominant party platform.
71 A lthough L abor’s platform, throughout the various governments and particularly that o f Ben Gurion,

emphasized the achievement o f peace, events often contradicted rhetoric. The 7th government, for example,
was supposed to be among the most ‘dovish’, yet it was confronted with major military conflict against
Arab countries, particularly in the Sinai Campaign. Similar situations were faced by the Likud
governments which were supposed to have stood for ‘hawkish’ agenda. During both 19th and 20th Likud
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Figure 3.3 s Theoretical Illustration of Ideological Parameter
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Table 3.8: Content Scores of Governments and Dominant Parties’ Ideologies
Government
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27

28

CP

2
2
-3.85
-0.87
-0.87
-0.87
0
0
5.71
5.71
5.07
5.49
8.18
0.66
7.17
46.58
12.24
18.75
0
6.82
8.82
9.84
4.94
5.13
8.05
-1.39
1.27
1.70

CL
19
19
12.31
15.65
15.65
15.65
6.13
5.86
10
10
9.68
8.86
9.55
6.89
10.75
2.74
16.33
0
-62.32
2.27
0
-1.64
-3.70
-3.85
14.09
3.47
2.55
8.94

PP
1.92
1.92
11.36
11.36
11.36
11.36
31.76
31.76
-2.69
7.78
7.78
7.78
22.22
0.82
0.82
2.13
2.13
29.09
0
0
-0.97
-0.97
1.03
1.03
0.09
0.09
0
0

PL
9.62
9.62
-4.55
-4.55
-4.55
-4.55
-2.35
-2.35
4.30
0
0
0
2.22
0.06
0.06
-2.13
-2.13
-16.36
-57.14
-57.14
0
0
0.07
0.06
12.68
12.68
7.69
3.70

I
9.38
9.38
22.70
23.61
23.61
23.61
32.88
32.81
10.15
10.21
10.05
9.15
15.84
6.82
12.43
44.71
21.05
19.36
5.18
59.81
9.79
10.93
5.43
5.66
8.09
9.32
5.30
5.50

governments’ major peace steps were taken to end the state of war with Egypt as concluded in the Camp
David peace agreement.
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Figure 3.4: Israeli Government’s Ideological Parameters 1949-1999
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Figure 3.4 illustrates the pattern of Israeli governments policy position distance
from that of dominant parties. The Figure shows that later Israeli governments were
more coherent with their dominant parties than predecessors. The 20th government, for
example, had an I value of 59.80 scoring very high (Table 3.8). Indeed this government
was very ideologically incoherent, with the Likud greatly differing from the PGG.72 The
20th government was a national unity government with a range of partners that included
left, right, and religious parties. Such a range of wide ideological coalition makes the
PGG a representative to the least common policy denominator among all partners. This
also makes the dominant party further apart from the PGG.

72 This study will aim to reveal reason for such variation. Supports are found in the analysis chapter to the
claim that increase in structural competitiveness and decline in economic pressure bring about efficient
formations (tight rank and sm all formations).
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Figure 3.4 also shows that the most ideologically coherent government was the
27th government headed by Netanyahu and scoring 5.3 on the ideological parameter scale
(Table 3.8). This reflects the small number of partner parties with very close ideological
positions; making the PGG with most ideological common denominator and placing it
very close to the Likud’s principle policy positions.

Measuring Coalition Size
Definition: Ruling coalition’s size is the original number of Knesset’s seats
controlled by coalition partner parties.

Consideration of coalition’s size could be the number of parties within the
coalition. However, such a variation has not been considered in our quantitative analysis
for two reasons. First, there are not many significant variations in the number of parties
throughout the coalitions. Almost all coalitions consisted of 4 or 5 parties. Second, and
more importantly, such a consideration is well accounted for in the number of seats the
coalition as a whole controls. Most significant to our analysis is to examine the size of
the coalition in terms of the number of seats it controls which indicate the extent to which
the coalition maintain control over the Knesset as a whole.

Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic Government: Party Government in 20
Democracies (1945-1990)” provides detailed information about every ruling coalition
that was formed in Israel from 1945 to 1990.

The information provided by Budge
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includes the number of parties participating in the coalition, the number of Knesset seats
they control, the cabinet ministry(ies) each party controls, in addition to other
information.73 We updated Budge’s data on seats controlled by each government from
1990 to 1999 using Keesing’s Contemporary Archive (Table 3.9).

Table 3.9: Israeli Coalition Governments Knesset’s Total Seats 1949-1999
CABINET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

SEATS
73
73
65
87
87
63
80
80
86
66
66
66
73
104
102
68
61
68
57
60
96
96
90
56
62
58
62
68

SIZE
LWC
LWC
MWC
LWC
LWC
MWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
MWC
LWC
MWC
MWC
LWC
LWC
LWC
MWC
MWC
MWC
MWC
LWC

73 Budge, Ian; Jaap Woldendoip and Hans Keman “Handbook o f Democratic Government: Party Government in 20
Democracies (1945-1990)”, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993.
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Measuring the Competitiveness of the Coalition System
Definition: Coalition competition is defined as an increasing opportunity for rival
ruling coalitions to be established by dominant parties.

Opportunity of rival coalitions to be established is determined in this study by the
relative power of the dominant party to form a winning coalition compared to the rest of
parties in the Knesset. The greater is the power of the dominant party to form a coalition
the lesser is the competition. The ability of the dominant party to form a coalition is
measured by Banzhaf s power index that calculates the power of each party to form a
winning coalition relative to other parties.74

“The standardized Banzhaf index can be

interpreted to give an answer to the question: what is voter's relative share among all
pivotal positions?”75 The voter here is the party’s sum of votes that are under its control
in the Knesset.

Table 3.10 provides a description of all Israeli parties’ share the various Israeli
Knessets (1 to 15) from 1949-1999, and shows two dominant blocs that have dominated
Israeli Knesset. The Right bloc was originally that of Herut, then became Gahal and
today is organized under the Likud. The Left bloc was primarily organized under Mapai
then was re-established under the Alignment then under Labor and by the 15th Knesset
was renamed as One Israel.

Both of these blocs have controlled large shares of the

Knesset and presented themselves as the main rival factions in Israel.

Table 3.10 is

74 S ee Banzhaf Power Index calculation and discussion in the Appendix.
75 Antti Pajala ('anoaia@utu.fi): http://powerslave.val.utu.fi. See Banzhaf, John. F. (1965). "Weighted Voting Does not
Work: A Mathematical Analysis." Rutgers Law Review 35: pp. 317-343.
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implemented in this study in order to calculate the Banzhaf s power index of each party
in the Knesset and ultimately the dominant parties.

Table 3.10: Distribution of Knesset Seats by Parties by Knesset 1949-1999
Knesset
1

2

5

6

7

4

4

4

3

4

10

7- 8

8

9

10

11

12

4

4

2

5

13

14

15

Political Parties
Agudat Yisrael

3

Ahdut Ha'avodah
Center Party
Degel Hatorah
Arab Parties
Democratic Party for Change
Fighters List
GeneralZionists/Liberal
Party/Independent
Liberals
Hadash/Democratic Front for
Peace and Equality
Hakla'ut Ufituah*
Hamerkaz Hahofshi
Hamizrahi
Ha'olam Hazeh-Koah Hadash
Hapo'el Hamizrahi
Herut Movement/Gahal/Likud
Israel Our Home (Yisrael Beiteinu)
Kash
Kidmah Ufituah*
Kidmah Va'avodah
Maki
Mapai/Alignment/Labor/One Israel
Mapam
Mahaneh Sheli
Meretz/Democratic Israel
Moked
Moledet
National Democratic Alliance Balad
National Unity
Omez
One Nation
Plato Sharon
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha
Progressive List for Peace

6
2
2

3

2

20

13

8

1

1

1

1

1
15

4

1

1

2

4

5

1

7

17

5

4

5

4

4

4

3

5

3

43

48

41

40

32

32

19
4

39
3

44

34

26

12

9

10

3

2

2
2

14

8
8

15

17

17

1

2

26

26

39

1

4
46
19

1
5
45
15

2
6
40
9

2

2

3
47
9

5

1

1

42
9

45
8

56

2

2

2

51

32

47

44

2
1
2

2
4
1
2
2

2

2

2

1
1

2
2
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Progressive Party
Rafi
Rakah
Ratz
Religious Torah Front/United
Torah Front
Sephardim and Edot Mizrah/Shas
Shlomzion
Shituf Ve'ahvah*
State List
Tami
Tehiya/Tsomet
Teiem
The Third Way
Tsomet
United Religious Front /NRP
United Torah Judaism
Shinui
WIZO
Yahad
Yahadut Hatorah
Yemenite Association
Yisrael Be'aliyah

5

4

5

6
10
3

6
4

3

6

4
3

1

1

3

5

5

2

4

6

1
5

3

6

4

2
5

2

3

2

6

10

17

2
2

2

2

2
3
3
3
2

4
16

11

12

12

11

12

10

12

8
6

9

4

4

5
5
6

1
3
1

1

Table 3.11 illustrates the changes in the ruling dominant party power index.
Since 1969, the power index of the ruling dominant party has substantially declined
(Figure 3.5).76 This indicates a considerable increase in the competitiveness of the
coalition system - also referred to in literature as “fragmentation”.

76 1969 election data, however, may be misleading in our power index consideration. The power index calculation
indicates an overwhelming power gain by the Labor bloc (56 seats and scored .99 on the power index). Nonetheless, if
we take into account the ideological orientations of possible partners its power to form a winning coalition may greatly
decline. See feasible coalitions in Table 3.11.
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Table 3.11." Pow er Index o f the Ruling Dominant P arty in the Knesset 1949-199977
Knesset
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Power index of
Dominant Party
0.86
0.88
0.84
0.93
0.83
0.85
0.99
0.81
0.71
0.56
0.61
0.55
0.74
0.55
0.58

Year
1949
1951
1955
1959
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1984
1988
1992
1996
1999

Figure 3.5: Power Index of Dominant Party 1949-1999
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77 For formula see B en zh a f P o w er Index A ppendix

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

2010

97

Note that the Banzhaf power index calculates the power of the party relative to the
coalition’s members based solely on the number of seats. Although this is a very strong
measure of party’s power, ideological consideration may also prove significant in the
determination of party’s power to form coalitions and therefore in the relative
competitiveness or flexibility of the system as a whole.

Ideological consideration can be accounted for by looking at ideologically feasible
competing coalitions. In addition to three dominant Zionist ideological camps, left, right,
and religious, various other camps have also been formed most notably the ethnic camp
of Sephardic Jews under Shas and Russian Jews under Israel Ba’aliah.

While these

camps have gained greater significance over the years they continued to play the
ideological partner of major traditional Zionist camps. Shas remains strongly associated
with the religious camp while Israel Ba’aliah with the center-right camp. As for the Arab
parties - which are not associated with Labor — and the communists, they have been
considered as anti-Zionist and categorized in most literature as ‘anti-system parties’. In
fact no Israeli ruling coalition has ever formed in partnership with either the communists
or the Arab parties.

We divided Israeli feasible coalitions among parties into the most likely ideological
grouping scenarios: left, right, religious, left-religious, and right-religious coalitions.
We ruled out left-right and left-right-religious formations because they were not
ideologically feasible to form in our considerations.

Such formations usually occur not

78 We categorized Israeli parties as left, right, or religious based on the description provided by International
Almanac of International History, 2nd Edition, 1982.
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on ideological basis (not ideologically feasible) but rather on the consideration of other
factors such as having a national unity government in war or for strictly electoral
opportunistic non-ideological purposes.

Our objective is to simulate the most

ideologically likely and opportunistically least likely formations. The result is shown in
table 3.3. This is being done in order to compare such a result to that of Banzhaf s power
index that measures dominant party’s power to form coalitions on a non-ideological
basis. Our ideological measure of feasible ideological coalitions in addition to that of
Bazhaf s dominant party power index should provide a compatible result to the
measurement of ‘competitiveness’.

For example, we should expect that the larger the

seats an ideological feasible coalition is capable to control, the higher is the power index
of the dominant party, and therefore the lower is the competitiveness of the system.

Both ideological feasible coalitions and Banzhaf s measures reflect similar
conclusions, which suggest that the greater the seats an ideological coalition is capable of
controling the greater is the power of the dominant party. As Table 3.3 shows, from 1949
until 1965 a ruling left alliance was always feasible strictly on ideological basis. For the
same period Mapai was the dominant party scoring above 83 on Banzhaf s power index.
Contradictory results emerge only in 1969 where dominant party power index scored
high (99%) but feasible winning coalition scored low seats relative to previous years (78
on the left-religious ideologically feasible coalition).

This result is due to the

simplification of power calculation after1969 with the absence of smaller left-parties
outside the grand left-alliance that was formed under the Alignment Bloc.79

79 In 1969 election almost all left oriented parties joined the Alignment (56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No
left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand coalition block. Therefore when Benzhaf power index
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Since 1969 the Labor-left parties were no longer in clear command of the
Knesset. For the first time the Labor alliance needed the essential support of either the
Religious or the Right parties in order to form a government. Banzhaf s power index
similarly shows that the post-1969 era represents a period where the dominant party’s
power to form ruling coalitions has been significantly reduced (Figure 3.6). For this
reason, we consider the 1969 Israeli Knesset to have introduced for the first time into
Israel a strong competitive coalition system.

Measuring Coalition Duration
Definition: Coalition duration is the number of days a ruling coalition lasts in
power from the time it is inaugurated by the Knesset to the time a new government is
likewise established.

The coalitions’ duration was measured by the duration of each government using
Ian Budge’s “Handbook of Democratic Government”.80 Figure 3.6 shows the pattern of
duration for 28 governments. The main observation to be made is that the duration of
Israeli governments in post-1969 period and since the 13th government has come to

calculation is made without taking into consideration potential ideological partners it scores high. However, if
ideological consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance
short o f a ruling majority.
80 Ian Budge, Hans Keman, Jaap Woldendorp “Handbook of Democratic Government: Party Government in 20
Democracies (1945-1990)”, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). Data for government duration from
1990 to 1999 were gathered from “Keesing Archive o f World Events”.
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fluctuate between very long and very short lived ruling coalitions.

On average,

governments of post-1969 lived longer than their predecessors.81

F igure 3.6; Government Duration in Days 1949-2000

1800.00

s

1600.00

C

1400.00

£

s.
s 1200.00

*>—

0
1
E

/

1000.00

\

800.00
600.00

§

E

I
o
o
>

\1

400.00

11
I

200.00

.00

3

40

10

CD
CO

0)
CO

o

CD

h» in
O
Y
— v— y—
1
Y- CO CM

- ...
■sf
CD
CO

CO

- .
N Tco

O)

Yco

CO
CO

in o
cb

y—

o

CO
CO
05

CO

CO

o
CM

§
CM
C \I

O

- .. i l l M ia
o CM in CO 05
05
05
05
T
— CO CM 00
— pv.
▼"* T“
CM v
h- x— CO
CD

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

G overnm ent's Formation Date

Measuring Event Pressure Variables
Event pressure variables are the non-structural variables that indicate political,
social, or economic changes that impact the country as a whole.

81 Explaining this pattern is provided in Chapter 3, where proper government’s structural form ation,
reflecting external pressure, and the decline in econom ic pressu re during the office term o f the government
are found to explain long duration governments. These attributes characterize p ost-1969 governments
more so than governments formed before 1969.
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In this study we consider six event pressure variables that are significant to Israeli
politics. Two variables are measures of external political pressures: severity of external
conflict and foreign aid. Severity of external conflict generally refers to the conflict with
the Arab states and the Palestinians. It is measured based on annual events that take into
consideration: number of Israeli casualties and fatalities, frequency of annual disputes
reported to the U.N., border skirmishes and attacks.

Our measurement is established

based on the information provided by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and
published online.

89

The MFA’s information provides data reflecting the views and

political concerns of Israelis as events shape their politics. Furthermore, J. David Singer
provides data from 1948 to 1992 documenting annual number of casualties in conflicts
and indexing annual fatality rate where 1 refers to low and 6 a very high rate.8J

We established a similar scale to Singer as to measure the severity of conflict.
The severity of conflict variable provides a scale of 1 to 6 where 1 indicates a very low
severity of conflict while 6 indicates a high severity (Table 3.12). This variable differs
from Singer’s index by incorporating two additional sources of external pressures: U.N.
resolutions and border skirmishes and attacks. The UN resolutions are those adopted by
both the General Assembly and Security Council. A list of UN resolutions related to
Israel is provided online by the Jewish Virtual Library (http://www.us-israel.org/isource).
We coded these as either 0 for resolution that carry no annual condemnation or criticism
to Israel, 1 for some condemnation, and 2 severe condemnations.

As of border

skirmishes and attacks, we thought that Singer undermined some conflicts that did not

82 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affair’s website, “Timeline of Events: Half a Century of Independence 1948-1998.
www.mfa.go.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH00ul0.
83 See D. Singer’s “Correlate of War Project” (1949-1992). I have updated this to 1999 using “The Jewish Online
Research Center - Jewish Virtual Library” w w w .Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html: “Israeli Casualties in Battle”.
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resemble a major war. Therefore, we coded a new variable “Skirmishes/Attacks” taken
into considerations Singer’s coding while relying on the annual skirmishes/attacks
incidents as reported by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.84 Skirmishes/Attack is
indexed from 1 to 4 with 1 representing low and 4 representing high level of
skirmishes/attacks. Severity variable adds both Skirmishes/Attack and condemning UN
resolutions for a maximum index score of 6 (Table 3.12).

Table 3.12: External Conflicts and their Severity 1949-1999
Year
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Event
War of Independence
Suez canal blockade
Syrian incursions / Suez canal blockade
Syrian border skirmishes
Water issue with Jordan/Syrian border skirmishes
Egypt interfere with ships
Kinneret incident with Syria/ 2. Gaza incident with Egypt
Sinai campaign
Post Sinai campaign87
Skirmishes on the Syrian and Jordan borders
Egypt blockade of Suez
Israeli goods are seized in Suez
Syrian-Egyptian union is dissolved/ Conflict on Syrian border
Conflict on Syrian border
Conflict on Syrian border
Divergence of Jordan water/arm race/establishment of PLO
Border conflict
Border conflict
Six days war
War of attrition
War of attrition
War of attrition
Arab boycott/ War of attrition
Lebanese Syrian border skirmishes/ Munich attack

Casualty85
6373
0
0
0
0
0

Fatality
86
6
1

2
1
1

Skirmishes/
Attacks
4
2
2
1
2
2

0

1
1

231

6

4

0

1
1

3
1

1
1
1

2
2
1
2
2

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
776
324
500
600

1
1

1

1

3

1
1

2
2
4

0

6
2
2
2
2

0

1

1

2
2
3

2

(-) U.N
R

2
1
1

6
3
3

2
1
1
1

3
3
3

6
1
1

4

2
3

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
1
1

84 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affair’s website, “Timeline of Events: Half a Century of Independence 1948-1998.
www.mfa.go.il/mfa/go.asD7MFAH00ul0.
85 As reported by Singer.
86 As reported by Singer as an index o f 1 to 6 where 1 represents low fatality rate while 6 high fatality rate.
87 Although no casualties were reported by Singer, tension ran high with Egypt under N asser. Border
penetrations and attacks were common. U.N. criticism to Israel for violating the Armistice Agreement was
severe. International Isolation o f Israel was mounting.
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2
2
3
3
4
3
3

6
4
4
5
3

2
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1973
1974
1975

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Yom Kippur War
2688
Syrian border skirm ishes/ Ma’alot attack.
0
Borders conflict with Lebanon/Savoy Hotel incident 7 Israelis 0
killed/talk with Egypt suspended/bomb in Jerusalem 14
killed
EI-AI attack in Istanbul, border skirmishes with Lebanon
0
Borders conflict with Lebanon
0
Terrorist attack in Haifa kills 37/invasion of Lebanon
0
Borders conflict with Lebanon
0
Borders conflict with Lebanon/conflict in territories
0
Borders conflict with Lebanon/Bombing Iraqinuclear 0
site/assassination of Saddat
Invasion of Lebanon
400
Lebanon occupation
400
Lebanon occupation
416
Lebanon occupation/attack on PLO in Tunis
0
Lebanon occupation
0
Lebanon occupation
0
Intefadah
0
Intefadah
0
Gulf War
0
Gulf War
0
Lebanon conflict/ Embassy in Buenos Aires is destroyed
0
Lebanon conflict
0
Lebanon conflict/conflict in territories
0
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians
0
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians
0
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians
0
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians/suicide attacks
0
Lebanon conflict/conflict with Palestinians/suicide attacks
0

1

6
2

2

4

1

2

1

3
4
3

6
1
3

4
1
2

2

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
2
3

4
4
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

2
2
2

1

2

3
2
2
2
2
2

2

2
2
3
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3

2
2
2
1
1

2
2

1
1
1
2

2

Foreign aid, on the other hand, is the measure of total annual money received by
the government in millions.

oo

Total aid is simply the sum of U.S. and European aid that

includes both military and economic aid excluding any loans or loans guarantees (Table
3.13). Foreign aid is considered a potential external pressure due the ability of aiding
nations to implement financial assistance in pressing the recipient government to pursue a
particular policy course. U.S. aid to Israel, for example, has been often associated with
Israel settlement policies. President George H.W. Bush conditioned increased U.S. aid to
88 Data of foreign aid to Israel (1949-1999) are obtained from the following sources: Clyde R. Mark, “Israel: U.S.
Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, (May 11, 2000); Larry Q. Nowels, “Israel: An Overview of U.S.
Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, (May 20, 1993); A. F. K. Organski, “The $36 billion bargain”,

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

3
4

5
4
4
3
3
3
4
4
4
5

2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
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Israel on halting settlement activities in the Occupied Territories in 1991. Other times,
U.S. assistance to Israel has been increased following peace agreements in reward for
- such a policy as was the case in 1993.89

Table 3.13: Foreign Aid to Israel in Millions of U.S. Dollars 1949-1999s0
Year
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

U.S. Aid
100
0
0.3
295.7
249.6
250.7
174.9
163.1
126.7
185.4
150
163.8
139.5
240
217.6
103.3
167.7
338.1
33.8
191.4
287.6
159.3
1285.7
838.3
818.9
4516.3
1064.2
3476.3
2583.4
2476.5
6102.7
2075.8

European Aid
0
0
0
0
0
26.9
62.3
82.5
142.2
200.9
1022.3
285.7
333.3
396.7
404.5
401.6
307.9
400.4
718.5
689.4
585.9
612.9
534.7
656.3
576.8
628.9
531.7
593.3
571.4
560.2
543.8
498.4

Total Aid91
100
0
0.3
295.7
249.6
277.6
237.2
245.6
268.9
386.3
1172.3
449.5
472.8
636.7
622.1
504.9
475.6
738.5
752.3
880.8
873.5
772.2
1820.4
1494.6
1395.7
5145.2
1595.9
4069.6
3154.8
3036.7
6646.5
2574.2

NY: Colombia University Press, 1990. See also Jewish Online Research Center, www.
Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html, “U.S. Assistance to Israel.”

89 Our hypothesis is that increase in foreign aid constitute a decline in external pressure and therefore
contribute to sm aller formations and durable coalitions.
90 Figures are adjusted to 1995 inflation index.

91 Including German reparations
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1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

2294.3
2206
2393.1
2631.6
3376.7
3663.5
3040.2
3043.4
3045.6
3434.9
3712.3
3100
5103.4
5097.2
5102.4
5144
5132.1
3080
3010

441.9
61.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2736.2
2267.1
2393.1
2631.6
3376.7
3663.5
3040.2
3043.4
3045.6
3434.9
3712.3
3100
5103.4
5097.2
5102.4
5144
5132.1
3080
3010

The other set of socio-economic event pressure variables provide important
statistical insights into the country’s internal stress. These variables are: change in annual
GDP, annual unemployment rate, annual percentage of strikers per strike, and annual
percentage of immigrants per population. This set of data is obtained from Statistical
Abstract o f Israel for the period of 1949-1999 (Table 3.14).92

92 See “Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il for data
since 1996.
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Table 3.14; Statistical Data 1949-1999
Y ear
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

GDP
0
10,155
11,202
10,880
10,436
12,172
13,352
13,922
14,352
14,867
16,259
16,883
18,099
19,051
20,249
21,380
22,328
21,980
21,774
24,304
26,658
27,835
30,009
32,905
33,364
33,990
34,434
34,227
34,166
34,823
35,585
36,005
37,048
36,876
37,129
37,185
38,159
38,913
40,645
41,340
41,148
42,412
42,314
43,727
44,156
46,073
47,765
49,096
49,464
49,471
49,359

GPDRATE

0.09
-0.03
-0.04
0.14
0.09
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.05
0.04
-0.02
-0.01
0.10
0.09
0.04
0.07
0.09
0.01
0.02
0.01
-0.01
0
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
0
0.01
0
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.02
0
0.03
0
0.03
0.01
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.01
0
0

Immigration
239,954
170,563
175,279
24,610
11,575
18,491
37,528
56,330
72,634
27,290
23,988
24,692
47,735
61,533
64,489
55,036
31,115
15,957
14,469
20,703
38,111
36,750
41,930
55,888
54,886
31,981
20,028
19,754
21,429
26,394
37,222
20,428
12,599
13,723
16,906
19,981
10,642
9,505
12,965
13,034
24,050
199,516
176,100
77,057
76,805
79,844
76,361
70,605
65,962
57,700
77,921

Population
1,174,000
1,370,000
1,578,000
1,630,000
1,669,000
1,718,000
1,789,000
1,872,000
1,976,000

Percimmig
0.20
0.12
0.11
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04

2,032,000
2,089,000
2,150,000
2,234,000
2,332,000
2,430,000
2,526,000
2,598,000
2,657,000

0.01
0.01

2,776,000
2,841,000
2,930,000
3,022,000
3,121,000
3,225,000
3,338,000
3,422,000
3,493,000
3,575,000
3,653,000
3,738,000
3,836,000
3,922,000
3,978,000
4,064,000
4,119,000
4,200,000
4,266,000
4,331,000
4,407,000
4,477,000
4,560,000
4,822,000
5,059,000
5,196,000
5,328,000
5,472,000
5,619,000
5,689,000
5,987,000
6,038,000
6,200,000

0.01
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.01
0.04

Strikes
53
72
76
94
84
82
87
74
59
48
51
135
125
144
126
136
288
286
142
100
114
163
169
168
96
71
117
123
126
85
117
84
90
112
93
149
131
142
174
156
120
117

0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01

77
114
73
75
71
75
69

0.01
0.01

53
66

Strikers
5189
9100
9715
14010
8804
12123
9861
11452
3692
6050
5873
14420
26184
37588
86475
47168
90210
85953
25058
42146
44496
114941
88265
87309
122348
27141
114091
114970
194297
224354
250420
91451
315346
838700
188305
528638
473956
215227
814501
327193
209841
571172
38776
211833
462208
106047
7 5792
124215
434335
265781
232583
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Avgstrik
98
126
128
149
105
148
113
155
63
126
115
107
209
261
686
347
313
301
176
421
390
705
522
520
1,274
382
975
935
1,542
2,639
2,140
1,089
3,504
7,488
2,025
3,548
3,618
1,516
4,681
2,097
1,749
4,882
504
1,858
6,332
1,414
1,067
1,656
6,295
5,015
3,524

Unem

8.6
7.2
7.5
7
5.7
5.5
4.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.3
3.6
7.4
10.4
6.1
4.5
3.8
3.5
2.8
2.6
3
3.1
3.6
3.9
3.6
2.9
4.8
5.1
5
4.5
5.9
6.7
7.1
6.1
6.4
8.9
9.6
10.6
11.2
10
7.8
6.3
6.7
7.7
8.6
8.9
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Data Analysis;
After compiling the data into twenty eight cases representing the entire Israeli
array of coalition governments a multiple regression analysis was conducted in two
stages.

In the first phase we regressed independent variables on size and then on
ideological parameter of the coalition as dependent variables. This is conducted in order
to measure the significance of the multiple regression models in accounting for size and
ideological parameter of the coalition.

In a further examination of our model we

measured its significance before and after 1969. We call this stage coalition formation
analysis.

In the second phase we regressed independent variables, along with size and
ideology, on duration as the dependent variable. This was done in two steps: first we
regressed the model using first year events data as to determine first year events in the
life of government in days; second we regressed the last year events data as to determine
last year events in the life of government in days. We further examined our model in pre
and post-69 using the same steps in analysis.

It is important to keep in mind that regression analysis provides a linear-based
measure of association rather than an affirmation of causation. The major pitfalls of our
least squares multiple regression is that our measurement of association is based on

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

108
relatively small number of cases (N=28) with seven independent variables in the
formation analysis and nine independent variables in the durational analysis.

This

represents a major shortcoming for any generalization that can be made in regard to
regression results. Multicolinearity represents another problem for the analysis. Such a
problem is associated with the integration of correlated explanatory variables. Although,
our independent variables may have no significant correlation among each other, such an
association may slightly remain present.

Comparative Case Study Methodology
The short comings of having a small number of cases to investigate quantitatively
(N=28) make us search for an additional methodology for theoretical confirmation. A
suitable investigative approach is the one that can, as Alexander George reasons, “convert
‘lessons of history’ into a comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity of the
phenomenon or activity in question” (George, 1979, p. 43).

We adopt George’s analytical approach known as “the method of structured
focused comparison” (George, 1979).

It is based on the strategy of grouping historic

phenomena that occur repeatedly throughout history as classes of similar events to be
studied and compared. It allows the development of scientific generalizations and general
laws that are specific to each class. This is achieved through establishing correlation
between independent and dependent variables in each case and describing the
relationship in general terms as to be considered as one of a class of such events.
Alexander suggests that this is possible through an inductive analytical approach whereby
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categories are established to describe the variance in each variable through different
cases.

The structured focused comparison approach has various weaknesses and
advantages. The main weakness is that generalization would remain limited to the small
population investigated unless similar conditions can be shown to exist for a comparative
group. Also, no formal statistical methods and probability calculations are employed.
Among the advantages of this approach is the ability to systematically deal with a
relatively small number of cases. Also it provides the researcher with the capacity to
select cases based on a variety of outcomes, not just quantified data. Furthermore it
allows the identification of the conditions and context under which each distinctive type
of causal pattern occurs rather than attempting to address the question of how often each
occurs or is expected to occur.

As George suggested a “... controlled comparison is

useful for developing a differentiated theory comprised of conditional generalizations
rather than frequency distributions” (George, 1979, p. 60).

George’s approach requires important prerequisites.

First there must be a

capacity to employ “disciplined-configurative’’ mode of analysis which “describes and
analyzes the case in terms of theoretically relevant general variables” (George, 1979, p.
51). Furthermore, the structure of the research must be able to define the “class” of
events which the theory seeks to explain. And finally, this approach should be capable of
applying a selective and focused technique in all the case treatments.
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Application o f Structured Focused Comparison to Israeli Coalition Study

Three phases are essential in this research design and implementation: design,
case studies, and theoretical implications (Figure 3.7). Each phase must achieve various
tasks and answer essential questions as follow:

Phase I: Design
•

Research question. Literature review, and initial theorization
a. What is phenomenon or behavior to be explained?
b. What are the relevant theories (variables)?
c. Which theory (ies) are most relevant and may require refinement or
elaboration.

•

Model of investigation
a. What is the dependent variable?
b. What are the independent and intervening variables?
c. What are the control variables which will allow comparison?
Case study selection
a. Select appropriate representative cases from the universe.
Plausible Theory
a. Generalize the causal relations between independent and dependent variables.
In other words, establish a set of hypotheses that are the essence of a plausible
theory.
Establish criteria for case evaluation
a. Ask the same questions that examine plausible theory hypotheses for each
case or class of cases in the controlled comparison.

•
•

•

Phase II: The Case Studies
a. Apply analysis for each case or set of cases.
b. Develop a historic explanation (casual imputation) for the outcome in each
case as they relate to the independent variables.
c. Examine alternative or null hypotheses.

Phase III: Drawing the theoretical implications of the case studies
a. What are the results: answer to the questions and confirmation to the
hypotheses.
b. Assess, refine, and/or elaborate initial theory.
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Ill
Figure 3.7: Steps in Structured Focused Comparison Approach
Pre-Research
Requisites

Design

Case Studies

Theory

I. Pre-Research requisites:
Applying George’s focused case comparison approach presupposes the ability to
establish a “disciplined-configurative” mode of analysis. Our objective is to explain two
phenomena that are relevant to most coalition theoretical research, i.e., coalitions’
formation and duration. As has been elaborated in chapter 2 we have proposed various
theoretically relevant variables responsible for coalition behaviors.

These include

structural variables such as coalition competitiveness, coalition size, and coalition
ideological parameters as well as event variables, such as internal and external pressures.
These variables are thought to discriminate between the formation and duration of
various Israeli coalition governments and they meet the first prerequisite of George’s
method by constituting a ‘pre-theory’ model for analysis.

The second prerequisite establishes the need for the researcher to define and examine
the “class” of events which the theory seeks to explain. In this study, the aim is to reveal
the variables responsible for particular coalition formation; namely the coalition size and
ideological parameter. Why is a particular “class” of governments established with a
particular size and ideology? And consequently how is this structural formation, while
taking political developments at hand, attributed to a short-lived or a long-lived “class” of
governments?

By being able to define the “class” (short-lived governments vs. long-
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lived governments) which the theory seeks to distinguish the second prerequisite of the
research approach is fulfilled.

The final prerequisite presupposes that the researcher must be able to apply a
selective and focused technique in case treatment to see whether the predictions are
correct.

In this study we meet this by establishing a selective criteria to study “the

shortest” and “the longest” governments. This prerequisite is further satisfied in
comparing both groups by asking the same set of questions. Such a comparison provide
a mean to evaluate independent variables responsible for different government durations.

II. Design
a. Theoretical Relevance
In Chapter 2 we reviewed major theoretical research in the domain of coalition
theory. We examined the structural paradigm and its sects. We also reviewed the event
paradigm which originally emerged as a challenge to the structural views. However, we
have come to realize that contemporary efforts have aimed to bridge and synthesize both
approaches. We examined some of the gaps evident in these synthetic views and we
proposed alternative solutions and measures. Most importantly we advanced the view
that coalition behaviors are significant to be analyzed as a determinant to party behaviors,
rather than the contrary. Parties’ decisions to abort a coalition, for example, are often
calculated relative to the policy objectives and the side-payments the coalition offers.
And in order to examine the coalition on its own terms we establish variables that are
essential for such an analysis.

Namely, we formulate two new structural variables:
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coalition ideological parameter and coalition competitiveness (see chapter 3 for definition
and measures).

As we further examined the literature we recognized another inadequacy in
synthetic coalition literature. We find that theories continue to debate whether to take the
structure or the event as a more determinant factor in coalition durability.

Further

investigation leads us to question which events matter the most and at what particular
time in the life of a coalition government? We propose to examine this by analyzing the
different impacts “external” and “internal” event pressures have on coalition formation
and coalition duration as the ruling alliance ages. We consider the theory composed in
chapter 2 as a tentative theory in need of investigation towards either confirmation or
further revisions.

b. Unit of Analysis, c. Dependent Variables, and d. Independent and Control
variables
Unit of analysis and variables are examined and defined at the beginning of the
chapter.

e. Case study selection
As has been discussed, our goal is to understand the underlying structural and
event factors responsible for government’s formation and duration. Therefore, our case
selection criteria for comparison take both extremes of government duration as a base of
analysis. We select the shortest vs. the longest lived coalitions to be the object of our
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investigation. Our selection criteria, however, does not include caretaker governments,
since their shortcoming and termination (election) is inevitable regardless of any
consideration.93

The shortest lived pre-1969 governments were the second and twelfth coalition
governments.

The second government lasted only 342 days while the twelfth

government lasted 383 days (Table 3.15).

In post 1969 the shortest duration

governments were the sixteenth (90 days) and twenty-sixth governments (206 days). In
contrast the longest lived governments were the seventh (796 days) and thirteenth (1162
days) in pre-1969 and eighteenth (1507 days) and twenty-fifth (1194 days) governments
in post-1969 (Table 3.16). These governments will serve as our cases for analysis and
comparison. In depth description and case analysis of each of these governments will be
provided in chapter 4.

Table 3.15: Shortest Lived Israeli Ruling Coalitions in Pre vs. Post 1969 (in days)
Knesset
1
5
8
13

Government
2
12
16
26

Begins
10/30/1950
12/22/1964
3/6/1974
11/22/1995

Ends
10/6/1951
1/9/1966
6/2/1974
6/17/1996

Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion
Eshkol
Meir
Peres

Duration
342
383
90
206

Table 3.16: Longest Lived Israeli Ruling Coalitions in Pre vs. Post 1969 (in days)
Knesset
3
6
9
13

Government
7
13
18
25

Begins
11/2/1955
1/10/1966
6/19/1977
7/13/1992

Ends
1/5/1958
3/16/1969
8/4/1981
11/21/1995

Prime Minister
Ben-Gurion
Eshkol
Begin
Rabin

Duration
796
1162
1507
1194

93 Only one Israeli government is officially considered as a caretaker, i.e., the Sixth Israeli government inaugurated in
6/25/1955 under Shared and lived 126 days until an election was held.
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f. Plausible Theory
We turn our theory that was established in chapter 2 and diagramed in Figure 3.1
into a plausible theory to be inductively analyzed and possibly refined and revised.
Restated, our theory suggests two relevant stages crucial for understanding coalition
stability: formation and duration. In the formation process structural variables such as
competition as well as event pressure variables are thought to determine the size and
ideological parameter of the coalition. Increasing competition and event pressures press
coalitions toward consensual formations where size and ideological parameters are
enlarged and widened. In the duration process, structured variables serve in prolonging
government life to the extent coalitions are most efficiently formed in the first place, i.e.,
the coalition formed smaller in size and tighter in ideological parameter is thought to last
the longest.

Another structural variable that impacts duration is competitiveness.

Coalition systems that are more competitive would tend to be maintained more
significantly than non-competitive systems. Event pressure variables are also important
to durability; the greater the pressure the shorter the duration of the government.

g. Criteria for Case Evaluation
As suggested by George the principal strategy of this research is to implement the
same questions to be investigated in each case and ‘class’ of cases under study, allowing
a final controlled comparison evaluation. Questions for each case are formulated to
address three distinct phenomena.

First we need to understand the pre-formation

conditions. Toward that that purpose we design our questions to evaluate the impact of
both structural and event pressure variables on the formative size and ideological
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parameter of the coalition. Second the questions are designed to examine the impact of
early formation and event pressure variables on duration. Lastly, the questions aim to
reveal the impact of the later event pressures to examine the ongoing changes of events’
pressure on government’s durability. In other words, the questions will measure whether
the government duration was linked to aging or its ability to reduce event pressures
(Table 3.17).

This design will allow us to set the stage for comparative analysis first between
short-lived and long-lived coalitions and then between pre-1969 and post-1969 coalition
systems if necessary. This is done in order to answer the fundamental research questions
as to whether systematic or events’ pressure determines coalition formation and duration,
which is more significant in determining formation and duration, and whether event
pressure gain momentum in coalition termination as they age (Table 3.17).

Table 3.17: Question for the Comparative Case Study of Israeli Coalitions94
Structure: H ow and why is the coalition structurally formed? (Size, Ideology, and Competitiveness)
Econom ics as Event Pressure: Is the country facing econom ic growth or decline before formation, after
formation, and at termination?
Immigration as Event Pressure:

Is the country facing immigration increase or decline before formation,

after formation, and at termination?
External Developm ents as Event Pressure: Is the country facing external pressure before formation, after
formation, and at termination?

94 Details about measuring and analyzing these questions have been discussed in the previous sections
regarding qualitative variables’ definitions and measures.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

117
CHAPTER 4
QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

In this chapter a quantitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition
formation and duration. The data were analyzed as to reveal the relationship between
coalition size, ideological parameter, and duration, with structural and event pressures.
The data were plotted to reveal trends of every variable throughout the years since Israel
was founded. A multivariate linear regression (OLS) and a robust regression analysis
were conducted to show the significance of the models developed in chapter 2. While the
models were not found significant, partly in light of small population of cases, certain key
variables did emerge, as trend analysis also showed that the dominant party power index
has consistently declined, foreign aid increased, and numbers of strikers per strike
increased over the years. These changes in trends became apparent since 1969. Thus, the
need for a qualitative comparative approach emerges in order to examine our models in
light of each separate historic period while analyzing a small number of cases.

Data Analysis:
The purpose of this chapter is to implement multiple linear regression analysis in
order to establish the existing relationship between coalition formations and duration
variables with event pressure and structural electoral factors. After compiling the data for
twenty-eight cases representing all Israeli coalition governments established between
1949 and 1999, a multiple regression analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first
stage we regressed the independent variables on the size and then on the ideological
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parameter of the coalitions as the dependent variables. This is done in order to measure
the significance of our theoretical models (Chapter 2) in accounting for coalition
formation tendencies.. We call this stage coalition formation analysis.

In the second stage, ‘duration’ or the number of days the coalition spent in office
became the dependent variable. We regressed independent variables, which included the
number of seats (size) and ideological parameter (ideology) of the coalition, on duration.
This was done in two steps: first we regressed the model using first year events data so
as to determine first year event pressures on the life of government in days; secondly we
regressed the last year event pressures data as to determine last year events’ effect on the
life and demise of government. Potential differences between first year and last year’s
independent variables on cabinets’ duration should provide indication as to which
variables impact the process of aging. We call this stage coalition duration analysis.

It is important to note that regression analysis provides a measure of association
rather than an affirmation of causation. The major pitfalls of our bivariate and multiple
regression analyses were that our measurement of association was based on a relatively
small number of cases (N=28) with seven independent variables in the formation analysis
and nine independent variables in the durational analysis. With such a small N and such a
large number of independent variables a lack in the degrees of freedom will be present.
Some cases were dismissed during statistical analysis due to the lack of unemployment
data during early years of government formations.

This further contributed to the

decreasing size of our already small number of cases and represented another shortfall for
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any generalization we could have made in regard to the regression results.

As one

remedy for this, the weakly associated independent unemployment variable was dropped
from the analyses in efforts to identify the largest associations.95

In addition, the analysis assumes linear relations among the variables, a situation
that might not pertain especially in looking at duration since variables might have more
impact on mid-range than long or short coalitions. Some variables associated with the
annual number of immigration per population and average number of strikers per strike
also revealed skewed distributions. This was corrected by implementing logarithmic
scales for these data. In order to further remedy such problem we implemented the robust
regression technique in STATA. The major advantage of ‘robust regression’ in our data
analysis over OLS is its ability to lessen the influence of outliers while analyzing a small
number of cases (Hamilton, 1992; p. 185).96 Both OLS and Robust regression analyses
were implemented, as to compare results. However, we favored the robust regression
results due to the better capacity of this approach in handling small N size. Nonetheless
and regardless of the statistical application used it remained difficult to assert any
quantitative generalization.

Examining the Findings
We examined our data in two ways. First, we observed the historic trends in each
variable throughout the various years prior to government formation. Trend analysis

95 Although coefficients may be unbiased they are likely to have large standard errors and lack the
important property o f robustness— that is, their size and even the signs o f the coefficients may change with
small changes in specification (deleting or adding one independent variable) or small changes in the sample
(adding or deleting a single case).
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provided directional projection for variables over time.

Secondly, we conducted

bivariate and a multiple regression analyses for our models in order to examine their
significance based on the data prior to government formation, first year of government
formation, and by the last year before government termination.

A. Trends:
The dependent variables this study attempt to explain are: coalition size, coalition
ideological parameter, and coalition duration. Although no significant trend emerged out
of these variables some trend variation can be observed.

For example, duration of

governments slightly increased over the years and duration in post-69 governments
became more extreme, fluctuating from very short to very long duration cabinets (Figure
4.1). This suggests a shift in the formative requirements and/or event pressure on post-69
coalitions, an issue that we will further examine. In Chapters 5 and 6 we analyze the
changes in coalition politics and conclude that after 1969 coalitions needed to cope with
increasing competition and the change associated with external and economic pressures.
Such a change required durable coalitions to form small and tight at low level of external
pressure and large and wide at high external pressure.

96 S ee Hamilton, Lawrence C. “Regression with Graphics” (Belmont: Wadsworth Inc.) 1992.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

121

Figure 4.1: Government Duration in Days 1949-2000
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Data Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il

Coalitions’ size slightly decreased over the years, again fluctuating more after
1969 (Figure 4.2). Coalitions appear to have shifted from mainly large sized formations
(65-90 seats) in the pre-1969 period to either very large or very small post-1969
coalitions (less than 65 or more than 90 seats). Most largely formed coalitions,
particularly before 1969, responded to high level of economic pressure as well as low
level of competition, a conclusion that we will discuss in Chapter 7. However, in the
post-1969 period formation became increasingly sensitive to external pressure, large
formations during situations of external tension and small formations during times of low
external pressure. Such formations, we will further suggest, have contributed to lasting
coalitional alliances.
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F igure 4.2: Israeli Coalition Governments’ Knesset’s Size 1949-1999
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Coalitions’ ideological parameters do not appear to have changed much over the
years. Ideological perspective of the dominant party remained close to that of coalitions
partners and became more consistently closer in recent years. This illustrates that
ideological closeness was necessary between the dominant party and coalition members
for any government to be formed. By the sixteenth and twentieth ruling coalitions (1974
And 1983), wide ideological differences between the dominant party and its partners led
to very short-lived governments (Figure 4.3).97 Increase in competition seems to have
necessitated tight formation contrary to our proposition. Domestic and foreign pressures
in post-1969 period appear to have had a polarizing impact on coalitions; thus

97 The sixteenth government was headed by M eir and lasted only 90 days while the twentieth government was headed
by Shamir and lasted 338 days.
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necessitating close rank among alliances.

This is another result supporting our null

hypotheses.

Figure 4.3: Israeli Governments’ Ideological Param eters, 1949-1999',98
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Data Source: The Principle Guidelines of the Government o f Israel (PGG).

Three of the independent variables examined in the model appeared to have
significantly changed through time, and 1969 emerged as a watershed in each category."
First is the government’s ruling dominant party power index, representing the party’s

98 Ideological parameter o f each coalition government was obtained by content coding the policy statem ent
o f each government entitled “The Principle P olicy Guidelines o f the Government”. The Policy Program o f
the dominant party in each government was also content coded. The difference between the government
position and that o f the dominant party represents a policy space difference that we label as ideological
parameter. For further measures and discussion see Chapter 3.
99W e consider a “significant” trend emerging over time when R 2, in a scaterplot that places consecutive
governments on the y-axis, sores higher than .50 (suggesting steep linear change in relationship over the
time). See Scatterplot Appendix D: Regression by Government. Other variables appear to have a positive
or a negative trend over the years, however, the “significances” o f such trends were considered low due
their respective low R2 score.
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ability to form coalitions relative to other parties. A consistent decline in this index is
evident after 1969 indicating a shift in the Israeli political system toward fragmentation
and competitiveness (Figure 4.4). This fragmentation emerged after a series of setbacks
for Mapai and the labor parties starting with the Lavon affair.100 This episode divided
the leadership of Mapai and fostered the situation of splinter movements among its ranks.
Further fragmentation emerged after the 1967 War, paving the way for territorial and
settler movements that further divided traditional ideological camps over the future of the
Occupied Territories (Isaac, 1984).

Other aspects of fragmentation have been observed in the decline of ideological
parties in favor of ethnic politics. This pattern emerged strongly in Israel following the
arrival of the Soviet Jews in the 1990s and the rise of Israeli Ba’aliah. In the same
period, Sephardic discontent with traditional ideological parties found its way in the
formation and growth of Shas. The propositions made in this study predicted that such an
increase in fragmentation and competition would yield larger-accommodating and more
durable governments (See Figure 2.4 for illustration).

100 In July 1954 Egypt was plagued by series o f bombs directed against American and British interests in
Cairo. Islamisist groups were the suspect o f responsibility. It was later discovered, however, that these
bombs were the work o f Israeli intelligence, orchestrated by Colonel Benyamin Givli and aimed at
widening the wedge between the government o f Egypt and both the U.S. and British administrations.
D efense Minister Pinhas Lavon, G ivili’s boss, was accused o f having link to this plot. Investigation to this
affair raked the Labor bloc into bitter internal dispute and continued to the early 1970s. This scandal came
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Figure 4.4: Dominant Party Power Index 1949-1999101
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Data Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.il. Calculation of the power of the
leading government party was based on Banzhaf, John. F. (1965). "Weighted Voting Does not Work: A Mathematical
Analysis." Rutgers Law Review 35.

to be known as the Lavon Affair (See David Hirst, “The Gun and the Olive Branch” (Futura Publications:
1977, 1984).
101 F our post-1969 governm ents em erged am id a noticeable rise in the dom inant party p o w er index: the 14th
and 15th governments (.99% ) as well as the 25th and 2 6 thcabinets (74.3% ). The 14th and 15th governments
were formed follow ing the election o f the 7th Knesset where almost all left oriented parties joined the Alignment
(56 seats) forming a grand labor alliance. No left-oriented “system party” was left outside this grand coalition bloc to
make alliance with. Therefore when Benzhaf power index calculation was made regardless of ideological
consideration, the Alignment power index to form a winning coalition scored high. However, if ideological
consideration was to be made, the Alignment could have only added 2 additional seats to a left alliance short of a ruling
majority. Likewise, both 25th and 26th governments were formed during the 13th Knesset and led by the
Labor Party who controlled 44 seats (34.7% ). The numeric power gain o f Labor in the 13* Knesset
indicated an increased in its capacity to form a winning coalition. However, a closer look into aspects that
stretched beyond the electoral strength in the distribution o f seats among the 13th K n esset’s parties may
reveal otherwise. Particularly if w e exam ine the various ideological orientations o f the parties w e w ill find
that ideological partners to a Labor-led coalition were very limited. Only M eretz (12 seats) emerged as an
ideologically close partner to Labor. Taking ideological consideration in coalition formation, the power
index o f Labor in both 2 5 th and 26th governments would have been undermined. In fact both 25th and 26th

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

28

126

The second trend change is found for foreign aid (Figure 4.5). Foreign assistance
to Israel in early statehood was based primarily on German reparations, which amounted
between 60 and 80-million U.S. dollars annually.102 Subsequently, aid to Israel has grown
tremendously, particularly with U.S. assistance after the Camp David Accords. Post1969, military and economic aid to Israel came to exceed two billion U.S. dollars
annually.103 This represented a great improvement over the pre-69 period where annual
aid amounted to less than one-billion U.S. dollars (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5: Foreign Aid to Israel in Millions of Dollars 1949-1999 104
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Data Source: Jewish Online Research Center, w w w .Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html, “U.S. Assistance to Israel.”

Labor-led governments struggled to maintain majority support in the 13th Knesset, while forming as
minimum winning coalitions controlling less than half o f the 13th Knesset.
102 In constant dollars. Kimche, Jon “Israel in 1965” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 208, No. 5; pages 60-65. November
1961
103 In constant dollars.
104 Figures are adjusted to 1995 inflation index.
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The increase of U.S. aid to Israel (and Egypt) signaled Washington’s growing role
in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly after the 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. A U.S. - Israeli strategic alliance was further solidified following the U.S.
sponsored Camp David Accords that eliminated Egypt as a major Arab threat against
Israel.

After Camp David, U.S. assistance remained very crucial for Israel’s military and
economic wellbeing. As posited in the model, foreign assistance can reduce external
pressure, thus relaxing conditions for consensus and helping prolong government
duration.

Thus in light of this trend we would expect smaller-based coalitions and

governments of longer duration after 1969.

A third major change is evident in the number of strikers per strike in Israel, an
indicator of potential social disruption which could threaten governments’ longevity.
Major strikes became frequent through time reflecting Israel’s industrial development and
consequently greater labor disputes. Again post-69 Israel witnessed greater intensity in
labor strikes reflected in larger number of strikers per strikes than that in the pre-1969
period (Figure 4.6). This might have reflected or contributed to Likud’s growing political
power, and the attendant policy changes that might have threatened trade unions and
Labor Party status.
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Figure 4.6: Annual Strikers p e r Strike 1949-1999105
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il
for data since 1996.

According to our theoretical propositions, increase in labor strife should have
been a factor in the establishment of large or accommodating coalitions. Furthermore,
the increase in such a pressure is expected to have led to shorter duration coalition
governments after 1969.

No significant trend was evident in other independent variables, suggesting a
relative political and economic stability in the country.106 Severity of external conflicts
variable, for example, shows that since its establishment Israel continued to exist in an
environment of conflict and confrontation.

Coexistence between Israel and the

105 R2 value was improved from .55 to .81 when we plotted the log value o f the number o f strikers per
strike.
106 Scatterplots for the rest o f the variables revealed very low values o f R.
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Palestinians often entailed violence. Israel’s military engagements with the surrounding
Arab countries saw outbreaks of wars or collective violence approximately every five to
ten years (Figure 4.7). It must be recognized, however, that the Arab states’ collective
military and security threat against Israel has tremendously declined over the years,
particularly after 1967 and 1973 Wars. The signing of the various peace agreements
between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority as well as the beginning path
of normalization between Israel and most Arab States contributed to an increasing
expectation of peace and security.

Yet, despite security gains, Israel’s sensitivity to

external and then internal pressure after 1969 grew tremendously. As we will later reveal
in Chapter 6, foreign or security policy became a source of greater polarization and
division among Israelis, leading in one instance to the assassination of a Prime Minister
(Rabin).

Thus, we find that the severity of conflict remained relatively high throughout the
history of Israeli coalitions, yet its impact on coalition formation and duration became
more prominent in later governments, as we will show in both our multiple regression
analysis and throughout our qualitative case study Chapters 5 and 6.

We will further

demonstrate that larger coalitions, forming amid high level of external conflict, lasted
longer than smaller coalitions.
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Figure 4,7: Severity of External Conflicts Confronted by Israeli Governments 1949-1999107
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Data Source: Casualties and Conflicts: D. Singer’s “Correlate of War Project” (1949-1992), The Jewish
Online Research Center - Jewish Virtual Library” www. Israeltour.org/jsource/vitaloc.html : “Israeli Casualties in
Battle.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affair’s website, “Timeline of Events: Half a Century of Independence 1948-1998.
www.mfa.go.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH00ul0.
VJ.N.
Resolutions:
Jewish
Virtual
Library
http://www.iewishviruallibrarv.org/isouroe/UN/stoc.html
and
http://www.
ievvishvirualli brarv.org
/isource/UN/gatoc.html compiled from he Avalon Project: http://www.vale.edu/lawweb/avalon.

Other variables showed slight trends over the years. Noticeable increase in
Israel’s GDP occurred over the years and by the 1990s exceeded that of its neighboring
countries combined. Thus Israel had the capabilities to take an economic leadership
position in the region, and to support its military establishment, but lacked the political
legitimacy to reach regional leadership potential. This fact had political implications for
Israeli governments, and for the origin of desired peace accords as well. Annual changes
in GDP slightly declined over the years, again suggesting relative economic stability. In

107 See Chapter 3 for severity o f external conflict definition and scale.
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the post-69 period, annual average changes in GDP declined to less than + or - 4% while
scoring above + or - 4% before 1969 (Figure 4.8).

These patterns suggest that, in accordance with our theoretical propositions, the
decline in economic pressure over the years has potentially contributed to smaller and
more durable coalition formations.

Figure 4.8; Annual Change in Israeli GDP 1949-1999
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il
for data since 1996.

Israel’s e annual unemployment rate

slightly increased across time.

Israel’s

development into a major economic industrial country and a world mini-economic power
helped establish a relatively large labor force and demand. In earlier years, most labor
was agriculturally oriented around the Kibbutz and similar collectivities. With
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industrialization, labor dislocation emerged with more people moving to industrial
centers and reporting employment status.108 (Figure 4.9). This trend of increased annual
unemployment is matched by the increasing rate of annual strikers per strike (Figure 4.6).
Both variables reflect certain economic dislocation as a direct consequence of growing
industrialization in the country.

The predicted impact of such dislocation on the

formation and maintenance of governments would be increasing pressures leading to
larger but less durable governments.

Figure 4.9: Annual Unemployment Rate by Israeli Governments 1949-1999
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il
for data since 1996.

108 A lso a growing num ber o f poor can be recorded, which is another problem associated with growing
industrialization. In 1998, for exam ple, the number o f poor reached 18% o f the population during high
industrial growth, (see Jewish Virtual Libray: http://www.israeltour.org/jsource/vitaltoc.html)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

133
The last trend variable is annual number of immigrants per population. Despite
significant immigration from the USSR and Ethiopia, the annual per capita figure slightly
declined over the years (Figure 4.10). This was measured in order to record the pressure
immigrants might have exerted on the country as a whole relative to its entire population.
The size of the population becomes relevant in this regard.

There could be a

tremendous drop in Israeli immigrants in the future particularly after the pool of Russian
immigrants has been drained.109

Figure 4.10: Annual Immigration and Immigration per Population Rate by Israeli Governments
1949-1999
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D ata Source: Statistical Abstract o f Israel”, Central Bureau o f Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs.gov.il
for data since 1996.

109 See the distribution o f the Jewish population around the world in the Jewish Virtual Library:
http://www.israeltour.org/jsource/vitaltoc.html. Also see projected population change in Statistical Abstract of Israel.
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Figure 4.10: Approximate Number of Immigrants by Israeli Governments 1949-1999110
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D ata Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics. Now available online http://www.cbs. eov.il
for data since 1996.

Approximate number of immigrants during governments’ time in power is also
demonstrated in figure 4.10 with no apparent trend. Immigration pressure appears to
have been periodically renewed throughout the history of Israeli governments. Both
governments formed before and after 1969 encountered periodical change in
immigration, although none so great as in the wave of Russian immigration of the early
1990s.

This fluctuation, it will be later revealed in our regression and qualitative

analyses, has been partially responsible for the variant impacting pressure on the
formation of coalition and duration of the coalition. Immigration pressure, it will be

110 The num ber o f immigrants per government was not a straightforward measure, since every government
may begin in the middle o f the year and terminate in the sam e year or in the m iddle o f the follow ing year.
The number o f immigrants is calculated annually. T herefore, w e approximated the number o f immigrants
per government by calculating the proportion o f government stay in power in a particular year and
multiplying that proportion by the total number o f immigrants for the same year. Then w e added all annual
proportions o f immigrants that responded to the total annual proportions o f governm ent’s time in office.
This is done in order to obtain an approximation to the total number o f immigrants who entered the country
while the government was serving office.
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revealed, has been partially responsible over the downsizing of cabinet formation and the
shortening of the coalition duration.

B. Examining the Models
The models proposed in Chapter 2 suggested that there are two important
components to coalition formation that need to be explained: the size and the ideological
parameter of the governing alliance.111 Explanatory variables selected in the models
were mainly of two types.

The first are of structural nature and measure the

competitiveness of each Knesset as reflected in the power of the dominant party to form
winning alliances.

The second set of independent variables indicates external and

internal political pressures exerted on coalition after formation and at termination
(Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). It was originally hypothesized that competitiveness as well as
political pressures press political parties to form large alliances and wide accommodating
policy programs (Figure 2.1).

Our trend analysis points in various directions:
> First, we observed a stochastic decline in dominant party power index, suggesting
higher competition, and expecting larger and durable formations.
> The observed increase in foreign assistance undermines external pressure and,
thus, we expected small coalition formations of long durations.
> Increase in the number of strikers per strike presented expectation for larger but
less durable formations.

1,1 Definition and measures o f both size and ideological parameter is discussed in details in chapter 3.
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Therefore, because various factors may have different impact on governments’
formation and duration, the trend of both formation and duration variables alone cannot
show patterns corresponding to the combined impact of independent variables, seen in
Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. The only quantitative way to reveal the various directional
impacts of each independent variable in shaping the formation and the duration of the
governments is to conduct bivariate correlation as well as a multivariate regression
analysis.

Based on the formation data, and after plotting the variables against the
coalition’s ideological parameter and then the number of coalition seats (size), our
bivariate analysis did not produce any statistically significant result Duration analysis, on
the other hand, had one significant correlate, i.e., severity of external conflict a year prior
to government termination. In a two-tailed test it showed significant correlation with
durable governments of .49 at the .01 level.112 This suggested that with N=28 the
increase in the severity of external conflict a year prior to government termination was
associated with prolonging governments.

Our OLS model produced reasonably significant results in predicting coalition’s
size but not ideological parameter. The model predicted the number of coalition’s seats
(44% of variance) at a significance level of .06, and ideological parameter (35% of
variance) only at a significance level of .17 as seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.3). In either case,
the model failed to explain at least 50% of the variance in the dependent variables.
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In terms of individual predictor variables, in OLS regression only one
independent variable in each analysis showed significance relationship with our
dependent variables.

A unit-increase in the level o f external severity o f conflict was

nearly significantly associated at a .063 level with a 6.61 increase in ideological
parameter scores while holding other variables constant (Table 4.1).

This result

supported our proposition that external pressure undermines or suppresses the policy
differences between political parties resulting in a broader government policy program.

By the same token, for OLS analysis of coalition size (Table 4.3), only the annual
percent of immigrants per population appeared to have a significant and negative impact
on number of coalition seats in formative decision making. Indeed this was a highly
significant association, and the entire model was quite significant as well, though not
especially strong in accounting for overall variance in coalition size.

These findings were partly upheld and partly contradicted in robust regression
analysis (Tables 4.2 and 4.4). Robust analysis did not support the significance of external
conflict for coalition ideological parameters. Instead robust regression showed, in the
only significant relationship, that a unit-increase in the log o f annual number o f strikers
per strike is strongly associated at a .01 level with a 6.29 decrease in ideological
parameter while all other variables were held constant (Table 4.2).

This finding

supports the null hypothesis 2, indicating contrary to Robertson (1984), that internal
‘event pressure’ intensifies the divergence in policy positions, thus exerting pressure
toward smaller and narrower alliances as it becomes more difficult and ultimately
112 See Bivariate A nalysis Appendix.
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infeasible to bridge the ideological or policy preference gaps in forming governments
(Chapter 2, Figure 2.2).

The robust overall model for the number of seats did not reach significance.
However, as with OLS, the annual percent of immigrants per population appeared to have
a significant (negative) coefficient, while the rest of the variables were held constant
(Tables 4.3 and 4.4). Both in the OLS and Robust analysis showed similar significance
levels, with the robust analysis suggesting that a percentage increase in the log o f annual
immigrants per population is associated with 8.86 decrease in the number o f coalition
seats with all other variables held constant (Table 4.4). This finding supports the null
hypothesis 2 that immigrant pressure flares partisan differences and instigates alliances to
form smaller and closer ranks (Chapter 2, Figure 2.2).
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Table 4.1
OLS Regression Analysis of Ideological Paramei ter(n= 26)113
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f Conflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
L og o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike

B

Sb

t

sig (2-tail)

-0.23
6.62
0.00
-125.67
1.40

0.33
3.36
0.00
75.62
3.08

-0.68
1.97
-0.06
-1.66
0.46

0.50
0.06**
0.95
0.11
0.65

-6.74

4.07

-1.65

0.12
0.17

12.41

R2 = .35

Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4.2
Robust Regression Analysis of Ideological Parameter (n= 26)
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f Conflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
Log o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike
Constant

B

Sb

t

sig (2-tail)

-0.11
0.99
0.00
-65.50
1.09

0.17
1.76
0.00
39.72
1.62

-0.61
0.56
0.43
-1.65
0.67

0.55
0.58
0.67
0.12
0.51

-6.29
60.09

2.14
22.60

-2.94
2.66

0.01***
0.02

F (6,19) = 4.33 Prob= 0.Q1114
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

113 28 cases were examined. However, the lack o f official statistic data on GNP in early years is
responsible for lowering the analysis to 26 cases.
114 Prob>F (6,19) = 0.01 indicates that the F test, which is a test for the overall linear relationship between
the independent variables and the dependent variable with F(6,19) means six degrees o f freedom in the
numerator (that’s the number o f independent variables that w e have), 19 degrees o f freedom in the
denominator (that’s n-k-1 or 26-6-1=19), a significant probability for a linear relationship exists (4.33)
between the x ’s and the y.
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T able 4 3
OLS Regression Analysis of N um ber of Coalition’s Seats (n= 26)
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f Conflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
Log o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike

B

sb

t

sig (2-tail)

0.54
0.00
-16.62
-9.18

0.34
3.44
0.00
77.54
3.16

1.60
0.67
-0.62
-0.21
-2.91

0.13
0.51
0.55
0.83
0.01***

-0.70

4.18

-0.17

0.87

2 .3 2

R2 = 0.44
12.73
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

0.06*

Table 4.4
Robust Regression Analysis of Number of Seats(n= 26)
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f Conflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
Log o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike
Constant

B

sb

t

sig (2-tail)

0.53
.2.40
.-0.00
-11.50
-8.86

0.39
3.93

1.36
0.61
-0.51
-0.13
-2.46

0.19
0.55
0.62
0.90
0.02**

-0.23
0.73

0.82
0.48

-1.10
36.65

0 .0 0

88.49
3.60
4 .7 7

50.35

F(6,19) = 1.87 Prob= 0.1 4 m
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Our theoretical formation models were based on various hypothetical propositions
drawn from the coalition literary traditions (Chapter 2). The first hypothesis predicted

115 Weak linear relationship between the xs and the y.
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large and ideologically wide coalitions corresponding to high coalition competition. We
found no quantitative evidence for such an assertion as party competition increased after
1969, and thus we were not able to confirm or reject Mershon’s thesis (1996, 2001).
This posed a new dilemma for our models, particularly in analyzing whether
competitiveness had distinct impact on formation before and after 1969. In order to
examine such a proposition, we must divide our population into two sets of coalitions
consisting of governments formed before and after 1969. This will leave us with 13
governments for the first set and 15 for the second. Due to such a small population size
comparative case study analysis will be necessary to examine such a proposition, an
approach we will explore in the following chapter.

The second aspect of our coalition formation models proposed that coalitions are
formed larger and ideologically wider when confronted with mounting domestic and
external pressures (hypothesis 2, Chapter 2). This proposition was partially contradicted
by our robust regression analysis where the increase in the number of strikers per strike
was found to be significantly associated with tight ideological parameters (rejecting
Robertson; 1984, 1986). The null hypothesis was further asserted in both our OLS and
robust regressions where increased immigration pressure was significantly associated
with smaller-sized coalitions. Our hypothesis was only confirmed in OLS analysis with
regard to increasing external pressure having positive effect on the ideological parameter
of the coalition.

Coalitions’ policy positions, our OLS model suggested, became

accommodating to various ideological perspectives as external conflict pressure on the
country mounts. Overall, however, in dealing with ideology, the robust model was quite

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission .

142

significant, though modestly powerful, and featured the effects of strikes in narrowing
coalition parameters.

Predicting coalition size in our formation model indicated some validity for the
combined propositions (including null hypotheses). The size model appeared nearly
significant, though at a modest level of variance explained (R2=44%) in OLS but not the
robust regression analysis.

Once again, trend analysis revealed shifts in important

characteristics of Israeli polity, which necessitate careful examination of coalition
behaviors while taking historic transformations into account. As our annual number of
strikers per strike and unemployment trends revealed, a dramatic increase began to take
shape following 1969 (Figure 4.3). This necessitates a qualitative comparative analysis of
our formation model for the periods before and after 1969.

As for the duration model proposed in Chapter 2, it was suggested that explaining
ruling coalitions’ duration involves two sets of independent explanatory variables. The
first set involves systematic structural variables entailing parliamentary competitiveness,
coalition size, and coalition ideological parameter. It was hypothesized that ‘efficient
formation,’ i.e., smaller size and tighter ideological parameter; contribute to extended
duration (Chapter 2, hypotheses 5 and 6).

It was also proposed that party system

competitiveness prolongs duration (Chapter 2, hypothesis 4). The second set of
independent variables includes event pressure indicators (Chapter 2, Figure 2.3). It was
argued that pressure upon formation or increasing change in pressure before termination
shortens the durability of the coalition (Chapter 2, hypothesis 3).
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An OLS analysis of data obtained the first year after government formation
accounted for a modest 22% of variance in duration (Table 4.5) and with a generally
insignificant confidence level. Dealing with individual predictors, and implementing
OLS, no significant correlation was found between the examined independent variables
and coalition duration.

However, when we use robust regression analysis the overall model appears as
highly significant, and the dominant party power index emerges as a significant predictor
of duration. Robust regression shows that a percentage increase in the power index o f
the dominant party was associated with 33.21 days increase in the duration o f the
government (Table 4.6). This implies that the years of lower party competition saw
longer duration coalitions. This finding contradicts hypothesis 4, which claimed that
coalition longevity was associated with higher level of competition. This result also
supported Grofman and Roozentaal’s (1997) thesis against Mershon’s (1996) view.
Neither the size nor the ideological parameter appeared to be significantly relevant to
duration analysis (Hypotheses 5 and 6, Chapter 2). Nonetheless, as has been previously
discussed, we still must further examine such hypotheses in light of important
institutional and historic developments as revealed by our trend analysis, which showed a
dramatic increase in competition as well as changes in coalitions’ size and ideological
parameters following 1969 national election (Figure 4.1, 4.5, 4.6).
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Robust Regression also reveals the significance of outside aid in prolonging
governments; each one million U.S. dollars increase in foreign aid is associated with a
0.21 day increase in the duration o f the coalition (Table 4.6).

This finding supports

hypothesis 3 which proposed that government longevity is associated with the decline in
event pressures or increased resources.

In this case, increase of foreign assistance

indicates a decrease in external pressures (perhaps signaling favorable international
circumstances), and therefore tended to prolong the duration of the ruling coalition.116
This finding supports the logic of Browne’s proposition (1984, 86, 88) where duration is
viewed as a function of declining event pressure. Nonetheless, acceptance of such a
proposition also requires a qualitative comparative examination to the shifting impact of
the dramatic increase in foreign aid on duration after 1969 (Figure 4.2).

116 O f course increasing aid opens the way for subsequently increased foreign pressure on Israel as the aid
donor can conceivably m ove to withdraw the aid if Israel did not cooperate.
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Table 4 5
OLS Regression Analysis of G overnm ent’s Days Based on One Y ear
A fter F orm atio n D ata (n= 27)
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f C onflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
L og o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike
Number o f Coalition Seats
Ideological Parameter

b

sb

T

sig (2-tail)

11.17
25.17
0.02
-2802.12
16.65

11.70
101.24
0.07
2347.55
126.65

-0.66
0.96
0.25
0.30
-1.19

0.52
0.35
0.81
0.77
0.25

125.30
2.44
-6.12

140.38
7.35
6.91

0 13

0.90
0 38
0 74

0 89
0 33

413.85

R2 = .22

0.74

♦Correlation is significant at the 0,1 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4.6
Robust Regression Analysis of Government’s Days Based on One Year
After Formation Data (n= 27)
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f Conflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
Log o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike
Number o f Coalition Seats
Ideological Parameter
Constant

b

sb

T

33.21
94.10
0.21
-1245.08
40.77

8.72
75.51
0.05
1751.01
94.47

3.81
1.25
4.00
-0.71
0.43

172.52
3.32
-3.30
-3565.44

104.71
5.48
5.15
1152.91

1.65
0.61
-0.64
-3.09

sig (2-tail)
0.00***

0.23
0.00***
0.49
0.67
0.12
0.55
0.53
0.01

F (8,18) = 4.28 Prob= 0.005
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0 01 level (2-tailed).

Neither the OLS nor the robust regression models revealed significant association
between events pressures a year prior to government termination and the coalition

117 Strong linear relationship exiting between the xs and the y.
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duration (Table 4.7 and 4.8). Furthermore no significant correlation was evident between
individual predictors and the dependent variable. Unlike some of the trend or bivariate
correlation analyses, these results suggested that the last year events (e.g., external
conflict) did not significantly impact the duration of the coalitions. In both analyses we
found no strong evidence to support the ‘aging proposition’ stated in hypothesis 3 which
predicted that the increase in pressures during a coalition’s office term contributed to its
downfall (Browne, 1982, 84,86). Only in our previous bivariate analysis did we find
indication supporting such a proposition where the deterioration of external conflict at
government’s end year was found to be associated with longer duration coalitions.118 It
appeared logical to conclude that as the coalition ages in power external shocks became
significantly associated with its downfall, but we find no clear evidence of this in the
regression analyses (though conflicts were the closest to significance in the regression
models). Still, however, we need to qualitatively examine such a proposition in order to
compare corresponding impacts on coalitions’ duration before and after 1969.

118 Deterioration in external conflict can include, as explained in Chapter 3, increase in casualties and/or the
level o f hostility with surrounding countries and/or U .N condemnation to international practices. See table
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Table 4.7
OLS Regression Analysis of G overnm ent’s Days Based on the Y ear of
T erm ination D ata (n= 27)
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f C onflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
L og o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
L og o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike
Number o f Coalition Seats
Ideological Parameter

b

sb

T

sig (2-tail)

7.09
177.30
0.00
-1066.79
-52.55

8.75
115.66
0.07
1329.38
92.09

0.81
1.53
-0.03
-0.80
-0.57

0.43
0.14
0.98
0.43
0.58

62.60
-2.83
-5.90

134.09
6.03
6.28

0.47
-0.47
-0.94

0.65
0.65
0.36

374.67
R l = 0.36
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

0.32

Table 4.8
Robust Regression Analysis of Government’s Days Based on the Year of
Termination Data (n= 27)
Independent Variable
Dominant Party Power Index
Severity o f Conflict
Foreign Aid
GDP change year to year
Log o f Number o f Immigrants as
Percent o f Population
Log o f Number o f Strikers Per Strike
Number o f Coalition Seats
Ideological Parameter
Constant

b

sb

t

sig (2-tail)

7.75
193.65
0.01
-0.75
-110.10

9.66
128.69
0.08
1536.22
115.13

0.80
1.50
0.13
-0.34
-0.96

0.43
0.15
0.90
0.74
0.35

57.14
-3.69
-8.07
-992.84

148.30
6.73
7.12
1381.49

0.39
0.59
0.27
-0.72

0.71
0.59
0.27
0.48

F (8 ,1 7 )= 1.22 Prob= 0.3 5 119
♦Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).
♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
♦♦♦Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3.12.
119 Weak linear relationship existing between the xs and the y.
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Discussion
Some event variables appeared to significantly correlate with formation
and duration analyses. Certain event pressure variables, such as labor disputes, appeared
to have association with both formation and durational analyses. Labor disputes appeared
to have driven a wedge between parties and increased the pressure for ideologically
tighter formations.

Also associated with such unexpectedly smaller coalitions was

immigration pressure. External event pressure involved in conflicts, on the other hand,
might have undermined policy differences and ideologically united distant parties. The
structural variables did not reveal significant correlation with either dependent variable,
suggesting perhaps greater impact of event pressure variables on formation analysis.

Durational analysis provided additional support to the significance of event
variables in coalition behaviors.

In our case, annual increase in foreign assistance

positively impacted the duration of coalitions. Structural variables also appeared relevant
to duration outcome. Increase in coalition competition emerged as negatively impacting
the duration of the coalitions. No significant results were found that other structural or
event variables significantly impacted coalition duration.

Furthermore, no significant evidence was found to support the aging thesis. Some
evidences hinted that certain external shocks might have been associated with the
downfall of ‘older’ or long-duration governments. Yet, dismissing systematic variables
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as well as other event pressure variables is premature before we have thoroughly
reviewed cases in the following chapter.

Trend analysis suggested that differences exist in coalition behaviors before and
after 1969. The trend plots showed increase in both foreign aid, unemployment, and the
number of strikers per strikes over the years. Such increases were significantly sharpened
after 1969, along with declining party power dominance scores.

Other variables showed

similar differences between the two periods, but in a less dramatic trend. These patterns
suggested that Israel became further dependent on foreign aid particularly from the U.S.,
and therefore that its coalition behaviors conceivably became more linked with U.S.
foreign policy. In addition, Israeli coalition behaviors became increasingly “industriallabor” oriented reflecting the industrial growth of the country and the rise of “industrial
politics” and the globalized, if somewhat more stable economy.

Most importantly,

however, to coalition behavior was the notable decline in dominant party’s power and,
thus, the fragmentation of the coalition system toward a more competitive arrangement
particularly seen after 1969. Immigration continued to be a significant aspect of coalition
formation as well. The flow of immigration has contributed to increasing fragmentation
in the Israeli system, polling partisanship toward greater ethnic divisions and, therefore,
tighter alliances.

Other potentially important observations in our trend analysis suggested that, with
the exception of wartime, the over-sized coalitions, which were the traditional formation
before 1969, became less of a strategy for post-69 formations. Instead, small or minimum
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winning coalitions became more frequent. Furthermore, though almost all coalitions’
ideological parameters were relatively tight, this became more pronounced post-69.
This difference in variable patterns before and after 1969 presents new challenges to the
proposed models. Perhaps it is the case that our models can be applied to one period
more significantly than another. The only way to examine such a proposition is to further
divide the population of governing Israeli coalitions into two sets for case study analysis.

In the following chapter a qualitative examination is, therefore, made. While a
number of the factors cited in this chapter, such as strikes and immigration, are peculiarly
relevant to Israeli politics, we will remember the overall categories of variables as
structural or event based, so that general findings can be developed about the potency of
these categories in predicting coalition size, ideology and duration in other countries as
well.
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C H PA TE R 5
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:
SHORT DURATION COALITION GOVERNMENTS

In this chapter a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition
formation and duration. The shortest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to
examine the most evident variables associated with governments’ early breakups and
terminations.

The sample examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided

between pre and post-1969 periods. This selection has been followed in order to provide
comparative evidence to whether a transformation in coalition behaviors has occurred
following 1969 general election in Israel. Explanatory variables examined include
economic, immigration, and external pressures as well as the structural competitiveness
of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition government. Changes in pressure
variables as well as the structural competitiveness of the Knesset, the coalition’s size, and
the coalition’s ideological parameter are further examined in a second stage analysis in
order to reveal factors determining the short duration of the governments.

The results of our examination to the four shortest lived Israeli governing
coalitions reveal that economic pressure is directly associated with coalition formation.
Coalitions are often formed on consensual basis (large-wide) when faced by high
economic pressure while formed competitive (small-tight) when confronted by low
economic pressure. In contrast to post-1969 period, economic pressure appeared to have
been higher during early years of statehood formation. Such a condition was reflected in
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the different impact of competitiveness on the formation of coalition governments. Early
coalitions were often formed consensual (large-wide) under conditions of low
competition in contrast to competitive formation (small-tight) that emerged throughout
the post-1969 era.

Increase economic pressure during the lifespan of the government

were evident in all short duration governments examined.

Overview
As seen in the quantitative results, Israel’s political history can be divided
primarily into two distinct periods: the pre-1969 and the post-1969 eras (Arian, 1998).
The earlier period was marked by the task of state political, economic and social
formation. The second period, in contrast, was a period of consolidation, expansion,
industrialization, and conquest (Perlmutter, 1985). The two periods in Israeli history
resemble human growth from youth to adulthood. The early epoch was faught with
uncertainties concerning the state of the economy, population demography, security, and
the structure of government, posing great challenges to Israel’s very existence. When
looking back to the early period Mosh Felber saw Israel’s history as “a story of recurring
dangers and crisis threatening to destroy it.” (Felber, 1999).

Two decades after its

establishment, Israel emerged strong and mature. It was able to meet the challenges on
many fronts achieving dramatic economic progress, meeting the need of a newly founded
immigrant-based society, fielding the strongest military in the Middle East while
achieving peace with major surrounding countries, and rooting a strong tradition of
democratic government.
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From the beginning the greatest task facing the nation was that of governing.
How could the Zionist parties with all their ideological and constituent differences align
together and lead a durable government under tremendous foreign and domestic
pressures? This challenge to the nation was answered by the ability of the different
Zionist tendencies and factions to form stable and durable alliances while allowing voices
of dissent to assemble and be heard.

Charismatic leadership (example, David Ben

Gurion) and dramatic events led to stretch coalitions that were inclusive of the various
Israeli political spectra. National governments were often formed to confront war and
threats against the State in 1948, 1955, 1967, 1982, and in 2000. Israeli democratic
tradition was further expressed in its capacity to enhance the environment of political
pluralism and toleration while reacting to changing environments. Political parties were
divided among ideological groups forming and breaking alliances in response to
changing political circumstances. In sum, Israeli democratic tradition was demonstrated
in alliances’ formation and duration, which responded to changing political and social
conditions that have confronted the nation.

The question that we aim to examine is how have the changing challenges to
Israel impacted its political cabinet structure and process (formation and duration)? We
examine this question while observing a shift in the political discourse of Israeli coalition
politics from a pre to a post-1969 era. In the quantitative section of this study we noted
that the making of coalitions in Israel after 1969 became subjugated to a more fragmented
and competitive Knesset. We also observed that coalition politics in this period became
less oriented to immediate external military threat. The U.S. political, economic, and
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military support to Israel following 1967 Six Day War and the 1973 Yum Kippur War
increased many folds, thus adding to Israel’s regional security and potential for arms
supplies (with some interruption in 1973). We also found that economic development in
this period entailed rapid industrial growth, including an arms industry, leading to
growing activities by labor for better living and working standards.

While a major

immigrant infusion took place first from Ethiopia and then Russia, this period also was
known for a decline in the number of immigrants relative to the entire Israeli population.

The prospect of the case studies is to examine how these challenges shaped
political alliances in both composition and dissolution for each period of time.

For that

purpose we discuss these challenges and their prospective consequences on coalitions’
formation and duration by comparing four shortest-lived to four longest-lived Israeli
coalition governments. We further study the differences between both groups for the
period before and after 1969. The coalition sample that we research is divided into two
shortest-lived and two longest-lived coalitions for each period of time (Table 3.15 and
Table 3.16).

In correspondence to the predictive models, the challenges (event pressures)
examined in this study are related to: the economy, immigration, and external pressure.
Each is briefly described for every government to answer the question proposed in
Chapter 3, i.e., how each developed prior to formation, after formation, and at
termination. Then we discuss for each government the structural dimension in order to
answer how each coalition formed by size and ideological parameter while considering
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system (Knesset) competitiveness and details of political competition and decision
making. Finally, we attempt to make association between the event pressures (economy,
immigration, external pressure) along with structural variable (competitiveness) with
coalition formation (size and ideological parameter). We compare the relationship by
two levels: pre-post 1969 level and shortest-longest government duration level. Then, we
examine the impact of changing event pressure on government duration in order to test
for the aging thesis.

The 2nd Israeli Government, 1950-51
The 1st Israeli government collapsed as a direct consequence of economic
shortfalls. The introduction of austerity policy in March 1949 with aims of decreasing
price and wage levels led to black marketeering and profiteering (Lann, 1996). The
collapse of the 1st government occurred after Prime Minister Ben Gurion attempted to
reshape the government in order to wage a long-range assault on black marketers. On
October 3rd Mr. Ben Gurion announced that he had assumed all powers vested in the
government in order to equip himself with the necessary authority to wage a campaign
against black marketers. In a broadcast aired on the 3rd of October Mr. Ben Gurion
warned merchants to surrende hidden stocks and declared severe punishment against
violators. Ministers of the Religious Bloc withdrew from the coalition government in
protest against the Prime Minister’s new vested power.120 As a consequence the 1st
coalition government collapsed and Mr. Ben Gurion resigned on October 15,1950.

120 K eesin g’s Contem porary Archives, p. 11131, December 2-9, 1950.
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Mr. Ben Gurion, the head of the major dominant Mapai party in the Knesset, was
asked by President Weizmann to form a new government on October 15, 1950. Mr. Ben
Gurion proposed the formation of a caretaker minority administration pending election.
His request, however, was rejected by the Knesset due primarily to the opposition of the
Religious Bloc to join such an administration. Finally on October 25 a settlement was
reached between Mapai and the Religious Bloc to form a coalition government until
January 1953, when general elections were due to be held. The 2nd government was bom
on October 30th after it received the confidence of the Knesset. The 2nd government
resembled the first with the same partner parties. The only important revision, which
indicated partial concessions by the Religious Bloc in favor of Mr. Ben Gurion, was the
establishment of the Trade and Industry Ministry under Mr. Jaacov Geeri who was named
by Ben Gurion.121

Economy:
On November 1, 1950 Mr. Ben Gurion addressed the Knesset declaring that
economic controls and rationing would continue to be the aim of government policy
together with measures to raise the standard of living. The new government received a
vote of confidence by 69 votes to 42, with two abstentions.122 Prime Minister Gurion’s
statement came amid mounting economic crisis facing the country.

121 K eesin g ’s Contem porary A rchives, p. 11131, Decem ber 2-9, 1950.
122 K e esin g ’s Contemporary Archives, p. 11131, December 2-9, 1950.
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But the major economic difficulty faced Israel following independence was
inflation. The annual inflation rate was in double digits increasing to 66% in 1952.123 In
1950 unemployment was approximately at 7% and rising with increasing waves of
incoming immigrants.

Most of the workforce worked in agricultural settlements

compared to only 3% today. Number of strikes and strikers increased for this period from
an average of 98 strikers per strike in 1949 to 126 in 1950 and 128 in 1951. In 1951 and
despite limited economic growth inflation rose by 20% from the previous year (Lann,
1996).

When the second government formed, Mr. Ben Gurion declared his aims for an
economic reform to boost exports and reduce imports, increase financial and technical aid
as well as provide larger allocation of raw materials to exporters, form mixed committees
of workers and employers to supervise productivity, encourage foreign investment, and
lift duties on capital imports.124

Ben Gurion’s efforts, however, did not succeed in

reducing inflation. In fact, from 1950, the year the government formed, until 1951, the
year it dissolved, inflation remained the major unresolved economic problem confronting
the nation.

And, despite government’s strategies to ease

price pressures, economic

circumstances proved to be overwhelming contributing to the 2nd government’s early
fall. Although the pattern was not as clear-cut quantitatively across all cases, this case
tends to confirm our hypothesis proposed in Chapter 2 that economic pressure
undermines the longevity of governmental terms. Furthermore, as will be shown in this
section, the 2nd government was formed large. This also supports the hypothesis which

123 Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, (w w w.m fa.gov.il/m fa/go.asp7M AFH 0ido01. 2003.
124 K eesin g ’s Contem porary A rchives, p. 11131Decem ber 2-9, 1950.
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suggested that economic pressure helps establish a large sized and ideologically diverse
coalition.

Immigration:
In addition to the economic burden and the high rate of inflation that confronted
early Israeli governments, immigration added another aspect of economic and social
burden on the country in general and on the government in particular.

From

independence in 1948 through 1951 a mass immigration of some 687,000 people poured
in.

Presenting the government to the Knesset in November 1950 Mr. Ben Gurion

declared that his administration regarded immigration as integral to national security. He
further announced that a total of 510,000 immigrants had entered Israel since the
foundation of the state in May 1948.125 This large number of immigrants exerted great
challenge for the newly emerging state.126 By 1951 the country had doubled its Jewish
population. The number of immigrants arriving in 1950 alone reached 12% of population,
totaling 170,563 immigrants.127 Immigrants arriving in 1951 rose to 175,279 (Felber,
1997). The immigrants included survivors of the Holocaust, large numbers of Bulgarian,
Polish and Romanian Jews, and nearly all of the Jewish communities of Libya, Yemen,
and Iraq.128

Immigration represented a multifaceted problem to the newly emerging state.
Most of the immigrants were not young or educated. Rather, they were refugees from the
12d Keesing ’s Contem porary A rchives, p.11131, December 2-9, 1950.
126 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Century o f Zionism” www.mfa.gov.il.
127 Central Bureau o f Statistics, JAFI, Jerusalem Post (December 29,2002)
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Nazi death camps in Europe. At that time, Israel did not even have the capacity to feed or
house the newcomers (Felber, 1999). In addition to the economic burden, immigration
represented a cultural and integration challenge to Israel.

Survivors spoke many

languages and held traditions that varied along with their national origins. They brought
diverse political and religious convictions that often clashed with early settlers.
Incorporating all these aspects into the process of nation building represented the greatest
challenge of immigration.

Religious versus secular education for the country in general and for the new
immigrants in particular proved to be among the major divisive policy issues for early
Israeli coalitions. Such a division fostered polarization among Israel political parties and
contributed to the downfall of both the 1st and the 2nd Israeli coalition governments.129
The dissolution of the 2nd government occurred following the Minister of Education’s
plan for allowing the Histadrut (the trade union movement) to supervise the religious
education of child immigrants in work camps.

Mr. Ben Gurion argued that parents

should determine for their children the type of education they should receive (religious or
secular) after they move from reception camps to work camps.

The Religious Bloc

rejected Gurion’s proposition on the ground that religious education should be
compulsory for all immigrant children in work camps. The opposition of the Religious
Bloc to secular education along with its rejection to government’s economic policy led to
the collapse of the ruling alliance and consequently to the resignation of Prime Minister

128 Israel Ministry o f Foreign A ffairs, “Century o f Zionism: A liya and Absorption”:
w w w .m fa.gov.il/m fa/go.asp7M FA H 00upQ . 1999.
129 Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government Make U p”:
w w w .knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng h istl s.htm. 2003.
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Gurion.130 Thus, in addition to economic pressure that faced the 2nd Israeli government,
immigration pressure was an additional factor that played a role in its early downfall.
Economic as well as immigration pressure also appear to have been associated with the
government’s rather ideologically broad formation as predicted by our model describe in
Chapter 2.

External Pressure:
The 2nd Israeli government declared in its policy guidelines its commitments to
peace and international law. It announced that Israel foreign policy would be formed on
the basis of “loyalty to the principles of the United Nations Charter...striving towards a
Jewish-Arab covenant within the framework of United Nations Organization...support of
every measure to strengthen peace, ensure the rights of man and the equality of peoples
the world over, and strengthen the authority and competence of the Untied Nations
513 1

Organization.”

These declarations of principle were announced the first year after independence
that followed two bloody years of war with Arab armies. Israel not only won the War of
Independence but also gained international support recognizing its legitimate foundation.
Although tension with Arab states remained high, 1950 was the first year of peace for
Israel.

130 K eesin g ’s Contem porary A rchives, p. 11348, March 17-24, 1951.
131 Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949. The Second Israeli government adopted the

principle guidelines o f the previous coalition.
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Under these circumstances the 2nd Israeli government was established. A year
after it was formed, a relative low escalation of external tension had emerged. Among
the most notable escalations were border skirmishes erupting on the Syrian borders and
the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan in the A1 Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.132
Despite these escalations, favorable international developments helped maintain Israel’s
sense of national security.

In 1950 and 1951 the United Nations did not pass any

resolution criticizing or condemning Israel. On the contrary, the Security Council passed
three important resolutions supporting ceasefire (Resolution 92, 93) and free passage in
the Suez Canal (Resolution 95).533

External circumstances of the 2nd Israeli government, therefore, do not appear to
have been factors in its duration, since the coalition collapsed early while low external
pressures were present. Furthermore, external pressures do not seem to have been a
reason for large government formation. Contrary, to our hypothetical expectations the 2nd
government formed large and fell early while external pressures were low.

Coalition Structure:

A. Size:
In October 1950 the 2nd Israeli government was established under high economic
and immigration pressures . As our model proposed, economic and immigration pressure
were aspects forcing the government to form on a national consensual basis, where

132 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron Medzinin,

2001 .
lj3 American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise “Security Council R e so lu tio n s” www.usisrael.org/isource/UN/sctor.html. 2001.
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parties from opposing ideological camps unite together in order to confront threats to
nationhood.

The government was formed as an alliance of various left, center, and

religious parties controlling the following seats: Mapai 46, United Religious Front (XJRF)
16, Progressive Party 5, Sephardim and Edot Mizrah 4, and the Arab List 2 (Table
5.1).134 This government was a model of the early governments that dissolved due to
differences about religious education, and in this case also about the Prime Minister’s
demand for the cancellation of Supply and Rationing Ministry.

The coalition formed with three “excessive” parties (Progressive, Sephardim, and
Arab) having 11 seats more than the necessary minimum winning majority seats of 62
which Mapai and URF alone controlled. This situation suggested that the coalition was
formed on consensual basis due, perhaps to the high immigration and economic pressures
that the country was facing. Consensual formations are often prompted by national or
international pressures where, for example, deteriorated economic conditions require
sacrifice of the various social cleavages or principles in order to safeguard the economy
and the entire nation from total collapse. Under such circumstances, larger (consensual)
alignments appear necessarily to maintain national harmony and overcome threatening
events.135

Both economic and immigration pressure seem to have been aspects of the large
formation of the 2nd government, as proposed by our theoretical model. Furthermore, the
134 Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government M ake U p”:
w w w.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng histl s.htm, 2003.
13d Exceptions rarely occur when neither o f the two dominant parties in the Knesset is capable o f capturing
the necessary vote to form a winning ruling coalition. In such a situation, as it occurred follow ing the 1983
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2nd government’s short duration also confirms our proposition that large coalition
formations (inefficient) reduce cabinet’s durability, especially in the face of continued
environmental pressures.

B. Ideological Parameter
The principal guidelines of the 2nd government established a wide range of
ideological positions ranging from religious to secular and from favorable private
economic policy to workers rights and control. It declared that the State shall observe the
Sabbath and Jewish Holy Days. Among its objectives was the encouragement of private
capital while providing an economic nationalization plan. It spelled the right of free
enterprise; at the same time stressing labor’s rights of minimum wage, collective
bargaining, and strike.136

The government was ideologically established between left, center, and religious
parties that controlled 73 seats.137 Budge coded this coalition 3 on the ideological
closeness scale. In Budge’s scale a coalition would score 1 for being ideologically very
tight and score 6 for being ideologically very wide.

The ideological variety of this

coalition was evident in having various parties of different ideological backgrounds.
Along Budge’s characterization of the 2nd government, we confirm that the ruling
coalition was established with somewhat wide ideological parameters.

Such parameters

coincide with its over minimum size, as expected.
election, both dom inant parties may seek each others alliance and form a grand coalition being forced by
electoral necessity rather than by event pressure.
136 Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, Israel Office of Information, 1949. The Second Israeli government adopted the
principle guidelines o f the previous coalition.
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C. Competitiveness
Mapai, with 46 seats (38%), was the dominant party of the First Knesset.
Although it did not control the majority of seats in the Knesset (61) it was realistically
impossible for any coalition to have been established without its leadership. A rival
coalition to a Mapai-led alliance was virtually impossible.

Any rival coalition that

excluded Mapai would have to have included religious, right, and left parties while being
led by Mapam (a far left-secular party), the second largest party in the Knesset (19 seats);
such an alliance was practically impossible.

Another indicator of low competitiveness in the 1st Knesset and leading to the 2nd
was the maintenance of parties’ ranks throughout the Knesset life. Only four seats were
lost by defections before the election to the 2nd Israeli Knesset (Table 5.1). As has been
discussed in previous chapters, high party competition encourages defection from party
ranks as potentially highly rewarding.

The 2nd government was terminated after the Knesset rejected an education bill
proposed by the Minister of Education and Culture regarding the registration of children
in schools. Religious partner parties opposed the legislation and as a consequence the
government collapsed on October 1951, lasting only 342 days.138 Thus contrary to what
was proposed by our model, coalition competition for this government does not appear to

137 Ideological categorization o f parties and government is established according to Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs “The Governments o f Israel”. ww w.m fa.gov.il/m fa/go.asp7M FAH 0hyd0.
138 K eesin g’s Contem porary Archives: p .!1 3 4 8 A , March 17-24, 1951.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165

have been a factor in its duration or demise.. Furthermore, low competition, contrary to
our theoretical expectation, did not lead to an especially small sized cabinet formation

Table 5.1: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the First Knesset
Political P arties
First Knesset
Before Next K nesset Election
Mapai
Mapam
United Religious Front
Herut Movement
General Zionists
Progressive Party

Maki
Sephardim and Edot Mizrah
Arab Parties
Fighters List
WIZO
Yemenite Association
Ari Jabotinski
Hillel Kook

46
19
16
14

7
5
4
4
2
1
1
1

46

20
16
12
7
5
4
3
2
1
1
1
1
1

Source: Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government Make Up”:
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng histl s.htm. 2003.

The 12th Israeli Government, 1964-66
The 12th government was established under Levi Eshkol, formed on 22 of
December 1964 after the 11th government resigned a week before, owing to a domestic
controversy within Mapai on the ‘Lavon Affair’. The controversy within Mapai began by
Mr. Dayan, a leading figure within the party and the Minister of Agriculture, who
resigned his post in November 4, 1964. The Israeli press reported that Mr. Dayan’s
resignation was primarily due to his deepening differences with the Prime Minister on
Mapai’s continued cooperation with Ahdut Avoda, as well as his reported demand for the
abolition of farm subsidies and ether disagreements. However, the dispute within the
Mapai leadership reached its climax on November 7th when supporters of Mr. Pinhas
Lavon decided to split with Mapai after Mr. Eshkol hesitated to nominate the former in
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the parliamentary and trade union elections. Worse, the dispute within Mapai led to the
resignation of Mr. Ben Gurion from the party’s central committee on November 15th,
after he had taken a hard position against any role of Mr. Lavon in the party and
demanded a new inquiry into his affairs.139

In December 14, 1964 Mr. Eshkol resigned from the Premiership after being
unable to establish a unified position among the party’s leadership in regard to the
Levon’s issue. Mapai’s central committee, however, reinstated Mr. Levon as the party
leader on December

17 and the Levon’s question was left to Mapai’s ministers to

resolve. President Shazar asked Mr. Eshkol on Dec. 20 to form a new government, and
on Dec. 22 Mr. Eshkol announced his new administration, which was identical with its
predecessor except for the appointment of Mr. Akiva Govrin, previously Minister without
Portfolio, as Minister of Tourism, a new post. Mr. Eshkol told the Knesset that his new
government would continue to act on the basis of the same principles and coalition
agreements that were in force during the previous administration.

The new cabinet

received Knesset’s vote of confidence and decided in its first meeting not to institute a
new inquiry into the Lavon affair.140

139 “Defection o f Lavon Group from Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion's Resignation from Mapai Central
Committee. - Resignation o f Eshkol Cabinet. - N ew Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol.” 139
K eesings Contmeporary Archive, January 1965 - Israel.
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Economy:
The

12th government’s economic policy was an extension of previous

governments’ programs of the 5th Knesset whose aims were to stabilize the economy.141
The means were proposed to stabilize prices and set a single exchange rate.142 In its
guiding principles, the 12th government promised a wide range of economic incentives to
local industry and foreign capital amid higher productivity and imports. The government
guidelines further emphasized the role of technology toward efficient productivity. The
final aim of government’s economic policy was expressed as: “the speeding up of
progress toward the achievement of economic independence and a vigorous effort to
obtain Jewish and international capital from abroad for the development of the
country.”143

In 1964, the year before the inauguration of the 12th government, the economy
(GDP) scored a relative rate increase of .05. Despite noticeable economic progress over
previous years, economic pressure remained, however, during

the government’s

formative period. Economic “crises” emerged prior to the formation of the government
following the economic regulation of 1962, which led to the devaluation of the Lira, the
cancellation of subsidies, and the increase in prices and taxes (Lann, 1996). GDP growth
rate also declined from .05 in 1964 to .04 in 1965, the government’s first year in office.
Although there was also a decrease in average strikers per strike in 1965, the number of

140 “D efection o f Lavon Group from Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion's Resignation from Mapai Central
Committee. - Resignation o f Eshkol Cabinet. - N ew C oalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol.” 140
K eesings Contmeporary Archive, January 1965 - Israel.
141 L evi Eshkol, “Statement to the Knesset” Israel Ministry o f Foreign A ffairs, 24 June 1963.
142 Israeli K nesset, “T he M ain E ven ts and Issu es D uring the Fifth K n esset” :
w w w .k n esset.g o v .il/h isto rv /en g /en g hist5.htm . 2 0 0 3 .

143 Israeli Knesset Archives, “B asic Principles o f Government Program” Decem ber 17, 1959.
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strikers increased, and unemployment increased slightly from 3.3% in 1964 to 3.6% in
1965.

At the time of the government’s termination in 1965 economic pressure had

increased with inflation reaching 7% after it had been reduced to 4.4% in the previous
year (Lann, 1996).

The 12th government operated in similar economic circumstances as those faced
by the 2nd government.

Indeed most governments of Israel’s first two decades formed

under conditions of high inflation and economic instability, though the GDP growth rate
was relatively stable. A decline in the economic situation was evident during the life of
both the 2nd and 12th governments, yet no dramatic economic deterioration occurred
before their formation, during their tenure, or as they were terminated. The GDP growth
rate indicated low decline during the terms of both governments. Yet both governments’
failure to resolve the problem of inflation and to instigate economic growth may have
contributed to their respective short duration in power. As predicted by our model, both
governments were formed relatively large in response to high economic pressure. The
gradual but continued deterioration of economic conditions seems to have been
associated with short duration, as expected.

Immigration:
For the 12th government the ingathering of the Jews remained among the
government’s prime objectives, though the rates of arrival slowed.. The guiding policy
principles of the 12th government spelled out theses aims by declaring its effort for
bringing to Israel ... Jews from countries where they are in distress, and the
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encouragement of immigration from other countries.”144 Yet, the number of immigrants
coming in the 60s dropped tremendously relative to early years. By 1964 immigration
hardly exceeded 2% relative to the population. The total number of immigrants entering
the country in 1964, before the 12th government formed, was 55,036. The number
dropped in 1965 to 31,115 and to only 15,957 in 1966. Thus immigration tides had
begun to recede.

For the 12th government immigration and settlement problems were much more
manageable relative to early years of statehood.

While the number of immigrants

entering the country during the formation of the 12th government still remained
significant and required allocation of resources for settlements, in contrast to the 2nd
government, immigration did not exert much political

pressure.

Theoretically the

decline of the number of immigrants while the 12th government was in power should
have contributed to a decrease in events’ pressures and, in turn, to longer government
duration. It did not. Thus, while immigration pressure might still have contributed to a
relatively large sized cabinet coalition, it did not extend the endurance of the government.

External pressure:
Prime Minister Eshkol prioritized the task of strengthening the security of Israel,
to repulse Arab hopes of defeating Israel, and consequently convince enemies that the
only solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was through negotiation. In his remarks to the
Knesset upon introducing the 11th government, whose policy principles were adopted by
the 12th government, he declared, “in a sincere desire for peace in the world and in our
144 Israeli Knesset Archives, “Basic Principles o f Government Program” December 17, 1959.
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own area, and in order to preserve it, the Government will give first priority to the
strengthening of security. It will endeavor to acquire and develop the most modem
equipment required of the security of the State and its people.. .”145

In 1964 defense Budget constituted 49% of Mr. Eshkol’s 11th government
expenditures and 44% of his 12th government’s spending.146 1964; as reflected in this
decline the year before the 12th government inaugurated saw low external tension.
Although the PLO was formed following the Arab Summit in January, it was kept under
firm Egyptian control and no serious confrontations occurred.

No United Nations

resolutions were passed and foreign aid to Israel was high. As of 1965, the government’s
first year in office, the situation remained calm with little noticeable escalation. A few
shooting incidents on the Syrian borders occurred and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
raided various West Bank areas. Arab positions toward Israel gradually hardened with
Syria declaring that the only solution to the Palestine problem was the elimination of
Israel.

The Arab summit conference in Casablanca intended to divert Jordan River
headwaters. Also during the year two United Nation Resolutions (2002, 2052) criticized
Israel for not acting on its resolution 194 in regard to Palestinian Refugees.

West

Germany also suspended its arms sales to Israel; thus 1965 presented increasing
challenges to Israel in terms of its foreign relations though the inter-Arab “cold war”

145 Levi Eshkol, “Statement to the Knesset” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1963.
146 Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics.
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tended to divide Israel’s adversaries, while forcing some of them toward more anti-Israeli
•
147
militancy.

The 12th Israeli government was formed amid low external pressure throughout
1964. There was no immediate threat or a major military confrontation with Arab
countries. Hostilities remained confined and Israeli casualties in the minor skirmishes
did not exceed a dozen.

External pressure would not have been a reason for wide

coalition formation. On the contrary, such a low pressure should have freed coalition
making from such a burden, while providing the dominant party with greater
maneuvering room to form close alliances. This situation does not comply with our
theoretical expectations that low external pressure yields small-sized cabinets.

Perhaps

other variables were prominent in determining the large coalition formation, as we will
discuss later. However, by the time the government terminated in January 1966 external
pressure was escalating as evident throughout 1965. This deterioration constituted
additional stress on the ruling coalition and accelerated its downfall as projected by our
hypotheses.

Coalition Structure:
A. Size
12th Government was the third government formed within the 5th Knesset,
controlling 66 seats and supported by outside votes that included the minority lists

147 Kerr, Malcolm “T he A rab Cold War ‘Abed Al-Nassir and His Rivals,’ 1958-1970” 3d ed. London:
Oxford University Press, 1971.
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(Kimah Ufituah and Shituf Ve’ahvah).148

The 12th government was actually the

extension of the 10th government formed in the 2nd of November 1961. It included the
same partners as that of the 10th and 11th coalitions: Mapai 42, National Religious Party
12, Ahdut Ha’avodah 8, Po’alei Agudat Yisrael 4 and the minority lists 4 (Table 5.2).
This coalition was not a minimalist since it included extra parties (Po’alei Agudat Yisrael
and Ahdut Ha’avodah) in addition to outside supporters (the minority list associated with
Mapai).

Two variables appeared to have been prominent factors in determining coalition
size: economic and immigration pressures. As suggested by our model, both factors
were associated with large coalition formation. The cabinet’s large size along with
economic as well as external pressures, also were associated with the short duration of
the 12th government, as projected by our model.

B. Ideological Parameter
The cabinet again emerged as an alliance between the left and religious parties.
The National Religious Party took three government ministries while Mapai and Ahdut
Ha’avodah controlled 13. Ideologically the coalition was inclusive of religious and leftist
policy orientations. The guidelines reaffirmed religious authority in major aspects of
Jewish society. At the same time, the proposed policies affirmed the leftist orientation by
maintaining government’s major role in economic affairs, providing national health care
and social welfare, confirming labor rights and the leading role of the Histadrut in

148 Minority lists were associated with labor, often supporting labor-led governments in the Knesset, but
not officially part of the ruling coalition.
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Israel.149 Budge considered the coalition to rank as 3 on the ideological closeness index.
This suggests that the coalition, as In the second government, was somewhat wide in its
ideological parameter. Both the size and the ideological parameter of the government
reflected its consensual orientation as a necessary formation required to confront extreme
economic and immigration pressure exerted on the country as a whole.

C. Competitiveness
Mapai (42) was the dominant party in the 5th Knesset making any realistic
coalition impossible without its full leadership (Table 5.2). A rival coalition would have
had to have been led by either Herut (17) or the General Zionists (17). Such a Right-led
alliance of both Herut and the General Zionists could have established a minimum
winning status if it were able to attract, in addition to the National Religious Party (12)
and Agudat Yisrael (4), 10 additional seats from at least two far left-parties .It was
highly unlikely, if not impossible, for either Mapam or Ahdut Ha’avodah to have
accepted an alliance with the Right-parties. This made rivalry and competition with
Mapai virtually absent.

Indication of increasing competition, however, was noticeable throughout this
Knesset.

By the time the government was terminated and a new election was called a

split in Mapai occurred leading to the formation of Rafi (Table 5.2). Also, a merger into
Gahal

(27) occurred between the Right parties of General Zionists and the Herut

Movement. Opponents to the merger established the Independent Liberals (7).

149 Israeli Knesset Archives, “Basic Principles o f Government Program” December 17, 1959.
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Israeli parties were undergoing more of the periodic splits and metamorphoses that came
to characterize the political system over the years.

The coalition collapsed in January 1966, after a dispute between Prime Minister
Eshkol and Ben Gurion over Mapai’s leadership leading to an early election. The dispute
within Mapai continued to divide the party between minority support to Mr. Gurion and
majority support to Mr. Eshkol. The differences within the party remained unresolved
throughout government’s term, which centered on whether the government’s re
investigate the Lavon affair or whether Mapai allow an electoral merge with Ahdut
Avoda. Mr. Ben Gurion’s faction demanded investigation in the Lavon affair and
opposed the merger with Ahdut Avoda. The dispute led eventually to Mr. Ben Gurion’s
defeat and his formation of Rafi confronted by a Mapai-Ahdut Avoda electoral bloc. An
early election was called for on November 2nd, 1965 and the 12th government was
terminated on the 12th of January 1966 after serving 383 days in office.150

Economic and immigration pressure faced by Israel seemed to have been
associated with Mapai’s effort to form large alliances as well as wide policy oriented
coalition. Despite the rifts within Mapai, its virtual dominance over the Knesset appeared
to have given the party a leading role in forming large alliances. Yet, the deterioration of
both economic conditions and rising external pressure during the coalition’s reign as well
as having large size cabinet and low competitive Knesset seemed to have fueled inter
150“Cabinet Changes. - Electoral A greem ent between Mapai and Ahdut Avoda. - Continuing Dispute
between Mr. Eshkol and Mr. Ben-Gurion. - Mr. Eshkol's London Visit. - Peace Appeal to Arab States.”
K eesing’s Record of World Events, July. 1965, Israel.
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party dispute and fostered the conditions for government’s early termination. These
associations support our hypothetical propositions.

Table 5.2; Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Fifth Knesset
Political Parties
Mapai
General Zionists
Herut Movement
United Religious Front/NRP
Mapam
Ahdut Ha'avodah
Maki
Agudat Yisrael
Kidmah Ufituah
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha
Shituf Ve'ahvah
Gahal
Rafi
Independent Liberals

5th Knesset Before next Election
42

17
17
12
9
8
5
4
2
2
2

34
0
0
12
9
8
5
4
2
2
2
27
8
7

Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist5.htm. 2003.

The 16th Israeli Government. 1974
The 16th government, third in our chronology of short duration cabinets, was
formed in March 1974 and lasted only until June of the same year (90 days). This was by
record the shortest-lived Israeli cabinet. Following the 1973 Israeli election, President
Katzir asked Mrs. Golda Meir, the head of the largest emerging party (Mapai), to form
the government. However, Mrs. Meir mission was proven difficult rocked by the
National Religious Party’s (NRP) opposition to join a government that did not strictly
adhere to the halacha.151 Negotiation with the NRP to join a coalition government broke

“General Election. - Political D evelopm ents. - Mr. Ben-Gurion excluded from Mapai after Formation of
New Party.” Keesing’s Record of World Events, Nov. 1965, Israel.
151 H alacha is the religious coda under which, to be recognized as a Jew, an individual must either have a
Jewish mother or have been converted to the Jewish faith by an O rthodox rabbi.
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down on February 1974 and Mrs. Meir’s attempts to establish a minority government
without the participation of the NRP was rejected by Mapai. Finally, on March 6 Mrs.
Meir succeeded to form an alliance with the NRP who accepted a compromise position
that the whole question of the halacha be shelved for 12 months or two years while a
Government commission draft new proposals aimed at a settlement of the “who is a Jew”
controversy.152 The new governing coalition received a vote of confidence in the Knesset
on March 10, 1974 and the new coalition consisted of Labor, the Independent Liberals,
and the NRP.

Economy:
The 16th government was the second administration headed by Prime Minister
Golda Meir and adopted the same principle guidelines of its two preceding cabinets. The
government was formed following Yum Kippur War; thus security and peace were at the
top of its agenda.

Yet, economic issues also remained relevant.

The government

established in its principles and objectives of “guaranteeing the constant, steady growth
of the economy” and controlling inflation by revising fiscal and monetary policies.

153

Before the formation of the 16th government, the country was facing a low GDP
growth of .01, increase in average strikers per strike from 519.70 the previous year to
1274.46, and a decline in unemployment from 2.8 to 2.6. Severe inflationary problems
emerged with 1973’s extreme oil price increase causing “stagflation” (or both recession

152 “New Coalition Government formed by Mrs. Meir after Prolonged Ministerial Crisis” Keesing’s Record
o f World Events. April 1974, Israel.
133 The Basic Principles o f the Government, Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, 1969. Note: 16th government
adopted the principles o f the 14th government.
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and inflation). Inflation reached 20% and defense budget rose significantly (Lann, 1996).
By the 1974 the situation worsened despite the declared aim of the government.
Stagflation led to another devaluation of the Lira, which reached six to the U.S. dollar.
The government cancelled subsidies on basic goods and the inflation rate doubled to 40%
(Lann, 1996).

The government’s economic achievement was notable only in the lowest

level of unemployment in comparison to the 60s and 50s.

The

16th government appeared typical

of the pre-1969

short-duration

governments, which underlined economic deterioration from the time of their formation
to a worsening situation at termination. Despite these similarities it is important to note
the differences between the economic wellbeing of Israel throughout the 70s in contrast
to earlier periods. In comparison to the 60s and 50s Israel’s 1970s economy was not
faced with comparable difficulties. Israel had been transformed into an industrial state
and most laborers became industrial rather than agricultural.

Foreign aid in 1970s

amounted to $29 billions in contrast to $6.5 billions in the 60s in total. GNP rose from
$2.5 billions in the 60s to $6.8 billions in the 70s. Israel also tripled its exports in the 70s
(Table 5.3).154 Therefore, in comparative analysis, we consider the 16th government to
have experienced a lower level of economic pressure upon formation than governments
of earlier periods.

Yet the economic conditions again

worsened

by the time the

government was terminated.
It appeared that economic deterioration during government’s term in office acted
as an important determinant of its early termination, as our duration hypotheses proposed.
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The formation of a tight 16th government in association with relatively low levels of
economic pressure agrees with our propositions that low economic pressure help the
dominant party form tight alliances.

Immigration:
Following the 1967 War Israel’s immigration policy focused on boosting efforts
to increase and maximize the recruitment of Jews from abroad. In its basic principles the
government declared its top priorities were “the ingathering of the dispersions of the
Jewish people in its homeland; stepping up immigration from all countries and from all
strata of the people; encouragement of immigration from the affluent countries;
stimulation of pioneering immigration.”' 55 Acting on this policy Israel attracted 54,886
immigrants in 1973 or about 2% of its Jewish population. However, the number of
immigrants began to decline the following year, with 31,981 immigrants arriving 1
increasing the Jewish population by 1%. Immigrants coming to Israel in the years after
the Six-Day War were predominantly from the West. They were mostly idealist Zionists
who came with the mission to defend the State. Furthermore, they hardly represented the
economic or domestic burden as that of earlier Alyiah.156 These immigrants were coming
to Israel without active government planning in contrast to earlier mass migrations.

However, the nature of settlement activities after!967, in contrast to that of pre1967, became more polarizing. The reason can be highlighted by the deepening division

154 Israel M inistry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel at 50: A Statistical Glimpse”:
www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAH00mx0, 1999. Amount adjusted to 1995 prices.
155 The Basic Principles o f the Government, Israel G overnm ent Y earbook, 1969. Note: 16th government
adopted the principles o f the 14* government.
156 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Aiyah” w w w .m fa.gov.il.. 1999.
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in Israel over settlement expansion into the newly Occupied Territories.

The

establishment of Gush Emunim, a movement calling for such expansion, was confronted
with an opposite ‘peace’ camp calling for a halt to settlement activities.
expansion was no longer nationally consensual.

Settlement

A less prominent division between

earlier immigrants and newer immigrants began to emerge in competition for jobs and
other resources as well as cultural and religious identities. These divisions led to the rise
of territorial movements within the traditional Zionist parties, further splitting the Knesset
and polarizing Israel’s political landscape.

Our examination of the 16th government, therefore, reveals that its coalition was
formed amid moderate but gradually increasing immigration policy pressure. However,
overall immigration does not appear to have been a major factor in the determination of
either the formation or the duration of the 16th government, , at least not to the extent of
earlier governments. Other variables, as we will discuss, appear to have had a more
prominent role in such determination.

External Pressure
The year 1973, before the 16th government formed, was a rocky one for Israel in
term of external threats.

Following the prolonged and sometimes tense “War of

Attrition” along the Suez Canal after 1971, in October 1973 Egyptian forces crossed the
Canal and the Yom Kippur War began. Syrian forces also attacked in the North opening
a second front against Israel. On the 17th of October Arab oil producing states began a
halt to oil production in protest of U.S support to Israel, and the Nixon administration
temporarily delayed resupply of arms to Israel in hopes of promoting peace talks.
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resupply from Washington soon resumed after Israel took major losses against Egyptian
forces and Prime Minister Meir pleaded for U.S. support.157 This Arab-Israeli conflict
extended to major powers, with a Soviet threat of direct Intervention and with the U.S.
order of worldwide alert in response.138 In the same year, the UN General Assembly
passed three resolutions criticizing Israel in regard to both the refugee question and the
Palestinian ci vilian population under occupation (3089, 3090, 3092).159

Amid these developments, and with growing domestic pressure to investigate the
decision-making that seemed to have allowed a surprise Egyptian attack initially to
succeed, the 16th government declared in its basic principles its intention to achieve a
permanent peace with each neighboring state and the utilization of all peace possibilities
and prospects expressed in the Geneva Conference.160 Indeed, with greater mutual
respect between Egyptian and Israeli forces, several achievements were made in the
peace process. The year 1974 began following the Geneva Peace Conference on the
Middle East; Israel-Egypt and Israel-Syria separation of forces agreements were signed,
and Arab States lifted oil embargo on the U.S. Israel’s foreign aid, primarily U.S. aid,
increased from $1395.7 million in 1973 to $5145.2 million in 1974. U.S. military aid to
Israel increased by 800%.161 Thus, while the 16th government was formed following a
year of intense external pressures, it was terminated while severe external tensions had
been contained. External pressure did not appear to have been a major determinant of
157 Dorf, Matthew “Remebering the Yom Kippur War: D ecision to resupply arm s solifiy U.S.-Israel ties”
Jewish Telegraph Agency, San Francisco: September 25, 1998.
158 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Isra el’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron Medzinin,

2001 .
159 American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise “General A ssem bly R esolutions” ww w.usisrael.org/isource/IJN/sctor.html. 2001.
160 The Basic Principles o f the Government, March 10, 1974. Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.
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government formation or duration, as our model has predicted.

1f t 9

Since, the coalition

government was established as a tight alliance while facing high level of external
pressure, contrary to what we would have predicted. Furthermore, the coalition was
terminated early despite a decline in external pressure amid separation of forces and
peace negotiation. Such an early termination contradicted our expectation, suggesting
perhaps other relevant environmental variables that may have been associated more
significantly with its termination. Inter-party disputes and/or failure in government’s
performance may have been important reasons contributing for the coalition’s early
breakup.

Coalition Structure:
A. Size
The 16th government was established following the election of the 8th Knesset in
December 1973..
Knesset Seats.

The government was formed in March 1974 and commanded 65

Coalition members included the Alignment163 51, National Religious

Party 10, and Liberals 4 (Table 5.3). Two seats were lost by the Alignment following
election, thus establishing a government of mini mum-wining proportions . Every party
became indispensable for the government to maintain its majority over the Knesset. Any
withdrawal of any partner party would have led to a lost majority, and consequently to a
government collapse.

161 Zunes, Stephen “W hy the U .S. supports Israel” P alestine Chronicle, June 1, 2002.
152 W hile Mrs. Meir Meir resigned follow ing the Agranat C om m ission, which faulted the government for
failing to predict the Egyptian surprise attack, her decision is often attributed to inter-party power struggle
particularly between Mapai, Raft, and Ahdut A voda factions o f the Labor B loc.
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Compared to early statehood governments, and despite high inflation rate, the 16th
government was established amid great economic prosperity. Economic achievements
appear to have been associated with tight political formation, relieving the dominant
party from sharing power with an extended list of parties.

B. Ideological Parameter
The government was formed as a left-religious alliance. It expressed its
ideological policy guideline as an extension to that of the 14th government established
under Eshkol. The guidelines of the government enforced its leading and dominant role in
major economic planning, education, and social spheres. It emphasized the leading role
of labor and civil rights.

At the same time, it preserved the authority of religious

institutions in various aspects of Israeli society.

Its foreign policy advocated the

importance of establishing a permanent peace with neighboring states. It aimed at
establishing a strategic alliance with the United States and advocated the freedom of
Russian Jews to immigrate to Israel. It called for a peace treaty with Jordan in which a
Palestinian-Jordanian federation may be realized.164

Budge scaled the ideological closeness of the parties in the coalition at 2. Thus,
ideological parameter was somewhat tighter than the previous governments we have
examined. This is particularly reasonable to accept since partnership in the coalition was
very small and the dominant party had no reason to compromise policies with such

163 The Alignment (Maarakh) represented the merger o f M apai, Ahdut HaAvodah, and Raft. Follow ing
1969 election, Mapam also joined. The Alignment lasted until 1984 representing Labor-left parties.
164 The B asic Principles o f the Government, March 10, 1974. Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.
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limited number of coalition members.165 Our model predicts the ideological tightness of
this coalition concord with the minimal size formation.

C. Competitiveness
Although the Labor Alignment was a very dominant bloc with 51 seats, it lost 2
seats following election; its coalition partners were limited, and its ability to form
alternative formations was reduced (Table 5.3). Rakah (4) and Ratz (3) were considered
anti-system (left and anti-Zionist) parties and not acceptable in any ruling coalition. This
left the United Torah Front (5), the Kidmah Ufituah (2), Moked (1), and the Arab Parties
(1) parties without any leverage in shaping the Alignment-NRP alliance. It was essential,
therefore, that the NRP remain part of the Alignment-led government in order for a
minimum winning majority to be maintained. Without the NRP the Alignment would
have had to establish a coalition with the Liberals (4), United Torah Front (5), Kidmah
Ufituah (2), and Arab Parties (1) and/or Moked (1). Such an alliance would have held the
government hostage to the will of the very small parties (Kidmah Ufituah (2), the Arab
Parties (1), or Moked(l)), and could have been the true nightmare of the Alignment
making an early election a better alternative.

Rivalry between dominant parties increased amid the relative electoral gain
achieved by the Likud (39) in the 8th Knesset. Likud’s gain in the election was achieved
following the failure of the Meir government to effectively respond to the attacks of Arab
armies in the Yom Kippur War. In addition, the increasing dispute within the rank of the
165 The governm ent clearly advocated the p eace process which posed its program relatively in
contradiction with the opposition o f the rightwing Likud Bloc.
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left parties on the future of the Occupied Territories strengthened the Likud’s electoral
position, which was able to attract more “tenitorialists.” Likud’s potential to form a
winning coalition increased, particularly after it won another additional seat to its rank
following the election and after a wedge began to emerge between the Labor parties and
the Religious bloc, the latter began to lean against territorial concession while
establishing biblical rights to Judea and Samaria. For the first time a serious challenge to
the Labor’s traditional power dominance emerged. The Likud was potentially capable of
forming a rival winning alliance consisting of Likud (40), NRP (10), United Torah Front
(5), the Independent Liberals (4), and any other small party. The rising challenge of
Likud to Labor’s traditional monopoly over power introduced to the Knesset a serious
sense of competitiveness. This situation became evident in the increase of defection and
realignments throughout the life of the 8th Knesset (Table 5.3). At least nine Knesset
seats switched party ranks.

The coalition was terminated following the resignation of the Prime Minister Meir
on the eve of the publication of the ‘Agranat Commission’.

This report examined

reasons responsible for late-responsiveness of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) following
the Yom Kippur War. Meir considered herself partially responsible and resigned as a
consequence. The government had lasted only 90 days.

For the 16th government, and as predicted by our model, the declined economic
pressure along with the increased competitiveness were reflected in the formation of a
minimum winning coalition with tight ideological parameter. The reason for its short
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term, as our model would have predicted, appears to have been associated with being
formed with limited number of partners operating in a competitive Knesset.

Table 5.3: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Eighth Knesset
Political Parties
Alignment
Likud
National Religious Party
United Torah Front
Rakah
Independent Liberals
Ratz
Kidmah Ufituah
Moked
Arab Parties
United Arab List
Social-Democratic Faction
Agudat Yisrael
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael
Mordechai Ben Porath

8th Knesset
51
39
10
5
4
4
3
2
1
1

Before Next Election
49
40
10
0
3
4
2
0
1
1

3
2
2
1
1

Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist8 s.htm. 2003.

The 26th Israeli Government, 1995-1996
The 26

tli

Israeli Government, another short-lived government, was established

under painful circumstances. The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on
November 4, 1995 by a Jewish extremist while addressing a peace rally in Tel Aviv.
Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres became the Prime Minister. The new government
under Prime Minister Peres promised to continue Rabin’s path of peace while
accelerating the country’s economic developments.166

Opposition Likud’s leader

Benyamin Netanyahu accepted Peres succession, and on November 6, Peres ruled out
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early general election until its scheduled date on November 1996. On November 21,
1995 the leaders of the outgoing coalition that included Labor, Meretz, and the Yiud
faction signed a new agreement. The new coalition was officially inaugurated by the
Knesset on November 22.

Economy
Among the new government’s economic objectives were: “the continuation of the
momentum of growth and development; the broadening of the international and regional
economic relations; the prevention of unemployment...”167

In contrast to the 16th government, the 26th was established amid remarkable
period of economic prosperity. In 1995 the GDP marked a .04% growth, average strikers
per strike declined form 1413.96 to 1067.49, so did unemployment from 7.8 to 6.3%.
Between 1991 and 1996 investment in Israel averaged a 13.5% increase per year. In
1995 foreign direct investment totaled $2 billions.168 Exports also increased by 8.6%;
tourism doubled in comparison to 1990 reaching 2,214,000.169

The inflation rate,

however, soared to 14.7%.

166 B asic P olicy Guidelines o f the Israel G overnm ent, 22 Novem ber 1995. Israel Ministry o f F oreign
Affairs.
167 Basic P olicy Guidelines o f the Israel Government, 22 Novem ber 1995. Israel Ministry o f Foreign
Affairs.
168 R afi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, V ol. 29, N o. 3. pp. 6 - 1 6 ,1996.
169 R afi Bar El, “Growth From P eace” Globes, V ol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
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In 1996, the year the government was terminated, inflation was 13.7%. This
decline, however, confronted an increase in number of strikers per strike, a rise in
unemployment rate, and a decline in growth.170

In contrast to the previous epoch, remarkable economic growth was achieved in
the 1990s. Israel reached an economic growth that allowed its standard of living to
equalize that of most industrially advanced nations. Its GNP increased to $98.5 billions
with a population of less than 6 million. Exports, particularly in military industry, rose
tremendously, reaching $22.5 billions, or about a third of the GNP. Foreign aid to Israel
also increased reaching a total of $42 billions in the 90s compared to about $30 billions in
the 70s.171 Thus the 25th government was formed in a situation of economic prosperity.

Following formation, economic pressure remained low as indicated in growth.
When the government terminated the economic situation remained healthy though with
some notable deterioration. Both the 16th and the 26th governments were established with
relatively low economic pressure. As a consequence, and in line with party competition,
both were formed as tight alliances, as our model would have predicted. They performed
under situations of economic health, though notable deterioration can be observed at their
dissolution. Economic deterioration, while both governments were in office, appears to
have been a factor for their short durations, as proposed by our hypotheses.

170 Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, “Israel at 50:
www.m fa.gov.il/m fa/go.asp7M FAH 00m x0, 1999.
171 Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, “Israel at 50:
w w w .m fa.gov.il/m fa/go.asp7M FA H 00m x0. 1999.

A Statistical Glimpse”:
Based on 1995 prices.
A Statistical Glimpse”:
Based on 1995 prices.
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Immigration
The 26th government was formed while facing the biggest wave of mass
immigration in Israeli history. Within a six- year period (1990-1996) 737,000 Soviet
immigrants arrived to Israel. This influx was similar to that of early statehood, 19481951 when 688,000 immigrants arrived (Table 5.4).172

It was estimated that the new

immigrants increased Israel’s Jewish population by 10% between the years 1990-1996,173
and to an extent eased fears of rising Arab birth rate. In 1995, 76,361 immigrants arrived
and in 1996, 70,605 (Table 5.4).

These new immigrants constituted an immense political and economic pressure
on the government.

The impact was felt with the rabbinic authority questioning the

authenticity the new immigrants’ Jewishness. The new immigrants’ distinctiveness was
manifested in their establishment of an independent secular political party “Israel
Ba’aliya” rather than necessarily merging with traditional Israeli parties. Other segments
of the emigres chose the path of the Likud, joining the Right in reaction to the hated
Soviet communist experience.

The Soviet immigrants further contributed to the

fragmentation of Israeli electoral system pushing ethnic politics in Israel to challenge the
ideological tradition of party politics. Such a fragmentation appears to have been closely
associated with short duration coalitions as projected by our theoretical model.

172 Ministry o f Foreign A ffairs, “A iyah” w w w .m fa.go.il.. 1999.
173 D epartm ent o f Jewish Z ionist Education, “Israel and Zionism: A liya from the U SS R ” w w w .iaz-ed.org.il,

2002 .
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Table 5.4: Immigration to Israel During Short Durational Israeli Governments
Government
2
12
16
26

Pre-Year
170563 (1950)
55036(1964)
54886 (1973)
76361(1995)

First Year
170563 (1950)
31115(1965)
31981(1974)
70605(1996)

Last Year
175279 (1951)
31115(1965)
31981 (1974)
70605(1996)

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau of Statistics.

External Pressure
The year of 1995 was a year of peace negotiations and achievements. Despite the
Palestinian Intifadah and various suicide attacks against Israel, Prime Minister Rabin
continued the path of negotiation with the Palestinians and the Syrians throughout the
year until his assassination.

Israel and the Palestinians signed the Taba Interim

Agreement.174 The U.S. Congress approved a bill calling for the transfer of the U.S.
embassy to Jerusalem. Israel reestablished its normal relations with several countries and
began a diplomatic offensive to achieve economic and political relations with the Arab
countries.175 Israelis seemed to envision a new technological leadership role in the
Middle East in collaboration with neighboring Arab states once the Palestinian issue was
settled.

At the same time, the UN General Assembly passed various resolutions that

criticized Israel in regard to Palestinian rights under occupation, settlements, and nuclear
programs.

However, the General Assembly applauded the achievement of peace

174 The Taba Interim A greem ent or Oslo II A greem ent w as signed on 26 September 1995. It divided the
W est Bank and Gaza into 3 geographic areas A, B, and C. Both A and B areas consisted o f approxim ately
29% o f the Occupied Territories and included about 90% o f Palestinian population. The agreement
established the transfer o f both areas A and B to Palestinian Authority while. See
http://www.dac.neu.edU/polisci/d.sullivan/peacequest/docum ents/osloprocess.htm l.
175 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron M edzinin,

2001.
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negotiations.176

Foreign aid to Israel stood at $5 billions in 1995, almost all from

Washington.

Throughout 1996, the last year of the government, Israel witnessed dramatic
developments. The rate of suicide bombing rose dramatically.177 Prime Minister Peres
delayed redeployment in Hebron.

Israel launched operation “Grapes of Wrath” in

Lebanon against Hizbullah.178 The UN General Assembly passed 30 resolutions mostly
criticizing Israel.179 Foreign aid remained around $5 billions (Table 5.6). Thus, external
pressure had again worsened.

Despite the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, the 26th Government was
established in relatively favorable external conditions of low pressure. In association
with low external pressure, and in accordance with our theoretical expectations, the 26th
government was formed tight.

However, the deterioration of external circumstances

during the cabinet’s office term appears to have been a factor, along with the economic
decline, in its early termination, as expected.

176 A m erican-Israeli C ooperative Enterprise “General A ssem bly Resolutions” ww w.usisrael.org/isource/U N /sctor.html, 2001.
177 In February and March 1996, 59 Israelis w ere killed as direct consequence o f four suicide bombings.
http://www.aish.com /Israel/articles/Suicide_Bombings.asp
178 Israel Foreign Ministry, “Israel’s Foreign Relations: Selected Documents” edited by Meron M edzinin,

2001 .
179 American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise “General A ssem bly R esolutions” ww w.usisrael.org/isource/UN/sctor.html. 2001.
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Coalition Structure:
A. Size
The 26th Government was headed by Shimon Peres and formed under the 13th
Knesset. It included 44 Labor seats, 12 for Meretz, and Yi’ud originally had 2. The
government controlled 58 seats with outside support of 5 Arab Knesset Ministers (Table
5.5). This coalition was practically the extension of the 25th government that was headed
by Prime Minister Rabin and commanded not even a minimum required majority seats in
the Knesset. Nevertheless, the outside support of 5 Arab Knesset members, inspired by
the prospect of peace negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians, helped the
government survive motions of no-confidence. Yet, government’s peace negotiation with
the Palestinians and its proclamation for Palestinians’ statehood rights in part of the
West-Bank in Gaza was responsible for its isolation from most Zionist parties in the
Knesset. Labor’s traditional ruling allies, particularly the religious parties, were critical
of government’s course and preferred to remain in the opposition along with the Right.

The small size of the coalition, according to our model, emerges in association
with low external and economic pressures. Despite the small size of the coalition, that
was expected to contribute to long duration, the deterioration of both economic and
external conditions while the cabinet was serving office appear to have been associated
with early termination.
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B. Ideological Parameter
The 26th government was among the most ideologically tight coalitions that were
formed in Israel. The coalition was an alliance of left parties supported by an outside
bloc of Arab Knesset premiers.180 Traditionally, nationalist Arab parties in the Knesset
aligned themselves with the Communists and the anti-Zionist (anti-system) parties.
However, their support to the Labor ruling coalition was due to the government’s
declared aim of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. This coalition was among the very few
Israeli governments that were formed without the participation of religious parties.
Although the coalition was left-oriented, its economic and social policies were moderate.
Government supervision over economic affairs was deemphasized in favor of private
entrepreneurs.

Rather than establishing economic independence, that was a typical

objective of early left-leaning Israeli governments, the 26th government demanded
liberalization and global integration. The Basic Policy Guidelines explained that “the
government will continue the implementation of reform in the capital market, including
the reduction of Government intervention in this market; the development of a riskcapital market; and the supervised opening of the Israeli capital market to international
fluctuations.”181

Scoring coalitions on the ideological closeness index, Budge did not include
governments formed after 1991. However, we can readily consider the 26th government
as ideologically very tight, scoring 1 in closeness. Both Meretz and Labor were Left
180 These Arab K nesset members were not part o f the ruling government coalition, yet they provided
essential support to the government by voting in its favor whenever a confidence vote w as placed on the
K nesset’s floor.
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parties committed to the peace process and to a similar economic and social liberalization
programs. We consider the 26th government, with primacy to peace initiative, to have
been very tight in ideological parameter.

The ideological parameter of the coalition

synchronizes its size, as expected: tight ideological parameter corresponds to small
coalition size.

C. Competitiveness
The 26th government was under continuous threat of losing the confidence of the
majority in the Knesset. It was practically held hostage to a few outside Arab votes. This
situation indicated that coalition competition in the Knesset was very high and evident in
Labor’s rivalry with the Likud. Competition was elevated with the increased partnership
options for the opposition to form a ruling alliance and to command a majority in the
Knesset (Table 5.5). It was hypothetically possible for the Likud to form a right-centerreligious winning coalition. A Likud-led coalition could have included: Likud (32),
Tsomet (8), United Religious Party (6), Shas (6), Yahadut Hatorah (4), Moledet (3), and
Gesher (2). Another less likely scenario — due to religious-secular pressure between
Meretz and religious parties— could have been an alliance between the Likud (32) and
Meretz (12) that attracts Tsomet (8) and either United Religious Party (6) and/or Shas
(6). Yet the Likud was not given the opportunity by the President to form a government
since it ranked second to Labor in term of number of Knesset seats that it controlled
(Table 5.5). For the Likud to be named by the President to form a government would

181 Basic P olicy Guidelines o f th e Israel G ovenrm ent, 22 Novem ber 1995. Israel M inistry o f Foreign
A ffairs.
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have been possible if Labor, with most seats, had failed to form a coalition (see previous
discussion in Chapter 3 about procedure in coalition formation).

Evidently, the distribution of Knesset seats increased the number of potential
ruling alliances, which made it very difficult for any dominant party to assure its firm
grip on power. This situation inflamed coalition competition throughout the 13th Knesset
leading to defections and realignments among several MKs. Most notable was the split
from Labor by the Third Way (Derch Hashishit). The Third Way was led by Avigdor
Kahalani, a hero of the Yom Kippur War, and was formed in opposition to the
concessions made in the peace talks by Rabin and Peres governments.
in the Knesset lost over 13 seats to new or rival parties and factions.

1R?

In total, parties

183

182 Weiner, Rebecaa, “T he Third W ay” T he A m erican-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, w w w .usisrael.org/isource/Politics/TheThirdW ay.html. 2003.
183 Israeli Knesset, “The M ain Events and Issues During the Thirteenth Knesset”:
w w w.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng h ist!3 s.htm. 2003.
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Table 5.5: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Thirteenth Knesset
Political Parties
Labor
Likud
Meretz
Tsomet
United Religious Party
Shas
Yahadut Hatorah
Moledet
Hadash
Arab Democratic Party
Agudat Yisrael
Degel Hatorah
The Third Way
Gesher
He'atid
Yi'ud
Ymin Yisrael
Yossef Aztran
Ephraim Gur
Nav Arad
Yossef Ba-Gad

13th Knesset
44
32
12
8
6
6
4
3
3
2

Before Next Election
41
29
12
5
6
5
4
1
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

Source: Israeli K nesset, w w w .knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist 13 s.htm . 2003.

The 26th government collapsed after increasing defections that occurred among
the rank of the Labor. Most notable was the loss to two MKs who formed the Third Way
(Table 5.6) leaving Labor totally dependent on Arab votes. This situation led Prime
Minister Peres to call for early election in hope that Labor will bring a sweeping victory.
The cabinet was terminated in June 17, 1996 surviving only 206 days.

Our model correctly predicts the tight formation of the 26th government,
particularly with circumstances of low economic and external pressure.
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competition appears to have had the opposite effect to our hypothetical expectations. In
this coalition, competition emerged as the prime responsible factor for tight formation.
Considering the high level of competition between the Labor and the Likud blocs, were
each was practically capable of forming a winning alliance, our model would have
predicted that such competitive pressure would have led to the dominant parties
extending partnership to smaller parties while making policy concessions. Such a
strategy, our model suggested would have been necessary for the dominant party to
maintain power.

Summary of Results
Economic Pressure
All four short duration governments examined confirmed our theoretical
expectations that economic pressures and alliance formation are directly related. In other
words, governments established under circumstances of high economic pressures were
widely formed (consensual formation: Gov. 2 and 12). In contrast, governments were
established tight while economic pressures were at low (Gov. 16 and 26). Coalitions
established after 1969 (Gov. 16 and 26) appear to have been formed amid low level of
economic pressure, contrary to prior governments (Gov. 2 and 12).

This difference in

economic circumstances between the pre-1969 and post-1969 eras may underline the
decline in national economic pressures in the later period. As predicted by our model,
pre-1969 governments’ economic pressure was high leading to large sized and
ideologically wide parameter-based coalitions (Table 5.6).
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Table 5.6: Economic Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Economy
Short Duration Governments
2
high
12
high
16
low
26
low
* s-t: small-tight, 1-w: large-wide.

Formation*

Economic Pressure Change

i-w

Elevated
Elevated
Elevated
Elevated

i-w
s-t
s-t

Economic pressures, after government formation, are found not to have a direct
association with duration. Short duration governments examined experienced both high
economic pressure (Gov. 2, 12) and low economic pressure (Gov. 16, 26). Change in
economic pressure, however, is found to be significant to durational analysis. In all cases
of short duration coalition governments studied, deterioration in economic condition is
found to be inversely related to duration.

In other words, an increase in economic

pressure during the lifespan of the government, as expressed in economic deterioration
from the year the government assumes office to the time it dissolves, was found to be
associated with shorter duration governments (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26).

In all governments examined evidence to the “aging thesis” was found. This was
most apparent where economic deterioration led to coalitions fast downfall (Gov. 2, 12,
16, and 26). This suggested that governments established under situations of economic
hardship were unable to last long in power while economic pressure continued to shock
them (Table 5.6).
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Immigration
In our methodology chapter we considered a high immigration pressure to occur
when number of immigrants exceeded 40,000 a year; otherwise it was considered low. In
our examination of the shortest lived Israeli governments immigration pressure was not
found to have an association with coalition formation.

Coalitions were formed large

(consensually) with high annual immigration (Gov. 2, 12) and formed tight (nonconsensual) with high annual immigration (Gov. 16, 26). This suggests no consistent
association pattern between immigration pressure and formation. However, immigration
pressure must be considered within the relative impact of other variables (later examined)
since immigration had clearly some effect on coalition formations (Gov. 2 and 12).

As for duration, an inverse association was seen between coalition annual
immigration and government longevity. Governments confronted with high immigration
pressure upon their formation tended to have difficulty maintaining power. All of the
short duration sample governments were formed after large waves of immigrants poured
into the country (Table 5.13: Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26).

There were no consistent patterns to show that changes in immigration pressure
during government’s life impacted durability. Nor was there evidence to suggest that
immigration shocks led to ‘aging’ and termination. This result suggested that although
the immigration pressure variable was found to be inversely associated with duration, it
remained a weak determinant of government durability; since, in two examined situations
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short duration governments had immigration pressure decreasing rather than increasing
(Gov. 12 and 16) and remaining the same in two other cases (Gov. 2 and 26).

Table 5.7: Im m igration Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Short Duration Governments

Immigration
high
high
high
high

2

12
16
26

Formation*
I-w
I-w
s-t
s-t

Immigration Changes
Same
Reduced
Reduced
Same

* s-t: small-tight, 1-w: large-wide.

External Pressure
External pressure was found to have a low direct association with coalition
formation in the sampled cases (Table 5.8). Three cases were found to have an inverse
association (Gov. 2, 12, and 16) and only one government’s formation was directly
associated with external pressure (Gov. 26). In other words, support to the hypothesis
that projected low external pressure to lead to tight coalition formation is contradicted in
two examined short duration coalitions (Gov. 2,12). Support to the hypothesis that
projected high external pressure to lead to wide coalition formation is also contradicted in
one examined short duration government (Gov. 16).

Thus, suggesting perhaps other

relevant variables in the respective circumstances of short duration governments to have
had determined their formations, an issue that we will further explore.

In relation to duration no clear association can be made with external pressure.
Three governments of short durations were established at low level of external pressure
(Gov. 2, 12, and 26) and only one case (Gov. 16) supports the proposition that high
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external pressure undermine the duration of the coalition. In two cases (Gov. 12, 26)
elevated external pressure (positive change) is found to be associated with short duration.

It is interesting to suggest, following our analysis, that coalitions not rationally
formed, i.e., small-tight when external pressure was high (Gov. 16) and large-wide when
external pressure was low (Gov. 2,12), shortly dissolve. This finding, and its implication,
will be further explored in the Chapter 7.

Table 5.8: External Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Short Duration Governments

External Pressure

Formation*

External Pressure Changes

2
12
16
26

low
low
high
low

I-w
I-w
s-t
s-t

Same
Elevated
Reduced
Elevated

* s-t: small-tight, 1-w: large-wide.

Coalition Structure
Our examination of four short duration Israeli governments produced the same
result which suggest that competitiveness of the electoral system determined to a large
extent the formation of the coalition.

Two coalition governments (Gov. 2,12) were

formed at low level of competition. Another two coalition governments (Gov. 16, 26)
were established small by size and tight by ideological parameter under condition of high
coalition competition. The result also indicated that the size and ideological parameter
variables were directly related.

Whenever the size of the coalition increased beyond

minimum winning requirement we expect that coalition’s ideological parameter to be a
wider, more accommodating, and of consensual policy space.
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These results additionally demonstrated that formation was significantly different
between coalitions formed in the pre-1969 than the post-1969 era. The early period
demonstrated a large degree of political consensus leading to larger structural formations,
while the later period provided less ground for national consensus leading to tighter
formations.

Another important observation can be made from our analysis that no

apparent difference existed between the durability of coalitions that varied in structural
formations. Consensual (1-w) and competitive (s-t) formations produced different
government duration with no apparent pattern (See table 5.9). No support was found to
our hypothetical proposition that efficient formation (small-tight) leads to longer duration
contrary to large-tight formation. This conclusion suggests that structural variables may
need to be examined in light of other event pressure variables in the process of
determining government’s duration, an issue which we will undertake in the following
chapter.

Table 5.9: Structural Formation o f Israeli Governments
Government
Short Duration
2
12
16
26

Size

Ideology

Competition

large
large
small
small

wide
wide
tight
tight

low
low
high
high

How does our result compare with long duration governments? In the following
chapter we will examine four long duration governments.

We will apply the same

procedure we have undertaken in studying short duration governments as to reveal
comparative differences and similarities in coalition formation and duration.
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CHAPTER 6
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS:
LONG DURATION COALITION GOVERNMENTS

In this chapter a qualitative approach is conducted to analyze Israeli coalition
formation and duration. The longest-lived Israeli governments were selected in order to
examine the most evident variables associated with governments’ longevity. The sample
examined includes four Israeli cabinets evenly divided between pre and post-1969
periods. This selection provides evidence of whether variables associated with coalitions
of long duration changed or remained the same following 1969 general election in Israel.
Explanatory variables examined include economics, immigration, and external pressure
and structural competitiveness of the Knesset upon the formation of the coalition
government. Changes in pressure variables as well as the structural competitiveness of
the Knesset, the coalition’s size, and the coalition ideological parameter are further
examined in a second stage analysis in order to reveal factors determining the long
durability of the governments.

Our comparative analysis to longest vs. shortest duration governments provides
support to the hypotheses on economic pressure and system competitiveness as
determinants of coalitions’ structural formation.

Furthermore, analysis shows that

changes in economics, immigration and external pressures are inversely related to cabinet
duration. Proper structuring of government formation that responds to changing external
pressure is found to relate positively to government duration.
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The 7th Israeli Government, 1955-57
The outgoing 6th Israeli coalition government was headed by Prime Minister
Shared and collapsed following the Dr. Israel Kastner's scandal.184 The coalition’s
disagreement over the Kastner’s trial erupted after the government, with “unnecessary
haste,” appealed the case to the Supreme Court. In protest to the government position,
The General Zionists, the second largest coalition partner in the government, abstained
from voting in a no-confidence vote brought by the opposition. Mapai considered the
position taken by the General Zionists as a breach in the coalition covenant and a
violation to the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility. This situation rendered the
four General Zionist Ministers as resigned and Mr. Sharett submitted the resignation of
his government to President Ben-Zvi on June 29.183

On July 26 a general election was held which brought back Mapai once again as
the largest dominant party to the Third Knesset (Table 6.1). Taking on the responsibility
of forming a ruling coalition, Mapai decided to form a large alliance consisting of various
political parties, particularly that of the left. Among the possible motivations to form
such an alliance could have been the increasing foreign threat, represented by the SovietEgyptian alliance as well as other considerations such as overcoming the Kastner’s case
controversy. Yet, Mapai decided to punish the General Zionists for violating previous
coalition’s unity and excluded them from the new Cabinet. On November 2nd 1955 the
7th government was inaugurated in the Knesset under the premiership of Mr. Ben Gurion.
184 Dr. Israel Kastner was high civil servant, a member of Mapai, and a former leader o f the Hungarian
Jewish community. O n June 22 the Jerusalem District Court, after 18 months o f deliberation, found Dr.
Kastner guilty for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. The court found evidence which supported the
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The new Mapai-ied alliance included all left-Zionist parties as well as the centrist-leaning
Progressive party and the Hapoel Hamizrachi of the National Religious Party. The entry
of the left-Zionist parties into the coalition government was motivated by the return of
Mr. Ben Guidon to the leadership of Mapai as well as their large acquired shares of the
government’s ministries.186 Mr. Ben Gurion's return came after his inter-party struggle
with Mr. Sharett, which led to the resignation of the later form the party's leadership.

The coalition only collapsed after a partner party, Ahudat Ha’avodah, leaked in its
newspaper details about the secret arms agreement Mr. Ben Gurion was trying to
conclude with Western Germany.

Ben Gurion considered the leak a breach in the

coalition agreement and demanded that Ahdut Ha’avoda pull out of the government.
After the latter refused, Mr. Ben Gurion dissolved the government in January 1958. The
government lasted 796 days in power and was among the longest lasting coalitions.

Economy
Economic tasks were among this government’s priorities. In its policy guidelines
the government declared its intention to achieve full employment, raise the standard of
living, attract private capital, balance the budget, and most importantly hold inflation in
check.187

claim that he had consciously taken p art in the sending o f hundreds o f thousands of Hungarian Jew s to their
death at Auschwitz. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308.
185 See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, July 9-16, 1955, p. 14308.
186 Ahdut Avoda acquired ministries o f Interior and Transport, Mapam received the ministries of
Development as well as Health. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, November 5-12, 1955, p. 14520.
187 Basic Principles o f Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3rd, 1955.
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For the 7th Government economic conditions were difficult upon formation.
Inflation was in double digits and economic growth declined from 30% in 1951 to 14% in
1955; unemployment was 7.2%.188 In 1956, the first practical year of the government,
emphasis on industrial developments led to the beginning growth of the economy.

1 SO

By

1957, the last year for the government in power, and despite the violent strike of “Ata”
textile factory workers,

100

unemployment was reduced to 7% and economic growth was

exceeding 9%.191 The average annual strikers per strike was also reduced to 63 compared
to 155 in the previous year.

192

The 7th government achieved many of its intended economic policies. Reducing
unemployment and controlling inflation in addition to attaining economic growth which
marked important economic progress for the government.

This government was a

predictable case in our theoretical model where high economic pressure contributed to
larger coalition formations.

At the same time, the improvement of economic

circumstances, throughout the life of the government, played an important determinant
factor, as expected in our model, in prolonging its duration.

Immigration
Like many others, the 7th Israeli government established immigration as a major
policy objective.

However, the government’s task was concentrated on immigrants’

integration and absorption. It was urgent to mobilize “all internal potentialities and
188 Rafi Bar E l, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
189 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
190 Israeli Knesset, “The Main Events and Issues During the Third Knesset”:
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist3.htm, 2003.
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special resources... to absorb the masses of immigrants in work and settlement, to house
them and integrate them in Israel.”193

The massive immigration that followed

independence represented a major challenge to the country’s absorptive ability.

An

estimate of 825,000 new Jewish immigrants entered the country between 1948 and 1957.
By December 1957 it is estimated that the Jewish population had increased from a total
of 650,000 to 1,770,000 due primarily to this immigration.194

By the mid-50s European immigration into Israel was declining and the Zionist
effort was turning to North Africa. In 1955, during the first year term of the government
only 37,528 immigrants came. In the second year immigration increased to 56,330, and
the figure continued to reflect the success of the government in attracting more
immigrants by raising the number in 1957 to 72,634 immigrants.

The 7th government

was established at the end of 1955 while the country was experiencing a dramatic drop in
the number of immigrants relative to earlier years. Yet, in the last year of the 7th
government, immigration from North Africa was once again on the rise.

According to our model, immigration does not appear to have been a factor in the
initial formation of the coalition.

The coalition was formed large, yet immigration

pressure was low. However, initial low immigration pressure may have been a factor that
contributed to longer duration government.

191 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From P eace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
192 See “Statistical Abstract of Israel”, Central Bureau o f Statistics.
193 Basic Principles o f Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3rd, 1955.
194 Riemer, S. “Israel Ten Years of Economic Dependence” Oxford University Press, p. 141, 1960.
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External Pressure
Many urgent tasks confronted the 7th government, particularly that of external
relations. Upon its formation the government’s foreign policy objective was centered on
strengthening Israeli military preparedness while observing the Armistice Agreements
between Israel and its neighbors.195 Related to such matters were the “feda’eyeen”
attacks from Gaza and Israel’s formation of demilitarized zones.

In 1955, when the 7th government was bom, external threat to Israel was
mounting. The Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms deal was announced while Egypt and Syria
signed a mutual defense treaty. Raids from Gaza intensified and the DDF responded with
attacks on the Egyptian military installations. "Eventually the Sinai War broke out in
1956 against Egypt with Israel fighting alongside France and Britain.

Israeli forces

conquered the Sinai Desert. The Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the conflict. In
the same year the Security Council and the General Assembly criticized Israel for
violating the General Armistice Agreement (UN General Assembly-UNGA and UN
Security Council - UNSC).

By 1957, the government’s last year in office, the Suez crisis was over and
external pressure on Israel was greatly reduced. The IDF withdrew to armistice lines.
Serious clashes on Israel-Syrian borders continued; however, they were limited
skirmishes which did not represent a major threat to the country. U.N peacekeeping
forces began to patrol the Sinai and continued in Lebanon.

195 Basic Principles o f Government Program, Israel Knesset Archives, November 3rd, 1955.
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Thus, the 7th government was preceded by high intensity of external pressure.
This pressure was further exaggerated after it was formed. By the time it was dissolved,
hTi

external pressure had been greatly reduced. In the case of the 7 government external
pressure appears to have been a factor in the formation of larger sized coalition as our
model has predicted. Furthermore, the breakout of the war with Egypt appears as an
additional factor contributing to the proliferation of the government. The eventual
reduction in external pressure appears to contradict the 'aging thesis' which predicted
collapse of coalitions at shocks.

Coalition Structure
A. Size
The large 7th government was established under the 3rd Knesset in November
1955. The government controlled 80 Knesset seats. Its partners consisted of Mapai 40,
National Religious Party 11 , Mapam 9, Ahdut Ah’avodah 10, The Progressive Party 5,
and the minority list 5 (Table 6.1). This government was a large coalition consisting of
many excess parties.

Beside Mapai every party in the coalition was potentially

replaceable.

Surrounding threats, immigration and integration, and economic difficulties were
among the pressures leading the various Israeli parties to establish and maintain a large
national alliance that pulled together the various ideological groupings in Israel.

As

predicted by our model, events’ pressure can be associated with large coalition
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formations as demonstrated by the 7th government. The coalition's long duration can be
associated with ‘proper’ coalition formations responding to pressures. Furthermore, as
our hypotheses projected, the decline of certain pressures might be also associated with
government longevity.

B .Ideology
The coalition was ideologically left-center and although basically secular,
included religious partnership.

Whether in economic or social welfare policies the

government was instructed to take on a dominant role in planning and management. The
guidelines expressed the need for the government to provide housing, national health
care, and jobs for all Israeli citizens. At the same time, the guidelines were founded
mostly on national building and integration of the immigrants. Thus, it emerged as a
consensus document expressing the national aspirations of most Zionist parties.196

Budge coded ideological closeness among partners as level 3, indexing the 7th
government ideologically as somewhat wide. This is further supported by the fact that a
large number of cabinet partners held diverse policy agendas, yet joined together under a
general wide governmental policy umbrella.

Both size and ideology appeared to have been stretched to accommodate a range
of partners. As our model predicted, among the factors that emerged to have been
responsible for this wide formation include immigration, economic and external
th

pressures. The 7 government also confirms our hypothetical expectations that reduction
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or resolution to economic and external pressure contributes to longer duration.197 Large
size and wide ideological formation, however, which responded to pressures, seem to
have gone along with longer duration in this case, contrary to our expectations.

C. Competitiveness
This was another government formed during the ‘Mapai dominance era’ where
challenges to party rule were virtually non-existent. Virtually no alliances were practical
without Mapai (Table 6.1). Mapai controlled 40 Knesset seats along with four Arab seats
associated with Labor. Only 45 seats were left to religious and right wing parties. A
Herut-led coalition could only have been formed if it captured all right and religious seats
(45) in addition to at least two other left-wing parties —Ahdut Ha’avoda (10) and Mapam
(9). Such an alliance would have been unrealisitc at that time between such ideological
antagonists. This situation left Mapai with the real power leverage to form and break
coalitions.

We consider coalition competition to have been very low. The implication of low
competition could be observed in the strong party discipline during the Third Knesset.
Party discipline was best captured in the absence of factional defections or re-alignments
occurring in the Knesset (Table 6.1).

196 B asic Principles o f G overnm ent Program, Israel Knesset Archives, Novem ber 3rd, 1955.
197 Aspects o f external pressure may have been elevated as for exam ple the problem o f Palestinian refugees,
which drew negative international condemnation while Israel refused their return. Yet, other aspects of
external pressure, particularly in term o f severity o f external conflict that reflects the number o f casualties,
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Table 6.1 Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Third Knesset
Political Parties
Mapai
Herut Movement
General Zionists
National Religious Party
Ahdut Ha'avodah
Mapam
Maki
United Torah Front
Progressive Party
Arab Parties
Kidmah Va'avodah
Hakla’ ut Ufituah

3rd Knesset
40
15
13
11
10
9
8
6
5
2
2
1

Before Next Election
40
15
13
11
10
9
6
6
5
2
2
1

Source: Israeli Knesset, w w w.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng hist3 s.htm. 2003.

Contrary to our proposed model, low competition was not associated with narrow
cabinet formation in the 7th government. Low competition also was not associated with
short duration as our model predicted. Quite the contrary, this seems to confirm the null
hypothesis which proposes that low competition widens coalitions and prolongs their
duration.

The 13th Israeli Government 1966-1969
The second longest durable cabinet in the pre-1969 period was the 13th
government.

It was inaugurated in January 1966 following a national election. The

government was formed by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol and lasted 1162 days in power.
The formation of the new coalition government followed a bitter inter-party struggle over
Mapai’s leadership. The outgoing 12th coalition government had collapsed in January
1966 owing to the dispute between Prime Minister Eshkol and Ben Gurion over the
Lavon case and Mapai’s electoral merger with Ahdut Avoda. The dispute led eventually

skirmishes, and attacks have declined. It is in our assessm ent, that despite the refugee problem, the overall
external situation for the government had been improved by the last year the coalition's term.
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to Mr. Ben Gurion's exit from the party and his formation of Rafi. Levi Eshkol claimed
Mapai’s leadership and reestablished electoral alignment with Ahdut Avoda.198 On
November 2nd, 1965 the Mapai-Ahdut Avoda electoral alignment (Alignment) captured
45 Knesset seat while Rafi won 10 seats.199

On November 28, following the national election and after consulting with party
leaders, President Shazar asked Mr. Eshkol to form a new government.

Coalition

negotiation was complicated by the religious parties' demands for an agreement calling
for a new legislation providing stiff penalties for transgressions of the Sabbath.

A

compromise agreement was reached on January 6, 1966 whereby strict Sabbath
observance was adopted as public policy by the coalition with exception under “special
circumstances” to be determine by a committee composed by the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Labour and Religious Affairs. The new coalition excluded Rafi200 while
including, in addition to the Alignment the National Religious Party, Mapam, the
Independent Liberal, Po'alei Agudat Yisreal and the minority lists. The coalition was
inaugurated by the Knesset on January 12.201 The coalition controlled 73 Knesset seats,
having 12 extra seats than the needed minimum majority of 61. On June 5, 1967 (the day
198 A Left w ing labor Zionist party. Follow ing the Six Day W ar m any o f its members, including the party's
spiritual leader Yitzhak Tabenkin, supported the idea o f Greater Israel; however, another leader, Yigal
Allon, advocated the return o f som e o f the administered territories which would not endanger Israel's
security.
199 Israel Knesset, “ Factional and Government Make-Up o f the Sixth K nesset”,
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng zhistb s.htm, 2003. A lso see “D efection o f L av o n Group from
Mapai. - Mr. Ben-Gurion's Resignation from Mapai Central Committee. - Resignation o f Eshkol Cabinet. N ew Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol” K eesing’s Record o f World Events, January 1965Israel.
200 R afi (Israel Labor List) was established by David Ben-Gurion for the 1965 elections as a protest against
M apai’s action in the Lavon Affair. R afi gained ten seats in the next elections. Shimon Peres served as its
secretary general and was instrumental in bringing Rafi and Mapai together to form the Labor Party in
1968.
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of the outbreak of the Six Day War), the coalition government was further expanded to
include Gahal and Rafi. The government ceased to exist when Eshkol passed away on 26
February, 1969.202

Economy
The 13th government's guiding principles emphasized the coalition’s initial leftist
orientation by providing the government with major tasks in planning and economic
development.

This was seen as a means to control inflation while providing full

employment, increase capital production, expand product export, import foreign capital,
and achieve economic independence.203

The government was formed in 1966 while the country faced economic recession.
The impact of the 1962 government economic policy of devaluation and tax increase
presented major challenges for the new government. A year prior to its formation,
inflation had been doubled from 4.4% in 1964 to 7% in 1965.
worsened after the government was established.

The situation even

In 1966, the year following

government’s formation, economic pressure was rising. Israel faced a bigger recession
forcing the closure of factories, cutting government spending, canceling subsidies,
reducing local demand, and resulting in heavy unemployment. Inflation was at 8% and
the growth rate was less than 1%.204

201 “N ew Coalition Government formed by Mr. Eshkol. - Mr. Eban succeeds Mrs. M eir as Foreign
Minister” K eesing’s Record o f W orld Events, February 1966, Israel.
202 Israeli Knesset, “Factional and Government M ake-Up o f the Sixth K nesset”
http://ww w .knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng hist6 s.htm, 2003.
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The economic situation, however, dramatically changed following the 1967 War.
In 1968, the government's last year in office, major economic difficulties were resolved,
economic growth increased to 12%, inflation fell to 4%, and unemployment was greatly
reduced to 6.1 compared to 10.5 in 1966.205

Both pre-969 long duration governments (7th and 13th) were thus formed under
daunting economic difficulties. Inflation and unemployment presented major challenges
to both. From the time they were formed until they terminated, major achievements in
reducing economic pressure can be noted in term of controlling for inflation, reducing
unemployment, and providing economic growth.

Governments formed before 1969 were established under tremendous economic
pressure. Such situations prompted larger formations as evident in governments 2, 12, 7
and 13. Duration of these coalitions appear to have been associated with the decline in
economic pressure. To the extent economic pressure declines, governments last longer in
power. Both results confirm our hypothetical expectations. Furthermore high economic
pressure (Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13) appear to be associated with large coalition formation
while low economic pressure can yield tighter formations (Gov. 16, 25, and 26).

Immigration
Immigration to Israel remained a central task for the 13th government, “...the
ingathering of the exiles of the Jewish people in its Homeland; speeding up aliya from all
203 B asic Principle o f the N ew Government’s Programme, Israeli Knesset Archives, 12 January 1966.
204 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From P eace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.
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countries and all classes, encouragement of aliya from the countries of prosperity,
stimulation of pioneering aliya.”206 And Israel was prepared by the mid-60s more than
earlier years to absorb new waves of immigration. There were 448 new settlements and
25 new towns partially occupied. Agriculture and industry were thriving. Immigrants
were taken directly to apartments rather than transit camps.207

The task of attracting more Jewish immigrants into Israel, however, became more
difficult. First, there was no immediate threat to Jews around the world typical to the
experience of WWU. Second, many Jewish communities found in the west, particularly
in the U.S., enjoyed a permanent and thriving home. This reality was reflected in the
decline of immigration to Israel during the 60s. The number of immigrants dropped from
31,115 in 1965, to 15,957 in 1966, and to 20,703 in 1968. Low immigration pressure
does not appear to have been associated in the formation of the 13

th

government.

Immigration issue began to lose significance in the political dynamics of coalition
behaviors.

In July 28, 1969 at a ceremony in Jerusalem, which was attended by Mrs. Meir,
Mr. Aryeh Pincus, chairman of the Jewish Agency asserted the declining immigration to
Israel. The information given by Mr. Pincus was supplemented by statistics that was later
issued by the Jewish Agency.

Mr. Pincus pointed out to the problem of attracting

Algerian Jews whose attachment to the French culture undermined Israel's attraction. He

206 Basic Principle o f the N ew G overnm ent’s Programme, Israeli K nesset Archives, 12 January 1966.
207 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, “Aiyah” w w w .m fa.go.il., 1999.
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also explained that the remaining number of potential Jewish immigrants from the "lands
of distress" outside the Soviet Union amounted to less than 250,OOO.208 These factors
were significant, in his assessment, to the decline of immigrations by the end of the 60s.
Evidently, this situation undermined the importance of immigration in national political
mobilization that characterized the early years of State formation.

External Pressure
The basic principles of the 13th government established the task of advancing
peace in the region and strengthening defense as a primary objective of the government
along with the aim of ingathering. “Foreign policy,” the basic principles advanced, “will
be designed to safeguard the full independence, sovereignty, welfare and security of the
State, the integration of its territory and boundaries, its internal freedom, the welfare of
its citizens, and the enhancement of Israel’s status in the family of nations.”

For that

purpose, the statement stressed, the government was to pursue avenues that can lead to
peace negotiation with Israel’s neighbors.

1 1fl

In 1965, the year before the government assumed office, external pressures
remained low, though with noticeable escalation in tension compared to 1964. In 1966,
however, pressure between Israel and its neighbors was on the rise after a U.S. sale of jet

208 " Immigration since Independence" K eesing’s Record o f World Events, August 1969.
209 B asic Principles o f Government Program, Israel K nesset Archives, January 12, 1966.
210 This policy went along the position taken by Mr. Eshkol who repeatedly expressed Israel's intention for
p eace negotiation. H is position was best captured in his speach on May 17, 1965 at the opening o f the last
term in the life o f the 5th Knesset, Mr. Eshkol made a statement on international affairs in which he
appealed for talks between Israel and the Arab countries to bring about a peaceful settlement o f the ArabIsraeli dispute.
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fighters to Tel Aviv. The American administration's justification for the transaction was
that the planes were needed to maintain the arms balance in the face of large Soviet arms
shipments to the United Arab Republic and Syria and, to a lesser extent, to Iraq. Serious
clashes between Israel and Syria broke out following a military coup in Damascus.
Egypt and Syria signed mutual defense treaty with a joint command.211 The UN Security
Council passed resolution 228 holding Israel responsible for violating the General
Armistice Agreement by its military action in Southern Hebron against Jordan (UNSC).
The following year the Six Day War broke out with Israel defeating Arab armies and
conquering new territories including the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

By 1968, the year the government dissolved, tension with the Arab countries
remained high.

The Jordan border became a stage for Palestinian attacks on Israeli

settlements and military posts. Nasser’s heated rhetoric against Israel continued and
fighting along the Suez Canal erupted. Israeli aircrafts attacked Iraqi artillery units in
Jordan and raided Beirut airport destroying thirteen airliners. Palestinians attacked an
Israeli airliner in Athens. The U.S. announced sale of Phantom jets to Israel.212 The UN
General Assembly’s resolution 2443 criticized Israel for its treatment of civilian
populations under occupation. The UN Security Council in its resolutions 248 and 256
condemned Israeli military action against Jordan as violation of UN Charter and cease
fire resolutions. The Security Council passed a similar resolution (262) with respect to
Israel’s attack on Lebanon.

211 Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.
212 Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

218

External pressure appeared evident prior to the formation of the 13th government.
This pressure was further escalated after formation, peaking in the war, and remained
relatively high at the time of termination. It should be noted, however, that with the
exception of persistent dispute over free passage in the Suez Canal and compared to the
1967 war, severity of external pressure at the time of termination in 1968 slightly
decreased with no major military threat against Israel evident. Initial external pressure
appeared to have had contributed to the establishment of a large sized coalition as our
model predicted. Furthermore, the persistent of external pressure throughout the term of
the 13th government appeared to have been associated with its longer duration.

As the

case of the 7th government demonstrated, the large size of the coalition may evidently
become relevant to duration at times of severe external pressure. Coalitions formed large
when pressures are high (war and severe conflict) may be associated with long coalition
duration.

Coalition Structure
A. Size
The 13th Government was formed as the first government under the 6th Knesset.
It was originally established as a coalition with partners controlling 73 seats. With the
outbreak of the Six Day War the coalition was enlarged to include most parties in the
Knesset including the right wing parties. Original partners included the Alignment with
45 seats, Mapam 8, NRP 11, Liberals 5, Po’alei Agudat 2, and Kidmah Ufituah 2 (Table
6.2). On June 5, 1967 Gahal and Rafi joined the government extending its control to a
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109 Knesset seats. Both economic and external pressures were associated with the reason
of forming a larger than minimum winning coalition, as our model had predicted. The
coalition was initially formed with 12 extra seats and three additional parties than
necessary to have a minimum winning coalition. External pressure, however, became the
sole reason for extending the size of the coalition to become a grand alliance of all
Zionist parties. This occurred in June 1967 on the eve of the Six Day War where the
government was further extended to include all Zionist parties in the Knesset.

The formation of a large government was associated with high economic and
external pressure that surrounded the 13th Cabinet. The slight declined of these pressures
may have helped prolonging government's duration, as projected by our model.
However, the large size of the government did not appear as a factor for short duration, as
we would have expected.

It appears that the formation of large coalitions during

situations of high external pressures can contribute to longer government's duration.

B. Ideology
The alliance initially represented a coalition between left and religious parties that
controlled 73 seats. When the Six Days War broke out the alliance was extended to
include Rightist parties. Ideologically the coalition was formed wide but with the war it
turned into a national alliance reflecting the entire spectrum of the Knesset. Thus, the
ideological parameter was originally wide but stretched even wider after the right parties
joined the government. Budge indexes the ideological closeness of the initial coalition
partners as 3. However, it could be argued that with the war, and after the coalition was
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extended to Gahal, that closeness was increased to level 5.

Whatever the case we

consider the coalition to have been formed as ideologically somewhat wide and it became
even wider on June 5, 1967.

Competitiveness
Coalition competition increased noticeably throughout the 6th Knesset. Although
the dominance of the Alignment remained indisputable with 45 Knesset seats, Gahal
became a significant political force in Israel (26 seats). Gahal (Gush Herut-Liberalism)
was a-right wing party formed in 1965 as a merger of two right-wing groups: Herat and a
splinter group of the Liberal party.213 Still, the level of competition remained low,
preventing any coalition from being formed without the participation of the Alignment
(Table 6.2). A rival coalition to that of the Alignment would had to have been led by the
right-wing Gahal (26) in alliance with the NRP (11), Rafi (10), Liberals (5), Agudat
Yisrael (4). But such a coalition would have required five more Knesset seats which
would have been potentially impossible to get out of either MAPAM (8) or other extreme
left-wing parties such as Rakah (3) or Hadash (1). Such a highly unlikely scenario helped
maintained the dominance of the Labor alliance and undermined any serious challenge to
the ralership.

Throughout the 6th Knesset the electoral position of the Alignment even
improved with Rafi rejoining labor ranks, thus making the Left the indisputable ruler of
the Knesset (Table 6.2). In addition, the successful conclusion of the Six Days War

213 The American Cooperative Enterprise, w w w .us-israel.org/isource/Politics/Gahal.html.. 2003
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brought to the Alignment great electoral and political rewards.214 Israel emerged as
indisputable military power in the region proving itself capable of defeating several Arab
armies at the same time. Conquest of new territories containing vast labor and natural
resources also proved indispensable for Israel's growing industry. The strategic military
significance of the new conquest elevated Israel’s military edge to a higher level and
attracted great powers to seek alliances and strategic positioning in the region.

The

government was terminated following the death of Prime Minister Eshkol on February
26, 1969. Prime Minister Golda Meir headed the following 14th Government.215

According to our predictive model, the case of the 13th government confirms two
important aspects of coalition formation. Both economic and external pressures seem to
be highly associated with large formation. Again, our null hypothesis is confirmed with
regard to competition where it seems that low competition contributed to large formation
and long duration. The presence of high levels of external and/or economic pressures,
low competition, and a large coalition formation appear to have been associated with long
government’s duration.

214 Although the Labor em erged electorally pow erful, the capture o f the new territories with Arab majority
opened new sources o f divisions and splits into the rank o f the left parties (territorialists vs. peace
advocates) and eventually helped strengthen the position o f the Right L ikud bloc.
215 Israel Knesset, “ Factional and Government M ake-Up o f the Sixth K nesset”,
w w w .k n e sse t.g o v .il/h is to rv /e n g /e n g zhistb s.htm. 2003.
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Table 6=2: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Sixth Knesset
Political Parties
Alignment
Gahal
National Religious Party
Rafi
Mapam
Liberals
Agudat Yisrael
Rakah
Kidmah Ufituah*
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael/Morasha
Shituf Ve'ahvah*
Ha'olam Hazeh-Koah Hadash
Maki
Hamerkaz Hahofshi
Ahvah Aravit
Druze Faction

6th Knesset
45
26
11

10
8
5
4
3
2
2
2
1
1

Before Next Election
63
22
11
1

0
4
4
3
2
1

1
1
1
4
1
1

Source: Israeli Knesset, www.knesset.gov.il/history/eng/eng hist6 s.htm, 2003.

The 18th Israeli Government. 1977-81
The 18th government was among the post-1969 longest-lived Israeli alliances. It
also come clearly after the rise of electoral competition had become firmly established in
the early 1970s. Prime Minister Menachem Begin formed the government in June 1977
and it lasted until August 1981, the sum of 1507 days. The outgoing 17th government of
Mr. Rabin had witnessed a series of internal party disputes and divisions marked by the
split of Mr. Arieh Eiav from the Labor party and his merger with Civil Rights Movement
to form a new “super-dove” Yaad party, which continued under the leadership of Mrs.
Shulamit Aloni. Further cracks in the Rabin’s 17th government emerged amid a power
struggle with the National Religious Party. The latter abstained from voting in a noconfidence vote against the government following a dispute over the Prime Minister’s
non-observance of the Sabbath. This prompted Mr. Rabin on December 1976 to invoke a
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1962 law that permitted the Prime Minister to dismiss cabinet ministers of parliamentary
factions that voted against the government or abstained on issues of confidence. Mr.
Rabin's dismissal of the NRP from the coalition provoked the Independent Liberal party
to quit the coalition, thus reducing the government command of Knesset seats to 53. Mr.
Rabin was forced to resign his government and the Knesset decided for an early
election.216

Prior to the national election, which brought victory to the Likud, the Labor
Alignment was undergoing leadership power struggle. It began first with the narrow
election of Mr. Rabin as the party leader against Mr. Peres in February 1977 (1,445 votes
against 1,404). A scandal concerning Rabin soon emerged following the publication of a
report by the daily Ha'aretz on March 15 revealing secret U.S. bank accounts held by Mr.
And Mrs. Rabin. In April Mr. Rabin resigned his post as the party leader and Prime
Minister. On April 11 he was ordered by the Finance Ministry to pay a fine of £115,000
and on April 17 Mrs Rabin was found guilty of contravening currency regulations by the
Tel Aviv district court and sentenced to a fine of £1, 250,000 or 12 months
imprisonment. 217

Against this background of Labor internal turmoil the general election was held
on May 17 leading to the victory for the right wing Likud bloc. The new election enabled
the Likud leader, Mr Menahem Begin, to form a centre-right coalition Cabinet on June
19, thus ending an era of labor dominance over every established government since the
216 “Resignation o f Rabin G overnm ent” K eesing’s Record o f W orld Event, March 1977, Israel.
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foundation of the state in 1948. Following the election the Likud began negotiations
primarily with primary three parties, the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC) and
the two main religious parties (i.e. the NRP and Agudat Israel), with a view to forming a
centre-right coalition. Negotiation with the dovish DMC proved difficult particularly
because of Likud’s initial hawkish position on the question of peace and the Occupied
Territories.

Negotiation was further complicated by the fact that Likud’s leader

Menachem Begin insisted in having Mr. Dayan as Foreign Minister, an issue that proved
unacceptable to the DMC. Thus, DMC's initial position was to oppose joining the Likud
government. Religious parties, on the other hand, accepted the Likud invitation on the
ground that great religious concession would be provided.

The coalition agreement

asserted religious parties' demand promising a sweeping reform in favor of applying
halacha to the Law of Return in addition to a greater role of religious authorities in civil
affairs.218

On June 1977, a narrow Right-Religious coalition was established and

inaugurated by the Knesset.

On October 20th the DMC also decided to join Begin’s

coalition. The DMC, however, underwent various divisions and splits that forced it to
withdraw from the Likud led coalition in 1978 and 1980.219

Economy
The principle guidelines of the 18th government were the shortest and most
summarized versions that have been written by any Israeli coalition. With regard to
economic objectives, the guidelines emphasized the need to achieve “restraint of
217 “Developm ents preceding Elections - Resignation o f Mr Rabin as Labour Party Leader - Succession o f
Mr Peres - Financial S candals” K eesing’s Record o f World Event, September 1977, Israel.
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inflation, stabilization of the currency, and assurance of a decent standard of living for all
residents of the state.”220

The government assumed office in 1977 while another devaluation of the lira had
taken place, growing tolO to the U.S. dollar. Inflation was high, reaching 39.1%.221
Inflation continued high, doubling annually and reaching 56.8% in 1978. By 1980,
economic pressures were tremendous.

The inflation rate was 131% and the shekel

replaced the lira as Israel's official currency. In 1981 Yoram Aridor became the Finance
Minister and his policy to lower taxes on imported goods led to another jump in the
inflation rate, reaching 120%. In February 1981 the Tel Aviv bourse collapsed with a
15% drop in total stocks’ values.222 Economic growth rates of the national product also
declined an average of 3.6% after mid-70s and 3% in the 80s.223

Although the 70s represented a period of major economic achievements in
contrast to the 60s, no sign of economic health was evident throughout the life of the 18th
government. The government insisted that the reason was a global recession. However,
the Labor opposition stressed that since the Likud-led coalition assumed power in 1977,
consumer prices had risen 1,200 %, unemployment increased sharply, and industrial

218 “Formation o f Begin Cabinet - Controversy over Nomination o f Mr Dayan as Foreign Minister Portfolios left Open for Dem ocratic Movement for Change” K eesing’s Record o f World Event, Septem ber
1977, Israel.
219 “Cabinet Changes” ” K eesing’s Record o f W orld Event, Decem ber 1980, Israel.
220 Basic Guidelines o f the Government, Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977.
221 Statistical Abstract o f Israel: w w w .cbs.gov.il
222 Shlomit Lann “History Lesson: Israel’s Econom y” Globes, V ol. 23, N o. 5. pp. 6-16, 1996.
223 M oshe Filber, “Israel at 50: Econom ic Achievem ents” Israel M inistry o f Froeing Affairs:
ww w.m fa.gov.il/m fa/go.asp7M FAH 00uc0.
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production stagnated.224

Economic deteriorations were evident from the time the

coalition assumed office until it was dissolved. Economic distress ran contrary to the
government’s declared objectives that were stated in the Basic Guidelines, where
controlling inflation and achieving higher productivity were the aims.

Contrary to our expectation, however, economic pressure did not lead to the
formation of a large initial coalition.

The 18th government was formed tight while

encountering such pressures. Furthermore, economic pressure and deterioration were not
found to have been associated with short governmental duration.

Despite economic

difficulties, the 18th government was among the longest-lived Israeli coalitions. We must
look elsewhere for the explanation.

Immigration
The Basic Guidelines of the 18th Government announced that, “the Government
will make the encouragement of aliyah a chief national task.”225 Furthermore, the
government established in its aims a “constant campaign for the return to Zion of all who
yearn for her in the Soviet Union, and for the rescue of the Jewries of Syria and the Arab
,

.

states.

??226

As has been previously discussed, post-1967 immigration issues gained greater
polarizing impact than in the pre-1967 period. Particularly the question of the location of
immigrants' settlements gained unprecedented attention.

Whether settlements to

224 Keesings C ontm eporary Archive, “G eneral Elections” V ol 27, Israel, October 1981.
225 This was unusual for p ost-1969 governments to prioritize aliyah above other national priorities.
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accommodate immigrants should be built in the newly Occupied Territories or within
Israel’s “green line” borders became a polarizing issue to the various Israeli parties.
Statements such as “the Government will plan, establish and encourage urban and rural
settlement on the soil of the homeland”227 became disputable. While the right-wing and
most religious blocs considered the Territories part of the ‘homeland,’ the left-wing and
center parties disputed such a claim.

Nonetheless, experience in immigration absorption and settlement by successive
Israeli governments helped the 18th government avoid major obstacles in the process of
integrating the new arrivals, primarily from the Soviet Union.228 Problems associated
with housing and cultural integration encountered by the Yemenites in the 50s and the
North Africans in the 1960s, for example, were avoided in the assimilation of Ethiopians
and Russians in the 80s and 90s.229 Still immigration continued to decline throughout the
duration of 18th government’s. In 1977 the year before the government was formed only
21,429 immigrants arrived.

This number slightly increased the first year following

government formation and reached 26,394 in 1978. By the time the Likud-led coalition
terminated in 1981 the number of immigrants had declined to 12,599. Low immigration
pressure, upon formation, appears not to have a significant association with coalition
formation or duration through out the life span of this government.

226 B asic Guidelines o f the Government, Israel Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977.
227 Basic Guidelines o f the Government, Israel Ministry o f Foreign A ffairs, 2 0 June 1977.
228 In the early 1970s, the S oviet Union permitted sig n ific a n t number o f Jews to emigrate to Israel. At the
end o f the decade, a quarter o f a m illion Jews had left the Soviet Union; 140,000 immigrated to Israel.
2/9 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, “A liyah” w w w .m fa.go.il., 1999.
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External Pressure
Prior to the formation of the 18th government foreign policy pressure was low.
Despite a few skirmishes on the Lebanese border, external tensions were hardly observed.
United Nation resolutions continued to be negatively worded against Israel in relation to
the Arab population in the Occupied Territories (UNGA).

However, no serious

resolution ever emerged from the Security Council. In 1978 serious efforts were made to
end the Arab-Israeli conflict beginning with the first peace agreement between Israel and
an Arab state (Egypt). This stunning success may have contributed to extending the
government longevity.

The 18th Israeli government was the first to be led by the Right. Despite Likud's
hawkish principles regarding the Occupied Territories, the achievement of peace with
Egypt was difficult to ignore.

The coalition government emphasized in its Basic

Guidelines the objective of achieving peace, declaring that “the government will place
the aspiration for peace at the forefront of its concerns, and will strive actively and
constantly to achieve permanent peace in the region.”230

In fact, this ‘hawkish’

government dedicated most of its guiding principles toward the objective of achieving
peace with its Arab states while avoiding direct discussion of a Palestinian State or
national rights for self-determination. The Camp David Accords substituted "autonomy"
for the discussion of a Palestinian State; a solution that was ultimately rejected by the

230 Basic Guidelines o f the Government, Israel M inistry o f Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1977. Although
common to all Israeli governments to declare their intention to achieve peace, the emphasis varied by the
subsequent administrations. The em phasis can be measured by the number o f statements dedicated to this
issue relative to other priorities.
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Palestinians.

The objectives of the 18th government appeared to aim at achieving peace

with the Arab states while delaying negotiation or comprehensive solution to the
Palestinian issue. The latter would have required constant pressure from Egypt and the
U.S., which was not to be.

The Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt were concluded in 1978 and
the state of war between them was terminated. However, serious clashes occurred with
the PLO on the Lebanese border and the PLO attacked a bus in Haifa leaving 37 dead.
The IDF retaliated against the PLO by invading South Lebanon and establishing the
"Security Zone." Thus, by 1981, and prior to the fall of the 18th government, serious
external tensions were present.
increased.

On the Lebanese borders Katyusha rocket attacks

Israeli warplanes attacked various targets in Southern Lebanon.

Worse,

Israeli air attacks shot down two Syrian helicopters in Lebanon and Syria retaliated by
introducing surface to air missiles into the Bekka Valley. The most serious escalation,
however, was the raid carried out by Israeli Air Force into Iraq, which led to the
destruction of the Ossiraq nuclear reactor in Baghdad. Many tensions between Israel,
Europe and the U.S. emerged in the aftermath, leading to the suspension of U.S. arms
transfers to Israel.

American aid to Israel also temporarily declined.

Several U.N

resolutions emerged from the General Assembly condemning Israel’s attack on Iraqi
nuclear installations (36/27) and demanding a freeze on nuclear weapons including those
of Israel (36/87, 36/98 UNGA). The Security Council also condemned Israel's action
against Iraq in resolution 487 and against Lebanon in resolutions 488, 490, and 498
(UNSC).
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The 18th government was established following a situation of low external
pressure.

Following formation, external pressure was dramatically reduced with the

signing of the Camp David Accords. By the time the government terminated external
pressure had been notably elevated. Our model predicts that low external pressure leads
to tight cabinet formation, as in the case of the 18th government.

Furthermore, our

duration hypothesis is confirmed where relatively low external pressure is projected to
have prolonged government durability.

Coalition Structure
A. Size
The 18th Government lasted throughout the 9th Knesset. It was the longest-lived
Israeli government ever and the first under with the Labor parties as the opposition group.
While the Likud became the dominant bloc in the Knesset, it operated under fierce
competition from its ideological rivals. Likud’s initial coalition controlled a narrow 61
Knesset seats and consisted of Likud 43, NRP 12, Agudat 4, Sshlomzion 2, and Moshe
Dayan 1 (Table 6.3). Four months after its formation the Democratic Movement for
Change (DMC), with 15 seats joined the government, increasing the coalition’s size to a
more comfortable 76 seats. The DMC was composed of several left-leaning secularist
parties including Shinui which was led by Yigal Yadin in 1976.231 The DMC soon
dissolved in 1979, due to Shinui’s opposition to join the Likud’s government, thus
reducing the size of the government once again to a minimum-winning stand. Thus, with

231 Weiner, Rebecca “Democratic Movement for Change” The American Cooperative Enterprise.
www.israeltour.org/isource/PoliticsDMC.html. 2003.
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the exception of a brief period of time the 18th government was a minimum winning
coalition.

The case of the 18th government confirms some of our hypothetical propositions
while it contradicts others. The establishment of a tight coalition amid low external and
immigration pressures supports our hypotheses. However, high economic pressure seems
to contradict the prediction of large formation. Furthermore, high economic pressure did
not seem to be associated with shorter duration. This could have been compensated by
peace accords and lower immigration pressure along with efficient or tight formation,
which with fewer partners to please helped the government live longer.

B .Ideology
Ideologically, the coalition was a right-center-religious alliance. Budge coded the
coalition as ideologically very tight, scoring 1 on his scale. Ideological tightness of the
coalition stems from the very close agreements between the parties over the main policy
issues facing the government.

Coalition members were united in the support of

settlement activities, including extended activities in the Territories. The government
expressed this uniting goal during Mr. Begin’s address to the Knesset where he stated,
“the government will plan, establish and encourage rural and urban settlement on the soil
of the homeland.”232 Although vague about whether “homeland” included Territories, it
asserted that settlements must be expanded into the Territories.

In a further

demonstration of unity among the ruling parties the guideline rejected the demand of
Arab countries to any condition for peace negotiations that included the returning of the
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Territories or a comprehensive agreement.23^ Mr. Begin declared, “the government will
invite each and every one of Israel’s neighbors ... to conduct direct negotiations...
without preconditions on the part of either side and without formulae prepared by outside
elements.”234

Table 6.3: Political Parties’ Distribution of Seats at the Ninth Knesset
Political Parties
Likud

Alignment
Democratic Party for Change
National Religious Party
Hadash
Agudat Yisrael
Shlomzion
Mahaneh Sheli
Ratz
Po'alei Agudat Yisrael
Flato Sharon
Liberals
Arab Parties
Shinui
Telem
Tehiya
Ahva
Ihud
Yisrael Ahat
Ya'ad
State List
Shivyon Beyisrael
Yossef Tamir
Yigael Yadin
Binyamin Halevy
Shmuel Tamir

9th Knesset
43
32
15
12
5
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1

Before Next Election
38
33
0
12
5
4
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
5
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Source: Israeli K nesset, w w w .knesset.gov.il/jiistorv/eng/eng hist9 s.htm. 2003.

232 Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, Netanel Lorch, University Press o f America, p. 2088, 1982
233 There is no reference in Camp David to a Palestinian S tate or the unconditional return o f the Territories
to Arabs. In reference to the Palestinians, C am p David spells out the right o f the W est Bank and G aza’s
inhabitants for autonomy (or self-rule) under Israeli-Egyptian-Jordanian supervision. The future o f the
Territories is kept for future negotiation determined after the conclusion o f various peace settlem ents with
Arab states. See “T he Camp David Accords” the U.S. Department of S tate’s Office of International
Information Programs (usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/cdavid.htm), September 17, 1978

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

233

Throughout its stay in power, all government parties supported the signing of the
Camp David Accords (a major reason for the DMC to join the government), settlements
in the Territories, and the conduct of war in Lebanon.235 With the exception of the DMC,
strong agreements between coalition members were evident in the support of the religious
institutions as well. The Likud considered the clauses in the coalition agreement not
necessarily to undermine secularist principles but having to do more with the cultural
Jewishness of the state. The coalition emerged ideologically tight, reflecting its original
small size.

C. Competitiveness
The coalition operated within a very competitive Knesset session and period.
Both Right and Left parties were potentially capable of forming a winning majority in
alliance with the Religious parties (Table 6.3). The left Alignment (32) hypothetically
could have formed a winning majority in alliance with Democratic Movement for Change
(15), National Religious Party (10), and Agudat (4). The plausibility of this formation
could have become real if either religious party, in addition to the DMC, defected from
the ruling coalition.

The fragmentation of the Knesset, through defections and

realignments among parties and MKs, evidenced the high competitiveness of the period.
Before the Knesset’s dissolution there were 20 parliamentary groups and four nonaffiliated MKs (Table 6.3).

pqf.

In fact, defection, alignments, and realignments finally led

234 Major Knesset Debates, 1948-1981, Netanel Lorcfa, University Press o f America, p. 2088, 1982.
235 Israel Knesset, “ Factional and Government Make-Up o f the Ninth Knesset”,
www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist9 s.htm. 2003.
236 Israel Knesset, “ History of the Knesset”, www.knesset.gov.il/historv/eng/eng hist alk.htm. 2003.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

234

to the loss of government's commanding majority over the Knesset forcing an early
election.237

Supporting our null hypothesis high competition in the 9th Knesset led to the
formation of a tight coalition government. Yet, such a high level of competition was
associated with a long-duration government as our hypothesis would have predicted.

T h e 25th Israeli Government, 1992-95

The 25th government was another extremely durable coalition one; lasting 1194
days from the time it was formed on July 1992. It was preceded by a Likud-led cabined
that was dissolved due to internal coalition divisions. The dispute within the outgoing
Likud coalition was sparked by autonomy negotiation with the Palestinians in
Washington.

On January 19, 1992 two nationalist right-wing coalition members

(Moledet and Tahiya parties) quit the coalition to protest a perceived territorial
concession in favor of the Palestinians, which was thought by the renegade parties to
endanger Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories. The departure of the two parties
from the coalition reduced Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir's command over the Knesset to
a minority position and forced him to call for an early national election.

-50

Israeli parties convened their national conventions in preparation for election set
to be held on June 23, 1992. Evidence of a split within the Likud emerged following the
237 Keesings Contemporary Archive, “Formation o f N ew G overnm ent by Mr. B eg in ” Vol. 27, Israel,
October 1981.
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defeat of Mr. Levi's list in favor of Mr. Shamir. In protest, Mr. Levi, who represented a
large Sephardi following within the party, resigned his post as a Foreign Minister in
Shamir's cabinet.

The national election brought the Labor party back to a dominant

position in the Knesset with 44 seats against 32 for the Likud. Labor promised a swift
move in the negotiation process with the Palestinians with the aim to end the Arab-Israeli
conflict.

On June 28 President Chaim Herzog formally asked Rabin to form a government
within 21 days. Two religious parties, United Tora Judaism and the NRP, were pressing
Labor to enter into a coalition with them to the exclusion of Meretz (a secularist party).
Shas240 also offered to participate in a coalition, which would include Meretz, provided
that an accommodation could be reached between Labor and the other two religious
parties.241 On July 13th, Mr. Rabin was able to assemble a coalition that included Meretz
and Shas providing the first with the Ministry of Education and the latter with Ministries
of Interior and Defense. This tight coalition was able to receive the confidence of the
Knesset only with the support of the Arab non-coalition parties who were inspired by Mr.
Rabin's peace policy.242

238 "D eparture o f Tehiya and M oledet from coalition Budget security issues Foreign affairs" Keesings
Record of World Events, January 1992, Israel.
239 "Announcement o f Levi's resignation" Keesings Record of World Events, March 1992, Israel.
240 Is a Sephardic-religious party equivalent to Aguddat Israel (Shom rei Torah Sephardim-Sephardi Torah
Guardians).
241 " Likud general election defeat" Keesing's Record of World Events, June 1992, Israel.
242 " Coalition government New Cabinet" Keesing's Record o f World Events, July 1992, Israel.
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Economy
Among the new government's top priorities was the establishment of a peaceoriented economy. This economy was envisioned as to eliminate unemployment, open
the prospect of high-tech producing industry, and privatize the public sector.243 There
were hopes of market development in the Middle East.

In contrast to the ‘70s and ‘80s, the ‘90s was a decade of economic miracles for
Israel. The 25th government was established as a ‘peace coalition’ following the Madrid
Peace Conference, the end of the first Palestinian Intefadah, and the conclusion of the
Gulf War I. By 1992 the peace economy was in the making, resulting in the high rate of
foreign investment, tourism, and export.

Defense expenditure declined tremendously

relieving the economy from a major burden. Between 1984 and 1994 defense expenditure
fell by over 70%; as proportion of the GNP the relative decrease approached 300%.244
Inflation was also declining by 11.2%.243 A year later the peace economy was proceeding
at a growing pace. The last year of the government witnessed an annual GDP growth rate
of 4%, a decline in the average strikers per strike form 1414 in 1994 to 1067 in 1995,
and a decline in the unemployment rate from 7.8 to 6.3% for the same years. Investment
in Israel rose on average of 13.5 % a year after 1991 and foreign direct investment totaled
$2 billion in 1995.246 Exports also doubled reaching an 8.6% increase, tourism doubled

243 Principle Guidelines of the Government o f Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992.
244 Sherman, Martin “T rends in Isra e l’s Defense Budget” in Arieh Stav, “Israel at the Cross Roads” (Israel:
Ariel Center for Policy R esearch) 1997.
245 Statistical Abstract o f Israel: www.cbs.gov.il
246 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From Peace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16,1996.
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in comparison to 1990 reaching 2,214,000.247 The inflation rate was relatively under
control at 14.7%.

Contrary to the 18th Likud-led government of 1977, the 26th government
experienced a period of economic growth and prosperity from the time it was established
until the time it was terminated. The termination of the government came as Prime
Minister Rabin was assassinated. The case of 25th government fits our hypothetical
predictions where low economic pressure seemed to have contributed to a tight coalition
formation.

Furthermore, the association between low economic pressures and

government's long duration in office provides further support to our proposition.

Immigration
Formed by Prime Minister Rabin, the 26th government faced the biggest
wave of mass immigration in Israeli history.

Over quarter of a million immigrants

entered the country while the 26th government was in office.

Yet, the government’s

immigration and settlement policy experienced a significant change. The government
made it clear that settlement activities needed to be shifted from the Territories toward
the 1948 Green Lines.

In its policy statements this orientation was expressed under

“Changes in the Order of National Priorities” which stated that “the map of developing
areas and cities will be made as to prioritize the settlements on the Green lin es and the
developing areas furthest from the center of the country; other than the eras of Judea,
Samaria, and the Gaza Strip that are close to the center of the country.”248 The coalition

247 Rafi Bar El, “Growth From P eace” Globes, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 6-16, 1996.

248 Principle Guidelines o f the Government o f Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992.
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was formed in 1992 with 77,057 Soviet immigrants entering the country. Immigration
pressure held steady through out the government life. In 1993, 76805 immigrants arrived
and 76,361 in 1995 when Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated (Table 6.4).

The settlement policy signaled a shift toward accommodating Palestinian and
international demands as conditions for regional peace. At the same time, it inflamed the
settlement movements against the regarded concession policy of Prime Minister Rabin,
and eventually led to his assassination. Thus, in a sense immigration and settlement
policy was a factor that ended the government.

Immigration pressure did not lead to a large coalition as our formation model
predicted. Nor did such a pressure lead to early termination. Contrary to our prediction,
here immigration pressures were associated with tight formation and long duration.
Despite the large number of immigrants, it seems that such a factor for coalition politics
was not as stressful as earlier years.

The modem capacities of the country to

accommodate a large wave of immigrants seemed to have rendered such a factor to a
secondary relevance in coalition formation if not duration.

Table 6.4: Immigration to Israel during Long Durational Israeli Governments
Government
7
13
18
25

Pre-Formation
37528 (1955)
31115(1965)
21429 (1977)
77057 (1992)

First Year
56330 (1956)
15957 (1966)
26394 (1978)
66805 (1993)

Last Year
72634 (1957)
20703 (1968)
12599 (1981)
76361 (1995)

Source: Statistical Abstract o f Israel
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External Pressure
Prior to the formation of the 25th government the Iraq War was successfully
concluded and new efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict were underway. In October
1991 the Madrid Conference was accomplished and bilateral talks between Israel and its
neighbors began. The 25th government was the first Israeli government to recognize the
Palestinian political right for independence. It asserted in its policy guidelines intentions
to negotiate with the Palestinians an interim plan “for the establishment of the
independent Palestinian authority in Judea and Samaria” while refraining “from actions
and policies that will slow the process of negotiation.”249

With its commitment to peace, the government survived amid a climate of low
external pressure.

In 1992, when the government was formed, U.S. aid to Israel

increased. No changes in U.N resolutions wording occurred in criticizing Israel over its
treatment of population under occupation or in demanding a nuclear free zone in the
Middle East (UNGA). Beside the dispute over the deportation of Palestinian activists to
the Lebanese border and minor skirmishes with Hizbullah, 1992 was a year of peace
negotiations and agreements.

The following year witnessed a relative escalation of

attacks against Israel, primarily in the Gaza Strip where Palestinian groups opposed to the
peace talks killed several Israelis through attacks. The Lebanese border caught fire at
various times, most seriously in the “Operation of Accountability” which involved an
assault on Hizbullah bases in Southern Lebanon. However, major peace achievements
concluded in 1993; most notable was the Oslo Agreement which for the first time brought
249 Principle Guidelines o f the Government o f Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992. N ote that the principle
o f “independence” remained vague throughout the various declarations o f the 2 5 th government. The
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mutual recognition between the Israeli and the Palestinian leadership. In addition to
Oslo, Israel concluded a peace settlement with Jordan and began a path of normality with
the Arab countries. U.S. aid to Israel increased to $5 billions with additional loans and
loan guarantees, a two billion U.S. dollars increase from the previous year.

The 25th government was terminated following the assassination of Prime
Minister Rabin.250 Despite this fact, and as has been previously discussed, 1995 was a
year of peace negotiations and achievements. External threats against the state were
greatly reduced.

The 25th Israeli government was essentially a peace government.
established following a situation of low external pressure.

It was

Major peace agreements and

achievements followed its formation leading to the decline in external pressure. The case
of the 25th government supports the hypothetical claims which suggest that low external
pressure provides the dominant party with greater maneuvering capacity to form tight
coalitions. Furthermore, this case agrees with the proposition that low and declining
external pressures tend to prolong duration.

‘extent’ o f independence remained a subject o f negotiation. A Palestinian State as w ell as its authority,
territorial extension, capital, and refugees’ return w ere issues to be later defined and agreed upon.
250 The death o f a P rim e Minister does not constitute a necessary termination o f government. The
dominant party can elect a new leader or appoint the vice in the position o f the Prime Minister with the
K nesset’s approval. H ow ever, because leaders’ personalities and charisma are important characteristics in
Israeli party tradition, it is often the case that a new government w ill be called forth to be inaugurated by
the Knesset.
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Coalition Structure
A. Size
The 25th Government was formed as the first government of the 13th Knesset.
The coalition was established as a minimal winning coalition controlling 62 Knesset
seats.

It originally consisted of Labor with 44 seats, Meretz 12, and Shas 6.

On

September 1993 Shas defected and on January 9, 1995 Yi’ud joined with 1 seat. Shas
defection came following a Sept. 8 Israel's Supreme Court ruling that demanded the
ousting of Shas leader Der'i and his Shas colleague, Deputy Religious Affairs Minister
Raphael Pinhasi, from the Cabinet because of accusations of corruption against them.
Shas' ministers in the cabinet resigned the coalition in protest.

The government

maintained the support of 5 MKs from the Arab parties (Table 5.5). With the defection
of Shas, however, the coalition became even less than minimalist. The only reason for its
continuation in power was the outside support of primarily Arab parties. The peace
process proved very controversial.

B. Ideology
The central policies of the 25th government focused on achieving peace.
Government guidelines envisioned a Middle East of economic, cultural, and scientific
cooperation. Regional cooperation was seen as the essence of peace.231 The growth of
high tech industry was a major reason driving the government to invest in the path of
regional cooperation and a greater economic role. The impact of globalization on politics,
in its momentum to liberate economies from national boundaries toward international
integration, appears to have been a factor in Israel’s push toward ending the Arab-Israeli
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conflict. Acting on these principles the 25th government signed peace agreements with
both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.

Budge data did not include governments formed after 1991. However, we can
readily consider the 25th government as ideologically very tight, perhaps scoring 1 or 2 on
Budge ideological closeness index. Both Meretz and Labor were left parties committed
to the peace process. Shas was the ethnic-religious party of Sephardim whose ideological
impact on the coalition was limited to issues related to religious education. Its impact
was further diminished by its withdrawal from the coalition one day after the Oslo
agreement was signed in September 1993.252 Shas' withdrawal added further ideological
cohesion to the ruling left-coalition. We consider the 25th government to have been very
tight in ideological parameter responding to its limited and small partnership.

C. Competitiveness
The 25th government operated under very competitive circumstances in the 13th
Knesset. Rivalry between the Labor and the Likud was evident in giving either the
potential leverage to form a ruling alliance (Table 5.5, see also previous discussion of the
13th Knesset). Labor was named to form the coalition because it had the largest number
of Knesset seats.

Had the Labor party failed the task of forming the coalition, the

President would have named the second largest party (the Likud in this case) to form the

2,1 Principle Guidelines o f the Government o f Israel, Israel Knesset Archive, 1992.
232 Shas did not oppose nor support the O slo Agreement and chose to remain outside the government, yet it
restrained from joining the opposition or voting against the government. S ee Behar M oshe, “T he Peace
Process and Israeli D om estic Politics in the 1990s” Socialism an d D em ocracy, No. 32, Summer/Fall 2002.
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government. Thus, the 25th government was clearly formed under the condition of high
competition.

This government was dissolved following the assassination of Prime Minister
Rabin. Mr. Peres assumed the formation of a new government which maintained the
same alliance. The case of the 25th government supports the hypothetical claim that
increasing competition leads to longer duration governments. However, this case the null
perception, which suggests that increase competition can be associated with wide
formation. This may indicates that other factors, particularly low economic and external
pressures, weigh more in determining the tight formation of such a government.

Qualitative Case Comparative Analysis
Economic Pressure
Seven out of eight governments studied in chapter 5 and 6 confirmed our
theoretical expectations that economic pressures lead to consensual coalition formations.
In the pre-1969 period, economic pressures in all the four government cases examined
had a direct relationship with formation (Gov. 2,12, 7, and 13) compared to three
governments in post-1969 (Gov 16, 26, and 25). In other words, governments established
under circumstances of high economic pressures were widely formed (consensual
formation: Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13). In contrast, governments were established tight while
economic pressures were lower (Gov. 16, 26, and 25). Coalitions established after 1969
(Gov. 16, 26, and 25) appear to have been formed amid generally low level of economic
pressure, contrary to prior governments (Gov. 2, 12, 7, and 13). As predicted by our
model, higher pre-1969 governments’ economic pressure apparently led to large sized

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

244

and ideologically wide parameter-based coalitions (Table 6.5).

For governments

examined in this study after 1969, with the exception of the 18th Government, economic
pressure was low leading to small-sized and ideologically tight parameter based
coalitions (Table 6.5).

Change in economic pressure is found to be significant to durational analysis. In
seven out of eight cases studied, change in economic pressure is found to be inversely
related to duration. In other words, an increase in economic pressure during the lifespan
of the government, as expressed in economic deterioration from the year the government
assumes office to the time it dissolves, was found to be associated with shorter duration
governments (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). In contrast, a decline in economic pressure during
the lifespan of the government, as expressed in economic improvement from the year the
government is formed to the year it terminates, tended to prolong durability (Gov. 7, 13,
and 25: Table 6.5). Only in the 18th government we noted its long duration despite rising
economic pressure.
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Table 6.5: Economic Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Short Duration Governments
2
12
16
26
Long Duration Governments
7
13

18
25

Economy

Formation*

Economic Pressure Change

high
high
low
low

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

Elevated
Elevated
Elevated
Elevated

high
high
high
low

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

Reduced
Reduced
Elevated
Reduced

* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.
In five of the government cases studied evidence to the “aging thesis” was found.
This was most apparent in the short duration governments where economic deterioration
led to their fast downfall (Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). This suggested that governments
established under situations of economic hardship were unable to last long in power
while economic pressure continued to shock them (Table 6.5). In contrast, long-duration
governments often experienced improved economic conditions while in office. This was
found to be the case for most examined durable governments (Gov. 7, 13, and 25) that
operated under circumstances of improved economic circumstances (Table 6.5).

Immigration
In our methodology chapter we considered a high immigration pressure to occur
when number of immigrants exceeded 40,000 a year; otherwise it was considered low. In
our examination of eight Israeli governments immigration pressure was not found to have
clear association with coalition formation.

Coalitions were formed large (consensually)

with under condition of initial high annual immigration pressure (Gov. 2, 12) and with
initial low annual immigrations (Gov. 7, 13).

Coalitions were formed tight (non-
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consensual) with initial high annual immigration (Gov. 16, 25, 26) and consensual with
low annual immigration (Gov. 18). Hence there may be some residual effect of such
pressure in tightening coalition ideology (3 of 4 cases), but further analysis would be
necessary to confirm this overall pattern (see table 6.8). However, immigration pressure
must be considered within the relative impact of other variables (later examined) since
immigration had clearly some effect on coalition formations (Gov. 2 and 12).

As for duration, an inverse association was seen between coalition annual
immigration and government longevity. Governments confronted with high immigration
pressure upon their formation tended to have difficulty maintaining power. All of the
sample governments of short duration were formed after large waves of immigrants
poured into the country (Table 6.6: Gov. 2, 12, 16, and 26). In contrast, three of the long
duration governments studied (Gov. 7, 13, and 18) were formed after low number of
immigrants entered the country (Table 6.6).

There were no consistent patterns to show that changes in immigration pressure
during government’s life impacted durability. Nor was there evidence to suggest that
immigration shocks led to ‘aging’ and termination. This result suggested that although
the immigration pressure variable was found to be inversely associated with duration, it
remained a weak determinant of government durability, since, in two examined situations
short duration governments had immigration pressure decreasing rather than increasing
(Gov. 12 and 16) and remaining the same in two other cases (Gov. 2 and 26).
Furthermore, we witnessed government of long duration having an increase in
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immigration pressure during their reign (Gov. 7 and 13) rather than having a decrease in
immigration as predicted (Table 6.6).

Table 6.6i Im m igration Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Short Duration Governments
2
12
16
26
Long Duration Governments
7
13
18
25

immigration

Formation*

Immigration Changes

high
high

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

Same
Reduced
Reduced
Same

low
low
low
high

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

Elevated
Elevated
Reduced
Same

high
high

* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

External Pressure
External foreign policy pressure was found to have a low direct association with
coalition formation in the sampled cases (Table 6.7). Five studied cases established a
direct association between external pressure and formation as predicted (Gov. 26,7,13,
18, and 25) while three cases were found to have an inverse association (Gov. 2, 12, and
16). In other words, evidences for the hypothesis that projected high external pressure
leading to large coalition formation are found in two cases (Gov. 7 and 13). Support for
the hypothesis is also found in tight governments formed during low external pressure
(Gov. 26, 18, and 25). The other governments examined contradicted our hypothesis,
suggesting perhaps other relevant variables in their respective circumstances to have
determined their formations, an issue that we will further explore.
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In relation to duration no clear association can be made with external pressure.
Three governments of short duration were established at low levels of external pressure
(Gov. 2, 12, and 26) while two long duration governments were established at high
pressure (Gov. 7 and 13).

This result tended to refute the proposition that external

pressure has an inverse relationship with duration.

Only three cases support such a

proposition (Gov. 16, 18 and 25).

Change in external pressure, however, showed better association with duration.
Five cases examined conformed to the inverse relationship between changes in external
pressure and duration (Gov. 12, 26, 7, 13, and 25). Decline in external pressure, during
government’s term, contributed to longevity as predicted (Gov. 13 and 25). In contrast,
negative change (accumulative shocks) led to short duration (Gov. 12 and 26). Two
cases contradicted this proposition (Gov. 16 and 18) suggesting that such an association
was weak (Table 6.7).

It is difficult to infer from our studied cases a strong conclusion in regard to the
‘aging thesis’. In four cases evidence may support that external shocks were factors in
termination (Gov. 2, 12, 26, and 18). However, in four other cases the result provided a
contradictory conclusion (Gov. 16, 7, 13, and 25).

It is interesting to suggest, following our analysis, that coalitions rationally
formed, i.e., large-wide when external pressure was high and small-tight when external
pressure was low, last longer in power (Gov. 7, 13, 18, and 25). Alternatively, those

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

249

alliances that are not rationally established, in reaction to external pressure, with the
exception of one case (Gov. 26), shortly dissolve (Gov. 2, 12, and 16). This finding, and
its implication, will be further explored in the Chapter 7.

Table 6.7: External Pressure Events, Structural Formation, and Duration
Government
Short Duration Governments

External Pressure

Formation4 External F

2
12
16
26
Long Duration Governments
7
13
18
25

low
low
high
low

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

Same
Elevated
Reduced
Elevated

high
high
low
low

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

Reduced
Reduced
Elevated
Reduced

* s-t: small-tight, l-w: large-wide.

Coalition Structure
The answer to the question “how the coalition structurally formed? (Size,
Ideology, and Competitiveness)?” is shown in our case study. Our examination of eight
Israeli governments produced the same answer, i.e., competitiveness of the electoral
system determined to a large extent the formation of the coalition.

Four coalition

governments (2,12,7, and 13) were formed at low level of competition. These coalitions
were formed large by size and wide by ideological parameter. Another four coalition
governments (16, 26, 18, and 25) were established small by size and tight by ideological
parameter under condition of high coalition competition. The result also indicated that
the size and ideological parameter variables were directly related. Whenever the size of
the coalition increased beyond minimum winning requirement we expect that ideological
parameter becomes wider, more accommodating, and consensual in policy space.
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These results additionally demonstrated that formation was significantly different
between coalitions formed in the pre-1969 than the post-1969 era. The early period
demonstrated a large degree of political consensus leading to larger structural formations,
while the later period provided less ground for national consensus leading to tighter
formations.

Another important observation from our analysis is that no apparent

difference existed between the durability of coalitions that varied in structural formations
(short: 2, 12, 16, and 26 vs. long: 7, 13, 18, and 25).

Consensual and competitive

formations produced different government duration with no apparent pattern (See table
6.8). No support was found for our hypothetical proposition that efficient formation
(small-tight) leads to longer duration contrary to large-tight formation. In other words, in
our examination of eight Israeli governments we found no evident relationship between
structural variables and government durability. This conclusion suggests that structural
variables may need to be examined in light of other event pressure variables in the
process of determining governments' duration, an issue which we will undertake in the
following chapter.

Table 6.7: Structural Formation of Israeli Governments
Government
Short Duration
2
12
16
26
Long Duration
7
13
18
25

Size

Ideology

Competition

large
large
small
small

wide
wide
tight
tight

low
low
high
high

large
large
small
small

wide
wide
tight
tight

low
iow
high
high
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Qualitative vs. Quantitative Comparative Summary of Results
Quantitative as well as qualitative analyses were conducted in order to examine
our theoretical model proposed in Chapter 2.

Various hypotheses were advanced

suggesting that coalition formation, in both size and ideology can be determined based on
the level of parliamentary competition as well as events’ pressure. It was suggested that
increase in coalition competition leads to coalitions of larger size and wider ideological
parameter.

Furthermore, the model predicted that increased economic, external, and

immigration pressures contribute to larger, consensual or accommodating coalition
formations. Duration of the coalition was generally predicted to be determined by both
structural systematic as well as event pressure variables. Higher competition and tighter
coalition formations were thought to help prolong government’s life, while increasing
events’ pressures undermined its durability.

The results of our analyses were mixed, suggesting the need for theoretical
refinement.

Our quantitative result suggested that some economic pressure variables

were significantly associated negatively with both formation and durational analyses.
Labor disputes appeared to have driven a wedge between parties and increased their
polarization into ideologically tighter camps.

Associated with such a pressure was

immigration pressure, which was also found to drive alliances into smaller formations.
Internal event pressures, so it seemed, fragment alliances into smaller and ideologically
tighter formations. Contrary to our theoretical expectation, quantitative results supported
the null hypotheses, which suggested domestic events’ pressure to be associated with
greater polarization and, therefore, tight formations (non-consensual). External pressure,
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on the other hand, appeared to undermine policy differences and unite ideologically
distant parties, supporting our hypothetical expectations.

Contrary to our quantitative result, our qualitative analysis supports the
proposition that event pressure forces accommodation (larger-sized wider-ideology)
formations, particularly in the economic domain. This result appeared qualitatively very
significant for the pre-1969 period. All governments sampled for this period of low party
competition provided association between high economic pressure and large coalition
formations (Table 6.8). In fact, our qualitative analysis of Israeli coalitions revealed a
permanent economic pressure throughout the pre-1969 period at the time where most
coalitions formed large. Yet, our qualitative examination revealed that this association
was weakened in post-1969 period due, perhaps, to the increasing competition between
parties for government control and the decline in governments' economic priorities.
Israel’s industrial growth in post-1969 period, as we have discussed, may have further
contributed to the growth of labor force, and consequently to the increase in the number
of reported labor disputes. Such a post-1969 development may have been responsible for
a greater weight in the negative quantitative association existing between coalition
formation and economic pressure.

Thus, we adopt the conclusion that confirms the

strong qualitative evidence of positive association existing between economic pressure
and the size-ideological structure of coalitions through pre-1969 period. This association,
we further believe, has been reversed to a negative association through post-1969 Israeli
coalitions, as our quantitative analysis asserted.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

253

Table 6.8: Table of Qualitative Formative Structural and Event Pressure Variables
Government
Before 1969

Size*

Ideology*

Competition

Economy

Immigration

External

Duration

2
7
12
13
After 1969
16
18

large
large
large
large

wide
wide
wide
wide

low

low
low
low

high
high
high
high

high
low
high
low

low
high
low
high

Short
Long
Short
Long

small
small
small
small

tight
tight
tight
tight

high
high
high
high

low
high
low
low

high
low
high
high

high
low
low
low

Short
Long
Short
Long

25

26

* Dependent Variable.

In regard to immigration pressure, our qualitative analysis supported our
quantitative findings particularly for the post-1969 period.

Both revealed a negative

association between immigration pressure and coalition size-ideological formation. As
for the prior period of time, we were unable to make a strong qualitative confirmation to
the whether an association existed between immigration pressure and coalition formation
(Table 6.8).

Both our qualitative and quantitative analyses provide evidence for the
proposition that external conflict undermines partisan differences and necessitate the
establishment of accommodating governments. With the exception of ‘war cabinets’,
most Israeli governments were established relatively larger in pre-1969 than in post-1969.
This pattern leads us to believe that a positive association existed between external
pressure and coalition accommodation in the earlier period.

At the same time, our

qualitative analysis revealed that in the post-1969 period external pressure did not

253 In our quantitative analysis 13 governments formed before 1969 and 15 governments formed after 1969
were included in the analysis. This situation may have led to a bias in favor o f 1969 coalition formation
pattern, since there were more governments formed during this period.
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broaden government formation (Table 6.8). On the contrary, lower external pressure
during post-1969, with the exception of wartime and severe external threat, was
associated with increasing polarization among political parties and small coalition
formations (Example, 18th government). The fact of increasing party competition may
have conditioned the impact of external events in this period. This leads us to conclude
that external pressure was positively associated with the structural formation of pre-1969
governments (asserting our quantitative result) and negatively associated with post-1969
governments (asserting our qualitative result).

Relevant to formation analysis, coalition competition also appeared highly
significant. This significance was marked by the shift to a post-1969 competitive Israeli
Knesset, a comparative difference that the quantitative analysis could have not accounted
for with a pre-post sample of coalitions. Our qualitative result suggested that coalitions
before 1969 were consistently formed large while having low level of competition (Table
6.8). The situation changed after 1969 with coalitions consistently forming tight while
experiencing high level of competition.

Quantitative durational analysis provided additional support to event variables
having significant impact on coalitions’ behaviors. As we expected, annual increase in
foreign assistance positively impacted the duration of coalitions. Structural variables also
appeared relevant to duration analysis. However, contrary to our expectation, increase in
coalition competition was quantitatively found to impact negatively the duration of the
coalitions.
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Our qualitative duration analysis supports aspects of our theoretical expectations,
particularly that increase in event pressures during the coalition's life span (economic,
immigration, external) undermine the durability of the government.

The significant

quantitative positive association found between foreign aid and government duration also
supports this assertion. Structural variables also appeared relevant to duration analysis.
However, based on the. case studies of eight Israeli coalition governments examined we
were enable to asserts qualitatively our quantitative finding which suggested that high in
Knesset competition contributes to shorter duration governments (Table 6.8).254 We
affirm the quantitative conclusion because of the larger number of cases examined. No
apparent qualitative difference was noted in the duration of coalitions through the periods
before and after 1969.

With respect to other structural variables, our qualitative analysis further
supported the proposition, that large coalition structure corresponding to particular
external pressure is positively associated with government duration.

This was

qualitatively found with respect to coalitions forming large when faced with severe
external threat (Table 6.7). Our quantitative analysis was unable to account for such
phenomena due to rarely occurring cases of large national alliances forming in response
to severe external threat (only 7 national governments out of 28 governments).

254 One reason for this discrepancy can be in our sample selection o f governments o f extreme duration
cases in the qualitative analysis. This may have biased our qualitative analysis in favor o f variables o f
severe implication on duration and undermined other explanatory variables. For exam ple, severe external
pressure such as war may have becom e the dominant factor in prolonging governments (7 and 13) and
undermined other factors that m ay prove significant under normal circumstances.
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Evidence on the aging thesis was also found in the qualitative analysis, which
associated short duration governments with economic and foreign policy deterioration.
Our quantitative bivariate analysis supported such perception by revealing significant
bivariate association between severity of external shocks and aging governments. The
qualitative results also suggested that the duration of the coalition can be associated with
both structural as well as event pressure variables. Deteriorations in economic and
external circumstances while the government is in office accumulate shocks that
undermine durability. The structural formation of the coalition becomes significantly
important at time of external pressure. Larger coalitions appear to cope more durably
with external threat than tight formations (supporting Warwick, 1992).

Table 6.9: Summary Table of Structural and Event Pressure Change Variables
Government
Short Duration
2
12
16
26
Long Duration
7
13
18
25

Formation

Competition

Economic Changes

Immigration Changes

External Changes

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

low
low
high
high

Elevated
Elevated
Elevated
Elevated

Same
Declined
Declined
Same

Same
Elevated
Declined
Elevated

l-w
l-w
s-t
s-t

low
low
high
high

Declined
Declined
Elevated
Declined

Elevated
Elevated
Declined
Same

Declined
Declined
Elevated
Declined

In the following chapter we revisit the literary discussions and explain the
contribution of our findings to coalition theories as well as proposed refinement of our
initial theorization. Further Interpretation to the significance of these results within the
evolution of Israeli coalitions are elaborated. The Shortcomings and limitations of our
study are evaluated and prospective research is proposed.
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CHAPTER 7
ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS 1949-1999: FORMATION AND DURATION
CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the findings of our quantitative and qualitative data
analyses. It discusses the findings in light of our proposed hypotheses. The findings
support our null hypotheses that high coalition competition presses toward tighter
ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets, resulting in short duration coalitions,
particularly for the period that followed the 1969 Israeli Knesset election. Economic and
external pressures, which were responsible for the formation of large coalitions before
1969, had the reverse impact afterward, leading to the formation of many contemporary
minimum-winning coalitions. Immigration pressure through the post-1969 period also
appears to have contributed to political polarization and smaller coalition formations.
Supports for our duration hypothesis were found in the significant negative association
existing between the rise of domestic and external pressures and government duration.
While competition was found to contradict long-duration proposition, large-sized and
wide-ideological coalitions were found to have conditional impact, contributing to
government longevity in situations of external threat. Supports to the ‘aging’ thesis
demonstrated negative associations between economic as well as external ‘shocks’ and
government duration.

Our comparative examination of Israeli coalitions revealed a significant
behavioral shift following

1969’s Knesset election.

Increasing parliamentary

fragmentation and coalition competition mark the transformation. Throughout the ‘post

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

258

national’ period, with the exception of grand alliances forming to repel external threat,
coalitions have gown more competitive and less tolerant to policy differences, forming
narrow agendas and smaller sized cabinets in response to domestic and external
pressures. This transformation appears to instigate shorter duration governments, and
consequently, instable polity.

The limitations of our proposition are due to the small number of cases studies
and to the cultural and political peculiarities of the country examined. The contribution
to the general coalition theory, however, shows that coalitions need to be examined in
light of important historic-national transformations. Theoretical models must take into
consideration the country’s level of national fragmentation arising as a consequence of
global transformation to reveal proper conclusions about coalition behaviors.

Future

studies can analyze countries of similar ethnic-cultural-political attributes, clustering
them into levels of national fragmentation while taken global developments into
consideration. The significance of such a proposition lies in forecasting the formation of
durable and stable post-national governments.

The Political Relevancy of Event Pressure Variables
It is important to note that this study focuses on variables widely debated in
theoretical literatures, and that these variables are relevant to Israel’s political and
cultural peculiarities. Many other variables remain relevant and may often prove to have
explanatory significance in the determination of coalition formation and duration.
Prospective research may undertake the examination of other explanations, such as the
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impact of leadership charisma and personality in the formation of alliances. Leadership
personality may also prove significant in the management of conflict among coalition
partners, and thus help prolong duration of the coalition. Personal rivalry within the
parties, as well as religious preferences and beliefs, may fuel disagreements and
undermine the inclusiveness and/or duration of the coalition. Scandals and unexpected
political developments may reshape coalition formation and undermine duration.

This

study does not claim to have discovered “the ultimate theory” of coalition formation and
duration. Instead, this research represents a modest attempt to shed light on issues that
seem to have reemerged, sometimes presenting a persistent pattern and at other times
showing significant association with Israeli coalition formation and duration.

This study also attempts to reveal the significant level of association that may
exist between the independent event variables and the dependent coalition behaviors. It
is important, therefore, to note that association does not necessarily imply causation, but
simply establishes the frequent occurrence of a particular set of events with a particular
set of behaviors.

Moreover, two reasons underlie the choice of studying particular

independent variables rather than others. The first has often been established by previous
research works that determine the importance and relevancy of particular independent
variables in shaping a specific institution. The second is the examiner’s own intuition
and research work.

Both reasons were present in this study for selecting economic,

external policy, and immigration event pressure variables.

The political relevancy of

these events and their significance in alliance behaviors may become further apparent
when one follows the daily political developments in the country. In this section we
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follow the issues debated in the 13th Knesset election campaigns leading to the formation
of the cabinet as covered by the daily Jerusalem Post.

This is done in order to

demonstrate that Israeli political party behaviors are often driven by the pressure
variables which we claim to be significant in coalition politics.

The 13th Knesset election was a landmark in Israel political history. It revealed
the fundamental issues that divide Israeli political parties and continue to shape their
political alliances.

Both the Likud and the Labor parties advanced fundamentally

opposite programs and visions for peace, security, immigration, and economic policies.
The following political debate that proceeded to the formation of the 25th government
illustrates our point.

Foreign Policy Debate
Prime Minister and Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir, pronounced that, “Labor’s
politicians are being driven out of their minds when they see the peace process pressing
and the expansion of Israel’s international ties.” He was reacting to a statement by Labor
campaign media chief Haim Ramon which undermined the peace effort being made in
Washington by the current administration. In Ramon’s assessment, “It is quite obvious
the negotiations have reached a dead end and the Likud is treading water.

But the

[impending] hasty return home of the Israeli delegation, despite the request of the Arab
delegation, demonstrates the lack of any real desire to talk.”255 The accusations between
the Labor and Likud parties was preceded by a heated campaign in which each portrayed

255 Jerusalem Post, M ay 1, 1992, p. 2.
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the other as an obstacle to peace and security.

One ad posted by the Likud associated

Labor Leader Yitzhak Rabin with the PLO’s Yasser Arafat.256

Underlining the disagreement over the peace process, Likud rejected concessions
that could have yielded a Palestinian state, while the Labor party and the “peace camp”
appeared willing to consider such a possibility. “A few more years of Likud rule, and no
one will talk again about the possibility of a Palestinian state. That will be a totally
unrealistic idea... There will no longer be the possibility of founding [a Palestinian state]
in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, where hundreds of thousands of Jews will be living... the
notion of territorial compromise will fade away like a bad dream,” said Shamir during a
Likud election campaign while Labor supporters demonstrated outside the hall.

nen

Meretz championed the opposite Zionist vision of peace. Author Amos Oz spoke at a
Meretz campaign and announced that he would vote for Meretz “because its positions
represent the most responsible Zionist options.

[It is time] to give Palestine to the
TCO

Palestinians and receive Israel in return at long last.”

The electoral rhetoric continued to heat up between the competing parties. On
June 1st, 1992, Likud represented the Labor platform as an ad, putting the country up for
sale by promising wide territorial concessions to the Palestinians if they won the election.
A statement by the Likud party described the Labor declaration as having “put Eretz
Yisrael on an end-of-season sale when it published a defeatist platform which advocates

256 Jerusalem Post, M ay 1, 1992, p. 2.
257 Jerusalem Post, M ay 4, 1992, p. 2.
258 Jerusalem Post, M ay 4, 1992.
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far reaching territorial concessions.”259 Labor had declared in its electoral platform that
“a peace process must be based on territorial compromise, in accordance with U.N
Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, while ruling out a return to the 1967 lines.”260

Immigration Policy Debate
During this period of time Israel received one of the largest waves of immigrants
who arrived primarily from the Soviet Union. The immigration and absorption policy of
the Shamir government was fundamentally linked with its vision of territorial expansion
in the West Bank. This policy was opposed by the Bush administration and drove a
wedge between the U.S. and Israel, leading to a freeze on loans to Israel that were
formerly guaranteed by Washington. Immigration declined in 1992, but its massive
burden was still felt in Israeli society.

The pressure was manifested in the debate

between the Likud government and the opposition and became a significantly divisive
issue in the election campaign.

Reacting to the growing burden immigrants were placing on hospitals, Labor
Histadrut spokesman David Tagar demanded that the government allocate funds to allow
the building of facilities, the purchase of equipment, and the hiring of staff for an
additional 1,000 hospital beds. Health Ministry spokesman Hagai Elias countered by
saying that arrangements were being made to accommodate the serious crowding and
overburdened staffs.261

In an editorial,

Rabin accused the Shamir government of

having done nothing for the immigrants. He described their situation upon arriving in

259 Jerusalem Post, June 1, 1992.
260 Labor’s electoral platform in Jerusalem Post, Supplement-Election 1992.
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Israel as having “no food to eat and no jobs to go to,” and he placed the blame on the
administration as being a ‘‘good-for-nothing government [that] stands helplessly as the
new immigrants lose what is most important to any human being - their dignity.”262
Rebuffing Rabin’s accusation at a meeting of the Likud ministers, Sharon described the
current wave of immigrants as “spoiled”,

yet he blamed the Labor party for the

slowdown in Russian immigration by disseminating false information among the
immigrants.263

240,000 of the country’s 3.4 million eligible voters were recent immigrants from
the Soviet Union. A survey conducted by Tatzpit Research Institute found up to 190,000
were expected to turn up at the polls, with enough electoral strength to determine at least
eight Knesset seats.

Most Russian immigrants leaned to Labor because of a general

feeling that the Likud government was falling short of providing basic support for the
newcomers. The Tehiya party began to emerge as an ethnic political group.264

Economic Policy Debate
The political division between Israeli political parties maintained the Left-Right
positions in which each camp proposed opposite economic visions.

Labor drew its

support from the Histadrut and leaned toward advancing the interest of the Israeli labor
unions. The Likud, on the other hand, pressed toward programs supporting economic
liberalization and a free market economy. Meretz stood closer to Labor in its support of

261 Jerusalem P ost, M ay 12, 1992, p. 2.

262 Jerusalem Post, June 1, 1992, p. 12.
263 Jerusalem P ost, June 11, 1992, p. 2.
264 Jerusalem Post, June 5, 1992, p. 2.
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a welfare state with a mixed economy. Tsomet was closer to the Right and established
the need for privatizing the public sector as a means of attracting foreign investment.

The debate between the Shamir Right wing government and the Left opposition
continued, with each blaming the other for the country’s economic problems.

The

electoral platform of Likud finally spelled out the position of the party as aiming to
“shape a free economy with the government merely providing the outlines of economic,
monetary and fiscal policy, while cutting down state involvement.

All government

companies will be sold off; likewise all shares in state hands.'"(footnote?) This position
was countered by that of Labor, which expressed a more cautious, Histadrut-oriented
free market economy. In its Platform it declared that “the private, governmental and
Histadrut sectors should all coexist in a mixed, competitive economy; conducted without
any discrimination along business principles, offering equal opportunity for all.”265

Coalition Formation
Rabin declared, following Labor’s victory in the 13th Knesset, that his “strategy
will be to change policy, to change the order of national priorities, to change the way the
government functions and hopefully to change the electoral system...We will be shifting
all government financing from what I call the political settlements to unemployment and
other social and economic problems,” he said; “ we will freeze all the incentives and all
the benefits that are given at the expense of the Israeli taxpayers to the political
settlements.”

He went on to state that economic and political pressures had been

responsible for the decline in immigration:

“the sharp reduction in the number of
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immigrants from Russia is related mainly to the economic problems, which are
influenced by the political climate in Israel.”

Labor pursued formation of a broad coalition while initially ignoring negotiating
with the NRP, who supported the Likud, particularly in relation to settlements and
immigration. Labor Knesset faction leader Haim Ramon opened the door for a broad
coalition that would exclude Likud and NRP but negotiate with Tsomet, Meretz, Shas,
and United Torah Jerusalem.267

Tsomet leader Rafael Eitan, who won 8 seats in the Knesset, declared that Tsomet
“will not deviate from its principles,” and rejected Rabin’s definition of “political
settlements” which he believed could undermine settlements in the Territories.268 He
further opposed the government policy guidelines as set forth by Labor. Meretz, from the
Left, also rejected the guidelines since “it makes no mention of substantive and basic
issues such as UN resolution 242, a settlement freeze, full autonomy and [Palestinian]
election in the territories.”269 To avoid a split with Meretz, Rabin offered the party the
Education Ministry. Giving the ministry to a secular party meant a breach with religious
groups.

United Torah Jerusalem criticized this offer and broke away from the

negotiation.

Shas, on the other hand, decided to join after its Council of Sages gave

party leader Aryeh Deri the go-ahead to enter the coalition based on the promise that the

265 Labor’s electoral platform in Jerusalem Post, Supplement-Election 1992.
266 Jerusalem Post, June 28, 1992, p. 1.
267 Jerusalem Post, June 28, 1992, p. 2. Tsomet is a right nationalist party with strong ties to settlers.
Meretz is a dovish social-democratic party. Shas is an Orthodox-Sephardic party. United Torah Jerusalem
is a religious party. NRP is a religious party with strong ties to settlers.
268 Jerusalem Post, June 30, 1992, p. 2.
269 Jerusalem P ost, July 2, 1992, p. 2.
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party would receive the Interior Ministry and two deputy ministers.270 Shas’ position was
also dependent upon Rabin temporarily holding the religious affairs portfolio.

Meretz finally joined the coalition on the condition of preserving its position
regarding

the Palestinian question and the inclusion of another principle in the

government guidelines, in which the PLO would be recognized as a partner in peace
negotiations. On July 10, the new coalition was formed and was among the narrowest of
labor-led alliances.271 The partners were Labor, Meretz, and Shas. Tsomet and Likud’s
opposition to the Labor coalition’s economic, immigration-settlement, and foreign policy
principles were among the major reasons for their exclusion. Thus, the consequence of
economic, immigration, and foreign policy pressures were felt in the political debate
leading to the formation of a tight coalition.

Findings and Discussion:
a. Coalition Formation
Several hypotheses were initially advanced in this study in order to examine
coalitions’ behaviors in both formation and duration. The first hypothesis suggested that
“high coalition competition presses toward wider-ideological parameter and larger-sized
cabinets ” (Figure 2.1). Our trend analysis of twenty-eight Israeli governments revealed a
consistent increase in coalition competition over time, particularly following the 1969
Israeli Knesset election. This trend was evident through the decline in the dominant
party’s power index over the years indicating greater fragmentation and, therefore,

270 Jerusalem Post, July 9, 1992, p. 2.
271 Jerusalem Post, July 10, 1992, p. 1.
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competition within the consecutive Israeli Knessets (Figure 4.1).

Nonetheless, our

analysis of coalitions’ size and ideological parameters did not reveal a similar inverse
pattern as to confirm our hypothesis (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6). On the contrary, our
case studies of eight Israeli governments suggested that the null hypothesis was correct.
This conclusion agrees with Mershon (1996, 2001) in the sense that the cost of coalition
membership increases with competition. The result of the qualitative analysis supports
the trend analysis in showing that smaller coalitions established after 1969 encountered
higher levels of coalition competition than larger government formed before1969 (Table
6.8). Our conclusion supports the null proposition that high coalition competition presses
toward tighter ideological parameters and smaller-sized cabinets.

The rationality of this conclusion is based on two foundations. First, that greater
coalition competition is the consequence of the declined power of the dominant party.
This situation instigates a multi-polar parliamentary system, rather than a monopole, with
each pole hardly capturing the minimum-required seat for a majority coalition. The
second rationale can be made in the required efficiency (small-tight) for a coalition under
multi-polarity to maintain rank and discourage splinter parties from defection to an
opposite pole. Efficient formation provides maximum benefits among smaller numbers of
coalition partners in terms of government resources and portfolios, and hence reduces
defection opportunities (Mershon, 1996, 2001). This conclusion leads us back to confirm
Riker’s classical proposition that minimum winning formation is the rational aim of
coalitions (Riker, 1962).

However, our conclusion presupposes conditional structural

variables represented by the level of parliamentary competition. Riker’s classical thesis,
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our study proposes, is confirmed to the extent to which parliamentary competition over
government formation is elevated. Likewise, Riker’s thesis is contradicted whenever
parliamentary competition declines (confirming Liphart; 1977, 1984).

The other aspect of coalition formation analysis is the impact of domestic and
foreign event pressures on the ways coalitions formed. It was initially hypothesized that
“events’ pressure moves a coalition toward consensualism and therefore a larger
formation and wider ideological parameters.” The trend analysis revealed that two
pressure variables have consistently increased over the years: foreign aid and annual
number of strikers per strike (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3). It was expected that while
increase in foreign aid reduced external pressure, the annual number of strikers per strike
increased domestic pressure on government formation.

In our quantitative analysis, we

found that the increase in the number of strikers per strike was correlated with the
decrease in the ideological parameter, contrary to our expectation (Table 4.2).
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis revealed that increased immigration pressure is
associated with smaller sized cabinets (Table 4.4). Both of these findings supported our
null hypothesis in suggesting that “events’ pressures polarize coalitions toward tighter
formations.”

Our case analysis, which combined the various internal and external pressure
variables, provided a result contrary to our quantitative analysis, revealing that the
combined internal and external pressures were often associated with the formation of
large coalitions with wide ideological parameters. Such a relationship was found to be
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particularly strong before 1969, where economic pressures positively impacted the size of
the coalition (confirming Robertson, 1986). Immigration pressure appeared to be
negatively associated with coalition formation, particularly in the post-1969 era. Modem
Israeli immigration policy seems to have been creating a greater wedge between Israeli
political parties. This is the case particularly when we recognize the various polarizing
religious, ethnic, and settlements aspects associated with Jewish immigration. Likewise
when we considered the external policy domain we found that external pressure, which
was positively associated with the structural formation of pre-1969 governments
(asserting our quantitative result), appeared to have been negatively associated with the
post-1969 governments (asserting our qualitative result). Thus, based on our analyses of
Israeli coalitions we conclude that our hypothesis was largely confirmed in regard to pre1969 coalition formations (Figure 7.1), but strongly contradicted in the post-1969 period
(Figure 7.2). After 1969, coalitions appear to have emerged less accommodative to minor
pressures, producing an exclusive formation pattern that supported our null hypothesis.
Our hypothesis is confirmed for governments formed before 1969 while our null
hypothesis is confirmed for the period thereafter, with formation becoming negatively
sensitive to additional pressure variables.

Emerging as a newly formed state and isolated by hostile borders, economic
development became by far the most important task for Israeli governments. It was the
economy that threatened the fundamental foundation of Israel as a nation. Despite the
various international treaties that guaranteed the protection of Israeli borders, such as the
Armistice Agreements, the U.N. charter, European and U.S. assistance, Israel remained
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hostage to Arab threats of its annihilation.

Accommodating massive waves of

immigrants, establishing a national economy, and achieving national security were
crucial tasks forcing political parties to seek unity and coalition accommodation. Thus,
the rationale for the tremendous economic, social, and external pressures that existed
before 1969, and their significant positive association with the structural orientation of
the Israeli coalitions, can be observed from this perspective. Early Israeli governments
were established large, accommodating a wide range of parties representing the national
spectrum of Israeli society (confirming Robertson, 1984, 86; Lipjhart, 1977, 84).

The post-1969 period witnessed tremendous economic, social, and security leaps.
Israel emerged as an economic and military regional superpower, thus undermining prior
national alliances. Post-1969 coalitions grew more competitive and less tolerant to minor
internal and external circumstances, hence forming smaller and ideologically tighter. In
response to pressures, and with the exception of national governments established to
repel severe external threats, we observed that coalition governments formed after 1969
to have been narrowly established (contrary to Robertson, 1984 or Lipjhart 1977, 84).
Thus we conclude that our hypothesis that stated “events’ pressure presses coalition
toward consensualism and therefore larger formation and wider ideological parameter”
is confirmed for the period before 1969 era (Figure 7.1) while the null hypothesis is
confirmed for the latter, suggesting that “events’ pressure polarizes coalition toward
fragmentation and therefore smaller formation and tighter ideological parameter"
(Figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.1: General Israeli Coalition Formation Model Before 1969
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Figure 7.2: General Israeli Coalition Formation Model After 1969
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b. Coalition Duration
The third proposed hypothesis aimed at examining the relationship between
domestic and external pressures and the durability of coalitions.

The hypothesis

suggested, “increase in events’ pressure yields shorter coalition durations” (Figure 2.4).
Furthermore, the hypothesis sets the stage for the examination of the aging thesis, which
claimed that “the impact o f increasing event pressure becomes more significant in
shortening the duration o f coalitions as they age. ”

In the qualitative comparative case

study the changes in economic pressure during the life of the coalition emerged as a
dominant variable impacting duration. It was found that economic deterioration during
the life of the coalition, or increase in economic pressure, shortens the durability of the
coalition (Table 6.9). Again, this was a further assertion regarding Roberston’s thesis
about the significance of economic indicators in determining governments’ duration
(Robertson 1983, 84). Furthermore, it was qualitatively revealed that elevated economic
pressure contributes to the accumulation of “shocks” that help bring quick endings to
coalitions. This qualitative conclusion confirmed Diermeier and Stevenson’s as well as
Browne’s theses that accumulative shocks undermine the duration of the government
(Browne, 1984, 86, 88; Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). Our qualitative study attributes
to “economic shocks” the most important determinant of coalition dissolution and
confirms our hypothesis

This finding reasserted the significance of economic pressure having the most
determinant role in Israeli coalition politics.

The confirmation of our hypotheses

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

273

establishes a priority to economic consideration in Israeli coalition formation and
duration analyses.

Economic pressures have determined, to a large extent, the

dimensional structure of coalition formation.

And more significantly, economic

pressures have determined the prospect of coalitions’ durability (Warwick, 1992).

Another significant domestic pressure variable found in our qualitative analysis to
have an association with coalition duration was immigration pressure. High immigration
pressure was another factor, in addition to the economy, which was found responsible for
short Israeli coalition durations (Table 6.8). This finding was a further assertion of
economic pressure having a dominant impact on coalition behaviors. While immigration
pressure is not strictly of an economic nature, it comprises major economic functions.
Housing, education, job training, integration, settlement, and employment of the new
immigrants can largely be associated with economic costs; thus adding to economic
pressure and consequently shorter duration governments.

External pressure was another important dimension of Israeli coalition politics. In
our qualitative analysis we found association between duration analysis and external
pressure variables. In accordance with hypothesis 3 the case study revealed that, during a
government’s term in office,

the accumulation of external pressure was a factor

responsible for additional shocks contributing to early termination (Table 6.9). Most
successful Israeli governments that endured for extended stays in power functioned under
situations of declined external pressures, contrary to short duration governments. Further
assertion of this conclusion was provided by our robust regression where we found that
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increase in foreign assistance helped to reduce external pressure and contribute to longer
duration coalitions.

Indeed, Israeli foreign policy emerged unique among the nations. The historic
opposition of the Arab states to recognize Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish nation,
confronted with the opposition of Israel to the creation of an independent Arab
Palestinian State, was a major source of tension and external pressure exerted on Israeli
coalition politics. The different positions of Israeli parties in regard to external issues,
largely those related to peace with the Arabs and particularly the issue of a Palestinian
State in the Occupied Territories since 1967, constituted major dilemmas in maintaining
alliances.

Our findings suggest that, during coalitions’ terms in office, reduction in

tensions due to external issues contributed to lasting alliances.

In the final analysis we concluded that our hypothesis was largely confirmed both
quantitatively and qualitatively in asserting that “increase in events ’ pressure yields
shorter coalition durations. ” Furthermore, our analysis confirmed the ‘aging thesis’
which proposed that “the impact o f increasing event pressure becomes more significant
in shortening the duration o f coalitions as they age. ”

Our qualitative analysis to

economic shocks revealed confirmation to the ‘aging thesis’ as Roberston proposed.
Deterioration in economic or external conditions during a government’s time is
associated with short duration government (Table 6.9).

Similarly, our bivariate

quantitative analysis revealed significant assertion of the association existing between
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external conflict and the duration of the government, suggesting that the termination of
long-durable (old) government is associated with external conflicts.

In addition to the ‘events’ impact on durational analysis, structural associations
were also considered in this study. The association of coalition competition with duration
was proposed in hypothesis 4 which suggested, “increase in coalition competition
contributes to longer coalition durations. ” The null association was found significant in
our quantitative analyses. The quantitative robust regression analysis showed that the
increase in competition was associated with shorter duration governments (confirming
Grofman, Roozentaal’s (1997) and rejecting Mershon (1996, 2001)). We were not able to
either assert or reject this proposition in our qualitative analysis.272 We accept the
quantitative result due to the larger number of coalitions involved in the analysis, which
our qualitative analysis lacked. Thus, we assert the null hypothesis, which stated that
“increase in coalition competition contributes to shorter coalition durations. ”273

The relationship linking coalition size and ideological structure with duration was
proposed in hypotheses 5 and 6 respectively, that “widening ideological parameter
shortens coalition duration ” and “enlarging the size o f the coalition shortens coalition
duration. ” In our qualitative study we found that ideological and size formations that
properly responded to external pressure yielded durable coalitions. In other words, the
association of durational analysis to the structural formation of the coalition was found

272 In o u r sa m p le of c o a litio n s studied we found that in situations of high competition two coalitions were
of short duration while two were of long duration. In situations of low competition, on the other hand, two
coalitions were of short duration while the other two where of long duration (see Table 6.8).
273 See previous discussion about the rationality of this null hypothesis which was elaborated in chapter 2.
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relevant when such a formation corresponded to external pressure.

Whenever the

structural formation of the coalition was contradictory to external pressure, as proposed
in hypothesis 2, coalition duration shortened (Table 6.8).

This conclusion asserts

Warwick’s claim against Browne that the structure, not only the event, is responsible for
the ability of a government to endure shocks (Warwick, 1994). Yet, this study found
some structural formations may prove to insulate coalitions from shocking events more
effectively than others. This study suggested that durational analysis could be relevant to
coalition formations when coalitions are efficiently structured in reaction to external
pressure. Thus, we find that our hypothesis is conditionally confirmed and the increase in
a coalition’s size and ideological parameter can be positively associated with duration
whenever such an increase corresponds to external pressure.274

In addition to revealing the importance of parliamentary structure, the above
findings assert the importance of foreign policy issues in determining the prospective
duration of Israeli alliances. In order to manage their fragilities, alliances need to take a
critical approach to external issues.

Grand alliances help establish long duration

coalitions when faced by severe external threats, such as war.

In contrast, narrowly

formed alliances were short-lived when confronted with typical external circumstances.
The presence of coalition competition or its absence may further contribute to duration.
This is a further illustration that Browne’s thesis needed to consider structural variables
that may undermine the impact of ‘shocks’ in durational analysis as proposed by

274 Our q u a n tita tiv e analysis does not include a conditional external conflict analysis. Such a statistical
design goes beyond our empirical design and the limitation imposed by our small number of cases.
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Warwick (1994), Grofman and Roozentaal (1997), Laver and Shepsle (1998, 1999), as
well as Diermeir and Stevenson (1999).

This study suggested that not all event pressures have equally and consistently
impacted coalition formations, and not all formations properly responded to pressures
yielding long duration governments. Perhaps radical historic transformations may have
altered aspects of coalition behaviors. Following 1969, it can be observed that the Israeli
coalition system has transformed into a competitive structure, thus changing important
expectations of coalitions’ formations and duration. The impact of economic pressure on
formation, for example, was reversed and additional relevant variables emerged.
Coalitions that formed large as a consequence of economic pressures before 1969,
formed small in response to lower pressure afterward. This study found that proper
coalition formations, properly structured in reaction to external pressure, as well as
consideration of the existing level of parliamentary competition, provided the best
guarantee of lasting governments. Coalitions that formed large in reaction to mounting
external pressure during low level of parliamentary competition were among the bestsurvived cabinets. Coalitions formed small while having low levels of external conflict
and parliamentary competition had a better chance to last in power. Since 1969, and with
the increasing level of competition, coalitions grew more polarized in their formation and
their alliances became more sensitive to event pressure (see Duration Model, Figure 7.3).
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Figure 7.3: Duration Model
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General Theoretical Implication for Israeli Coalition Formation and Duration
Our findings supported the view that claimed Israeli coalition politics prior to
1969 to have been differently structured than afterwards. The early period of Israel’s
history reflected national consensus faced by national building tasks. Security, economic
pressure, and immigration absorptions were among the major challenges that enforced
political unity among the various sectors of Israeli society (Issac, 1976; Lann, 1996;
Felber, 1997; Arian, 1998).

This was translated in the democratic society through

parliamentary coalition building politics. Many Israeli governments in the pre-1969
period were formed larger by size and more receptive to various ideological partnerships,
amid low level of coalition competition.

Coalition behaviors throughout this period
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support Lipjhart’s thesis of consensualism in pluralistic societies (Lijphart, 1977,
1984).275

In this study we found that these challenges acted as event pressures leading
governments in pre-1969 to be based on large alliances with wide ideological spectrums.
Economic pressure emerged as having the most imprints on coalition formations.
Permanent economic pressures in this period led to the establishment of grand alliances
(confirming Robertson, 1984).

The fate of these alliances, upon formation, was

determined by economic and external political developments. Economic deterioration
often meant early coalition breakup and dissolution contrary to situations of economic
progress. Large coalitions responded more effectively to external pressures and proved
capable of lasting in power, overcoming internal disputes and divisions; while tight
coalitions faced with typical circumstances shortly collapsed (confirming Warwick,
1994). Low coalition competition further contributed to longevity of coalitions through
this early period (confirming Grofman and Roozendaal, 1997).

The dominance of Mapai throughout the pre-1969 Knesset undermined the ability
of challenging coalitions to be formed. Mapai’s dominance provided the party with the
luxury to form larger alliances and share government resources with minor ideologically
odd parties without fearing a “coalition coup d'etat" (confirming Mershon, 1996, 2001).
Mapai’s coalition governments often included, in addition to religious blocs, rightist
parties such as General Zionists, the Liberals, and even Gahal. Mapai’s unchallengeable

275 Lipjhart (1977, 1984) claim ed that pluralistic nations consisting o f various ethnic groups tend to form
consensual political ruling alliances contrary to situations in hom ogeneous countries.
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power contributed further to the formation of lasting and consensual national
governments that were capable of confronting primarily economic challenges, foreign
threats, and immigration pressure (rejecting Mershon, 1996, 2001).

Post-1969 achievements were evident in various national spheres, most notably in
economic development.

Post-1969 Israel became industrially oriented, achieving a

dramatic increase in GNP, exports, growth, and foreign investment. Security threats were
to a large extent contained by Israel’s military edge and a series of peace agreements.
Afterl969 Israel became more susceptible to ‘normal’ democratic factional politics
within an increasingly complex society. This study showed that the decline in economic
and external stress combined with the increase in competition among rival dominant
parties were politically reflected in lesser structural need for consensual coalition
formation (Figure 7.4). The increase of competitiveness among Israel’s dominant parties
was marked by a substantial decline in the Labor party’s dominance over the Knesset
(Figure 7.5).

Coalition politics in post-1969 Israel were contradictory to Lijphart’s

views, which emphasized consensualism in pluralistic societies (Lijphart, 1977, 1984).
Both the decline in economic and external stress and the increase in structural
competitiveness of the Knesset contributed to the formation of many minimum-winning
coalitions in this period (Riker, 1963). Grand alliances, in the same period, were formed
as a consequence of external threat rather than economic pressure. For example, the
national government that was maintained by Prime Minister Meir following the 1967
War, Shamir and Peres following the 1982 War, or Sharon following the 2000 Palestinian
Intefadah.
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Figure 7.4 provides another illustration of the declined emphases of economic
objectives by Israeli governments. Israeli government policy guidelines expressed the
various policy objectives of each coalition upon formation. These policies included a
variety of tasks set forth by each cabinet, ranging from strengthening security, achieving
peace, fostering immigration, to pursuing particular economic plan (Chapter 3 provides a
detailed discussion of Governments’ Policy Guidelines). After these guidelines were
content-coded the percentages of statements stressing economic policies by each
government were plotted in Figure 7.4. The trend demonstrates that earlier governments
preoccupied themselves with emphasizing economic policies more than later cabinets.
Early Israeli governments dedicated 20% to 40% of their policy guidelines to economic
plans while more recent government guidelines fell below 20%. This Figure provides
additional indications to support that economic pressure was a more significant factor in
earlier Israeli coalitions than in later ones.
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Figure 7.4s Economic Policy Priority in Government’s Guidelines (1949-1999)276
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Figure 7.5 provides further demonstration for the combined impact of both
economic pressure (% of statements emphasized by each government’s policy guidelines)
and Knesset competitiveness (as indicated in the % of dominant party power index) on
the structural formation of the government (the number of Knesset seats controlled by a
coalition’s parties). The Figure reflects a synchronized trend between three variables:
276 From M arch, 1974 until A ugust, 1981 (16th - 1 9 th governments) policy priorities focused on issues such
as peace, government corruption, support o f religious institutions. Econom ic questions were not o f
immediate concern. Overshadowing econom ic concerns were post-1973 peace plans with Egypt and the
rise o f the Likud to government follow ing the 1977 national election. The 2 1 st government was that o f
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increase in economic pressure and increase in dominant party power index (decrease in
competitiveness) is reflected in a similar trend in coalition size.

Figure 7.5 s Economic Policy Guidelines, Dominant Party Power Index, and
Coalition Size by Government (1949-1999)277
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national unity formed in S eptem ber 1984 and was primarily occupied with the War in Lebanon and the
Palestinian Intefadah.
277 From M arch, 1974 until A ugust, 1981 (16th - 1 9 th governm ents) policy priorities focused on issues such
as peace, government corruption, support of religious institutions. Economic questions were not of

immediate concern. Overshadowing economic concerns were post-1973 peace plans with Egypt and the
rise of the Likud to government following the 1977 national election. The 21st government was that of
national unity formed in September 1984 and was primarily occupied with the W ar in Lebanon and the
Palestinian Intefadah.
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Economic performance, this study showed, was one of the primary determinants
of government duration (Robertson, 1983, 1984). This agrees with our findings above,
showing that the economy has played a central role in Israeli democratic politics.
Economic pressure was relevant to structural formation. Furthermore, this study revealed
that the extent to which economic pressures were resolved determined the capacity of the
government to last in power. In the pre-1969 period resolution of economic pressure
increased the durability of governments in power.

However,

post-1969, additional

factors relevant to government duration were primarily external and immigration
pressure, combined with increased competition.

Among the additional factors found relevant to duration analysis, particularly
after1969, was government foreign policy performance. After 1967 Israel was no longer
in a position of merely defending its right to exist as a nation, but it had to increasingly
justify its occupation of newly captured territories populated by a Palestinian majority.
Despite military supremacy and enhanced national security, the subsequent Israeli
governments had to shield themselves from international condemnation for “illegal
occupation” and work more skillfully in the diplomatic arena. In this study we have
shown the relevancy of increased foreign aid in prolonging the duration of the
government. We have further demonstrated that governments which existed amid low
external pressure lasted longer in power (Gov. 7, 13, and 25). The 25th government of
Prime Minister Rabin was a case in point. The government was able to survive various
no-confidence votes while not commanding a majority of seats in the Knesset. Yet, its
various achievements in reducing external pressure, particularly signing the peace
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agreements with both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, helped prolong its longevity
with the support of external votes.278

Figure 7.6: Foreign Policy Priority in Government’s Guidelines (1949-1999)279
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Figure 7.6 demonstrates a steady increase in Israeli governments’ emphasis on
foreign policy issues. Foreign policies were emphasized by later Israeli governments in
reaction to growing issues in this domain.

278 Two sources of outside support helped th e government defeat no-confidence votes. The Arab MKs
voted with the government w h ile Shas’ MKs refrained from voting with the opposition.
21916th L a b o r-le d government was that of P.M. Golda Meir of 1974. It emerged after the October, 1973
w ar and w as overwhelmingly concerned with the question of peace in the Middle East. It was also among
the shortest lived governments of Israel, lasting only 90 days.
19thgovernment was a Likud-led government overwhelmingly concerned with religious affairs.
2 1 st and 22nd governments w e re national unity governments arising after 1982 w a r in Lebanon and
continuing though the Palestinian Intefadah.
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In addition to resolution of external pressure, the duration of Israeli governments
emerged as a function of structural formation. This study demonstrated that governments
rationally formed in reaction to external pressure lasted longer in power. In other words,
coalitions formed on a larger basis when external pressure was high or on a smaller basis
when external pressure was low were the ‘rational’ and durable governments.
Competition also emerged as relevant to duration. The increase in coalition competition
after 1969 has exerted additional pressure, undermining the durability of the government.

Israel is a country of immigrants. Massive immigration to Israel exerted great
pressure on the country’s institutions, particularly in the early period of nationhood.
Housing, welfare, jobs, education, religion and cultural integration for the new
immigrants were among the few imperative tasks faced by governments. After 1969,
government immigration policy became more controversial, fueling religious, ethnic, and
settlement disputes. These represented additional pressure on governments leading them
to terminate relatively quickly whenever immigration pressure was high.

Our above discussion demonstrates that event and structure variables are relevant
to both the formation and the duration of governments. In the case of Israel, coalition
competitiveness (structure), economic and immigration pressures (internal events), and
foreign policy pressure (external events) are found to be the primary determinants of
coalition systematic formation. Furthermore, government duration was also found to be
determined by structured formations and event variables. In eight Israeli governments we
found that increases in internal and external pressures, along with ‘irrational’ structural
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formations responding to external pressure, undermined the duration of the government.
The relative increase in competition was also found among the structural variables that
have undermined the durability of the government.

Figure 7.7 combines both foreign and economic policies emphasized by the
various Israeli coalitions within their respective policy guidelines. The trend shows a
decline in economic emphasis in favor of external policy. This suggests that pressure
exerted on Israeli coalition politics has been of increasingly external orientation. Thus, if
trends continue along the same path, we should expect future Israeli coalitions to take
foreign policy, an arising determinant of coalition unity and stability, as a more essential
factor in coalition building.
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Figure 7.7: Foreign and Economic Policy Priorities in Government’s Guidelines
(1949-1999)
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Significance of Findings to Coalitions’ Formations and Duration Theories
The study finds that there are no contradictions between policy-based and
structural or size-based research.

Coalitions’ ideological parameters increase with

coalition size. More participants in the coalitions mean more ideological concessions.
This suggests that minimum winning coalitions are among the most ideologically tight
structures, contrary to grand coalitions.

Parties strive for minimum formations

(confirming Riker, 1962) but are often confronted with events’ pressures to stretch
beyond the boundaries of “efficiency” (confirming Robertson, 1986 Lipjhart, 1977,
1984). These pressures shape formations and consequently determine coalition duration.
The first important aspect of coalition formations is the parliamentary structural context.
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This structural component is best captured by the degree of competitiveness within the
system. A competitive system, with many potential winning coalitions, acts just like a
competitive economic system in producing “efficient” formations or enterprises
(confirming Mershon; 1996, 2001). Whenever competitiveness is reduced, other variables
become relevant in determining formations. Most significant to formation analysis are
the economic and security well-being of the country.

Severe economic and external

pressure on the country forces greater formative accommodation (confirming Robertson,
1986). When confronted with severe economic pressures, coalitions often formed large
as to maintain national unity in confronting domestic threats (confirming Lipjhart; 1977,
1984 and rejecting Riker, 1962).

Yet, increasing coalition competition fuels rivalry

between dominant parties and coalitions grow less tolerant to event pressures, thus
forming among a smaller number of partners (confirming Mershon; 1996, 2001 and
Riker, 1962 and rejecting Robertson, 1986 and Lipjhart; 1977,1984).

Following formation, maintaining a coalition, i.e., prolonging its life, becomes the
second significant aspect of coalition politics.

Reduced event pressures help the

government repels reasons for early termination and prolong its stay in power. Most
importantly in this regard are the changes in economic and external pressures as well as
immigration pressure, their elevation providing mounting reasons for early termination
(confirming Browne, 1984, 1986, 1988). The second aspect of duration is competition.
The durability of a coalition is enhanced whenever the chances of a competing coalition
to control a winning majority in the Knesset are reduced (confirming Grofman and
Roozentaal ,1997 and rejecting Mershon, 1996, 2001). The third aspect of duration is the
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structural formation of a government that responded to external pressure.

Larger

formation responding to external pressure prolongs government duration. Also, small
formation responding to low external pressure has a similar impact (confirming Warwick,
1994).

Thus, the theoretical contribution of this study is to provide new avenues in which
both structural and event pressures are combined in analyzing coalition formation and
duration behaviors. This has been achieved by taking the coalition as the unit of analysis
while making the distinction between important historic eras to which our model can be
separately applied. Our study demonstrates that the application of theoretical models
must carefully consider national historic transformations. Coalition formation theories
may provide contradictory results when applied to countries undergoing varying levels of
economic and global transformation.

As the case of Israeli coalitions demonstrated,

nations undergoing early nation building prioritize consensus and unity in alliance
formations in order to confront common tasks. However, the situation is often changed
after the same nation matures economically and internationally and begins to globalize.
Post-nationalism boosts political fragmentation and competition, and undermines, as a
consequence, consensual coalition behaviors.

The immediate consequence is greater

ethnic and ideological polarization that can potentially undermine the stability (duration)
of national alliances.

Our theoretical finding synthesizes both the Rational-Efficient model, initially
advanced by Riker (1962), later elaborated and revised by Dodd (1976, 84), Strom
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(1984), Laver and Shepsle (1990, 96), and the Ideological-Interest model, suggested by
Lipset and Rokhan, (1967), Axlerod (1970), de Swaan (1973); Lipjhart (1977), Warwick
(1979), Baron (1993) and Dunleavy (2001). Evidence of Lipjhart’s “consensual theory”
in pluralist societies is demonstrated in the cases of Israeli governments being established
in reaction to economic and external pressures, particularly before 1969.

Evidence

suggests that ideological cleavages are overcome during early periods of nation building.
Riker’s view about minimum winning coalition formation, on the other hand, is found to
be plausible in post-national periods where political circumstances approach ‘normalcy’
and/or ‘complexity’, i.e., society is no longer confronted with threats to its fundamental
foundations. This situation became evident in Israeli polity after 1969, where political
parties further factionalized into a multi-polar Knesset.

The differences in Israeli coalition behaviors through two distinct periods of time,
before and after 1969, invite additional considerations and conditions to political
analysis. Lipset and Rokhan’s “freezing hypothesis”, that established the 20th century
ideological struggle to have been shaped by the same tenets of the industrial and national
revolution of the 19th century, must be viewed in a different light. Our analysis of Israeli
politics, which distinguishes between two political periods, before and after 1969,
demonstrates rapid national development indicated by a shift in the priorities of coalition
building.

Economic progress, and perhaps globalization, appears to have liberated

national politics, particularly that of multi-ethnic and pluralistic societies, from the
tradition of national consensualism toward greater ethno-political fragmentations, and
therefore, political competition. Morgan Pederson was correct to characterize modem
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political alignments as being in a state of ideological detachment and electoral volatility
(Pederson, 1990), yet, examining the impact of globalization on national politics can
perhaps further enrich the explanation of the realignment phenomenon.

The liberation of politics from the strict tasks of nation building toward a process
of global integration seems to constitute the essence of a new coalition synthesis. While
this study did not undertake fully the examination of the global transformation impact on
national politics, it provided greater support for such a paradigmatic perception. The
decline in ideological commitment in favor of greater ethno-political fragmentation
constitutes an important aspect of this process (contradicting Lipjhart, 1977, 1984). Such
a process, this study demonstrates, is manifested in shifting pressures and increasing
fragmentation among parties making coalition building hardly consensual and, thus,
giving greater thrust to the formation of minimum winning coalitions (reasserting Riker,
1962).

The conclusions established in this study are constrained by the small size of
examined coalitions. Quantitative examination included only 28 cases while qualitative
case study focused on only eight governments. Other limitations to our proposition stem
from the country we studied whose unique political and cultural attributes may have
undermined our theoretical assertions in regard to other countries. Despite the reliability
limitation imposed on our theoretical assertions, the generalization made in this study
provides partial support to various theoretical traditions and provides ground for the
examination of a synthetically oriented theory.

Thus, we consider the generalization
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made to constitute a base that can stimulate research that takes into consideration our
results, which we view as necessary for the advancement of a comprehensive coalition
theory.

The Transform ation of Politics from Nationalism toward Globalism
Franklin and Mackie question: “what it is about these countries that make them
different?” (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 688). The answer to this question, they suggest,
“might provide us with powerful additional variables with which to attack the problem of
predicting coalition formations.” (Franklin & Mackie, 1984, p. 688). The answer to such
a question must be examined in light of the impact of global transformations on countries
like Israel, a subject that can be further elaborated by future research.

As we have

established in this study, study of a country needs to look at the time period that signals a
shift from national to global politics. Toward such a thesis we must look at countries’
ethnic fabrics and evaluate their internal tendencies toward global integration and
national fragmentation, as well as their coalition and parliamentary political formations.

The question can be further extended as to whether we can establish an
association between coalition duration and global integration. Browne, Frenderis, and
Gleiber’s studies (1984, 1986,1988) provided extensive emphasis on environmental
developments as primary factors determining the lifespans of coalitions. Events, they
claimed, place accumulative pressure on coalition partners to split. Unforeseen wars,
flow of refugees, economic crises, scandals, etc... are events that invite increasing
differences and divisions within ruling alliances. This theme seems to suggest that global
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events invite greater challenges to traditional alliances and their durability. Globalization
entails far-reaching events with dramatic impacts that include cultural, political,
economic, and environmental transformations.

Should we then expect that alliances

formed in modem times will be of shorter duration (less stable) as a consequence of
dramatic global transformation shocks?

Shorter government durations and increased instabilities could perhaps be
rational conclusions to the rapid global transformations that are storming nations.
However, our study suggests that the structural situation might often counteract the
impact of events on coalition duration. This confirms Warwick’s views that structural
variables hold important determinant power when events are controlled (Warwick, 1992,
p. 875). In our study we have found evidence to support Warwick’s thesis that properly

structured coalitions- in reaction to external pressures events - are more resistant to
environmental pressure, and therefore, are often more durable.

Coalition formation and duration, this study established, is a permanent process
conditioned by institutional limitations as well as environmental political developments.
Considerations of the time period as well as the country and its social fabric are serious
factors that need to be integrated within the analysis of coalition theories. The world is
rapidly changing toward global integration with radical consequences on national
politics. It is no longer valid to examine coalition politics today by the same standards
that governed countries in previous decades and it is difficult to impose the previous
standards on modem coalition behaviors.

The solution to this dilemma may lay in
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categorizing democratic systems according to their respective levels of national
development or global integration, i.e., by the extent to which countries have achieved
social cohesiveness and economic development within the international arena. Leaders
and policy makers can then foresee the shape and the prospect of durable coalitions. A
comparative analysis of several countries may prove useful in this regard. Applying our
model to future research might be achieved by grouping proportional representative
democratic countries according to their respective level of existing fragmentation and
ethnic plurality, economic development, and security pressure. Each country will, thus,
be included in two samples where each is distinguished by its level of national
transformation.

Turkey, Pakistan, India, Italy, South Africa as well as many South

American countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, are suitable candidates for such a
comparative examination.

These countries have encountered dramatic national

transformations as evident in economic growth while their coalition politics have
confronted mounting global transformation pressure. Prospective research can determine
the historic periods in which global impact has marked the political transformation in
these countries. All coalition governments will then be grouped into two samples of pre
vs. post global transformation sets. Examination of their formation and duration can then
be separately examined and compared in light of the hypotheses proposed in this study.

Lipjhart was right to suggest that pluralistic societies tend to produce consensual
political formations. However, in this study we found Lijphart’s thesis to be conditioned
by the time framework and the global circumstances nations encounter. Lipjhart’s views
can be asserted during periods of national revival, where multi-ethnic cleavages in
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pluralist societies unite in the process of State building. However, we must recognize
that globalization has greatly undermined the national paradigm in favor of an ethnic
synthesis (Gurr, 1994, 1997, 2000). Globalization today is reinventing nationalism in
favor of world integration and altering ethnic identities and ideological politics toward
greater fragmentation.

The most fundamental imprint of globalization on national

politics can be seen through the “liberation” of the “ethnic interest” from geopolitical
limitations, or from the border space of the Nation State. Never before have we seen
pluralistic nations, subjugated to the force of globalization, so divided and polarized
(Crawford, 1998). The Kurds in Iraq, as well as the Tajiks in Afghanistan, appear to have
a more in common interest with the Americans than with their fellow national ethnics. If
we were to examine political loyalty of the other contemporary Iraqi ethnicities of
Turkmen, Assyrians, Chaledeans, Arab-Christians we will hardly find a common
momentum for traditional national unity. What politically matters for ethnicities today is
having a State capable of nurturing their respective ‘ethnic interests’ rather than having
the contrary. With globalization, ethnic groups appear to be growing less trustful of the
national ‘melting pot’ paradigm, and emerging more assertive of their distinct politicalethnic identities.

Thus, while consensual politics may be needed for governing, such a

requirement continues to be undermined and reinvented by the process of globalization,
where ethnic groups are increasingly finding supports and alliances being extended
beyond their national ethnic counterparts.

The post-national state’s role appears to

emerge as less concerned with regulating and unifying national economy and culture, but
more concerned with the management and distribution of resources among the various
ethnicities.280
280 The role o f post-civil war governments in Lebanon, for exam ple, was predominantly submerged in the
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The impact of globalization on Israel is apparent in the increasing rise of ethnic
politics and the undermining of national or ideological currents. The increasing influence
of groups such as Shas, Israel Ba’aliah, and the Arab parties along with the growing
tendency of larger parties to adopt ethnic perspectives (Ashkenazim vs. Sephardim) are
evidence of such a pattern.281 The most important consequence of globalization is the
deterioration of national unity in favor of greater political fragmentation and competing
‘identities’ (Crawford, 1998). Such a situation has been responsible, as this study has
demonstrated, for contemporary coalition competition and less consensual Israeli politics.
As we move to the 21st Century, global and domestic events continue to reshape modem
Israeli politics.

It is evident that the new century of globalization will exert greater

pressure on Israel’s pluralist society and its structure of government, and determine the
prospect and shape of its post-modem national unity.

process o f distributing national resources among the various ethnic and religious sects. The predominant
religious Lebanese sects (Maronites, Sunnis, and Shia’ah) divide governm ent’s power and national
resources through an ongoing political struggle.
281 In the 2003 Israeli election, Shinui emerged as a large party with 15 seats in the Knesset. Shinui is
w idely view ed as a secular-Ashkenazi party in opposition to Shas, a religious-Sephardic party.
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APPENDIX A
IAN’S BUDGE’S DEFINITIONS OF POLICY DOMAINS AND SUBDOMAINS282
Domain 1 External Relations

102 Foreign Special R elationships: Positive
Favorable mentions o f other countries w here these are either specially dependent
on or are especially involved with the relevant country. For example, former
colonies; in the W est German case, East Germany; in the Swedish case, the rest o f
Scandinavia; the need for cooperation with and aid to such countries; their
Importance to the econom y and defense programs o f the relevant country.
102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative
A s 101, but negative.
103 D ecolonization
Favorable mentions o f decolonization, need for relevant country to leave colo
nies; greater self government, and independence; need to train natives for this;
need to give special aid to make up for colonial past. This also includes negative
references to Soviet Imperialism in Eastern Europe, especially in the United
States.
104 Military and Security: Positive
N eed for strong military presence overseas, for re-armament and self-defense, need
to keep to military treaty obligations, need to secure adequate manpower in
military.
105 Demilitarization
A s 104, but negative.
106 Peace
Declaration o f b elief in P eace and peaceful m eans o f solving crises; need for
international disarmament and desirability o f relevant country joining in nego
tiations with hostile countries.

107 lintemationalism: Positive
Support for U N . need for international cooperation, need for aid to developing
countries, need for world planning o f resources, need for international courts
support for any international aim or world state,

282 Based on the work o f Budge, Ian and Hans Keman "Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and
Government Functioning in Twenty States" Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
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108 Jewish Community: Positive283
Favorable mentions o f Jewish Community in general and in Diaspora in particular.

109 Internationalism: N egative
A s 107, but negative

110 Internationalism N egative EEC and Europe
A s 108, but negative.

Domain 2 Freedom and Democracy

201 Freedom and D om estic Human Rights
Favorable mentions o f importance o f personal freedom, civil rights; freedom o f
choice in education; freedom from bureaucratic control, freedom o f speech;
freedom from coercion in industrial and political sphere; individualism.

202 Democracy
Favorable mention o f democracy as method or goal in national and other
organizations; support for worker participation; for involvem ent o f all citizens in
decision making, as w ell as generalized support for sym bols o f democracy.
203 Constitutionalism: Positive
Support for specified aspects o f a formal constitution, use o f constitutionalism as ,w
argument for policy as w ell as generalized approval for 'constitutional' way o f doing
things.

204 Constitutionalism: N egative
A s 203, but negative.

Domain 3 Government

301 Decentralization: Positive
Support for devolution, regional administration o f politics or econom y, support for
keeping up local and regional customs and sym bols, deference to local expertise in
planning, etc.

283 We replaced Budge’s sub-domain “favorable mention of European community” with what we thought a category
related greater to Israel’s case as “favorable mention of Jewish community”.
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302 D ecentralization: N egative
As 301, b u t negative.

303 G overnm ent E fficiency
N eed for efficiency in governm ent (e.g. m erit system in civil service), econom y in
governm ent, cutting dow n civil service; improving governmental procedures;
general appeal to m ake process o f governm ent and adm inistration cheaper and
more effective.

304 G overnm ent C orruption
N eed to eliminate corruption in government, and associated abuse, e.g. regulation
o f campaign expenses; need to check pandering to selfish interests.

305 Government Effectiveness and Authority
This includes references to government stability, especially in Italy.

Domain 4 Economy

401 Enterprise
Favorable mention o f private property rights; personal enterprise and initiative;
need for the econom y o f unhampered individual enterprises; favorable mention o f
free enterprise capitalism; superiority o f individual enterprise overstate, and over
state buying or management systems.
402 Incentives
Need for financial and other incentives and for opportunities for the young, etc;
encouragement to small businesses and one-man shops; need for wage and tax
policies designed to induce enterprise; Hom e ownership.

403 Regulation o f Capitalism
N eed for regulations designed to make private enterprise work better; actions
against m onopolies and trusts and in defense o f consumer and sm all businessmen;
anti-profiteering

404 Econom ic Planing
Favorable mention o f central planning o f consultative or indicative nature; need
for this and for government department to create national plan; need to plan
imports and exports.
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405 Coorporatism (Applicable to the Netherlands and Canada only)
F avorable m entions o f the need for the involvem ent o f em ployers and Trades
U nion organizations in overall econom ic planning and direction through the
medium oftri-partite' bodies such as the SER in the Netherlands.

406 Protectionism: Positive
Favorable m ention o f extension or maintenance o f tariffs, to protect internal
markets; or other domestic econom ic protectionism.

407 Protectionism: N egative
As 406, but negative.

408 Econom ic Goals
Central statements o f intent to pursue any econom ic goals that are policy
non-specific.

409 Keynesian Demand Management
Adjusting government expenditure to prevailing levels o f employment and
inflation.

410 Productivity
Need to encourage or facilitate greater production, need to take measures to aid
this, appeal for greater production, and importance o f productivity to the econom y;
increase foreign trade; special aid to specific sectors o f the econom y; growth; active
manpower policy; aid to agriculture, tourism and industry.
411 Technology and Infrastructure
Importance o f modernizing industrial administration, importance o f science and
technological developments in industry; need for training and government spon
sored research; need for overhaul o f capital equipm ent, and methods o f com m uni
cations and transport (including Merchant Marine); developm ent o f Nuclear
Energy.

412 Controlled Economy
General need for direct government control o f economy; control over prices, wages,
rents, etc. This covers neither Nationalization nor Indicative planning.

413 Nationalization
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Government ownership and control, partial or complete, including government
ow nership o f land.

414 Econom ic Orthodoxy and Efficiency
N eed for traditional econom ic orthodoxy, e.g. balanced budget, retrenchment in
crisis, low taxation, thrift and savings; support for traditional econom ic institutions
such as the Stock Market and banking system; support for strong currency
internationally.

Domain 5: Welfare and Quality of Life

501 Environmental Protection
Preservation o f countryside, forests, etc; general preservation o f natural resources
against selfish interests; proper use o f national parks; soil banks, etc.

502 Art, Span Leisure, and Media
Favorable mention o f leisure activities, need to spend money on museums, art
galleries, etc; need to encourage worthwhile leisure activities, and to provide
cultural and leisure facilities: to encourage development o f the media etc.

503 Social Justice
N eed for fair treatment o f all men; for special protection for exploited; fair treatment
in tax system; need for equality o f opportunity; need for fair distribution o f
resources and removal o f class barriers; end o f discrimination.
504 Social Services Expansion: Positive
Favorable mention o f need to maintain or expand any basic service or welfare
scheme; support for free basic social services such as public health, or housing. This
excludes education

505 Social Services Expansion: N egative
A s 304. but negative.

506 Education Pro-Expansion
The need to expand and/or im prove education provision at all levels. But not
Technical training which is coded under 411.

507 Education Anti-Expansion
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A s 30 li, but negative.

Domain 6 Fabric of Society

601 D efense o f National W ay o f Life: Positive
Favorable mentions o f importance o f defense against subversion, necessary
suspension o f som e freedoms in order to defend this; support o f national ideas,
traditions and institutions.

602 D efense o f National Way o f Life: N egative
A s 601, but negative.

603 Traditional Morality: Positive
Favorable mention o f e.g. prohibition, censorship, suppression o f immorality and
unseem ly behavior; maintenance and stability o f family.

604 Traditional morality: N egative
As 603, but negative.

605 Law and Order
Enforcement o f all laws; actions against organized crime; putting down urban
violence; support and resources for police; tougher attitudes in courts, etc.
606 National Effort o f Social Harmony
Appeal for national effort and solidarity; need for nation to see itself as united;
appeal for public spiritedness; decrying anti-social attitudes in a time o f crisis
support for public interest; national interest; bipartisanship.

607 Communalism, Pluralism, Pillarization
Preservation o f autonom y o f religious, ethnic, linguistic heritages within the
country. Preservation and/or expansion o f schools with a specific religious
orientation.

608
A s 607, but negative.

609 Immigration and Settlement: Positive284
284 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
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Fostering im m igration and settlem ents, support im m igrants settle the land o f Israel.

610 Support o f R eligious Laws: Positive285
Support o f religious institutions and establishm ents by the governm ent politically and financially, given the
religious authorities greater role in public life.

611 Support o f R eligious Laws: N egative286
As 610 but negative.
612 Jerusalem 287
Insistence that Jerusalem w ill remain the eternal capital o f Israel. Facilitating Jerusalem for all sorts of
religious worship.

Domain 7 Social Groups

701 Labor Groups
Favorable references to Labor, working class, unemployed, poor; support for
Labor Unions, free collective bargaining, good treatment o f manual and other
em ployees.

702 Labor Groups: N egative
A s 701, but negative.

703 Agriculture and Farmers
Support for agriculture; farmers; any policy aim ed specifically at benefiting these.

704 Other Econom ic Groups
Favorable references to any E conom ically-defined group not covered by 701 or
703. For exam ple, em ployers, self-em ployed, middle-class and professional groups
in general.

705 Underprivileged Minority Groups
Favorable references to underprivileged minorities which are defined neither in
econom ic nor in demographic terms, e.g. the handicapped, hom osexuals, etc.
285 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
286 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
287 We inserted this category, due to its significance in Israeli policy domain.
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706 N on-econom ic Demographic Groups
F avorable m entions o f or need for, assistance to W om en, O ld P eople, Y oung
P eople, linguistic groups and national m inorities; special interest groups o f all
kinds.
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APPENDIX B
BANZHAF POW ER INDEX

The standardized Banzhaf index, normalized Banzhaf index or just Banzhaf index was
introduced two decades after Shapley-Shubik index by lawyer John F. Banzhaf in 1965
(Banzhaf 1965). The index calculates voter I's swings like the Shapley-Shubik index.
While the latter one analyzes all possible voter permutations the former index considers
each distinct coalition only once thus concentrating on voter combinations. The
standardized Banzhaf index value for voter i is obtained by dividing the sum of i's
swings (regarding all possible 2® combinations) by the sum of all voters' all swings
hence giving I's proportion of all swings. Formally voter f's standardized Banzhaf index
is calculated as

Jp{S)-v(8\{i})]
~
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I®(^5-* (* \ (iBJ

*

The standardized Banzhaf index can be interpreted to give an answer to the question:
what is voter i 's relative share among all pivotal positions (swings)?
Example:
Consider a three voter weighted voting game where voter a has 50 votes, b 49 votes and c
[51; 50,49, Ij
one vote with a quota of 51, i.e.
. In order to find the pivotal positions for
each voter we have to analyse all the possible voter combinations. There are always 2®
(n being the number of voters) of them, so in this case we have 2*2*2=8 possible
combinations which are
Combination Weight

Status

Critical voters

99

losing
i . . i
jwinning •

a,b

ac

51

iwinning i

a,c

abc

100

, winning i

a

b

49

1 losing j

-

be

50

losing

-

c

1

losing j

-

0

0

los ng

-

a

50

ab

-

First the winning coalitions which meet the vote threshold have to be found: these are
ab,ac and abc. The critical voters (swings) are found within the winning coalitions by
withdrawing a voter and checking whether the remaining coalition is winning. Clearly in
coalition ab both voters are critical, thus both have a swing. In the grand coalition abc
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only a is critical since b or c could be removed (not both at the same time of course) and
the coalition would still remain winning. There are altogether five swings, a has three of

a = |,&= | , c = |
them, b and c one swing. Thus, the Banzhaf index scores are
References:
Banzhaf, John. F. (1965). "Weighted Voting Does not Work: A Mathematical Analysis."
Rutgers Law Review 35: pp. 317-343.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

308
APPENDIX C
DATA STRUCTURE

There are three structures to the data. The first entails the data collected based on
governments being the unit of analysis. This primarily includes data gathered about each
of the twenty eight governments —their duration in power, size, ideology, etc. The
second set of data is based on fifteen Knesset general election results. From those fifteen
Knesset elections we establish and calculate the dominant party power index. The
dominant party’s power index remains the same throughout the Knesset’s terms. This
power index, which is a measure of the ability of the dominant party to form alliances,
remains the same regardless of cabinet changes during the same Knesset. The third
dataset consists of annual figures relating to external and domestic political indicators
from 1949 to 1999.

We collapse the data based on the government being the unit of analysis, since it
is the ruling coalition is the objective of this study. This was done as follow: First, we
entered the size, ideology, and duration data simply in accordance with the original
formulation of the government. Second, we entered the power index of the dominant
party data based on party’s relative position in the Knesset. Whenever more than one
government was established within the same Knesset we duplicated the same dominant
party’s power index for the different governments unless a different dominant party led
the new government.
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The third annual dataset was then integrated into the government data in three
data blocks. The first block consists of the annual data figures for the year before
government formation if the government’s formation occurred in at least mid-year;
otherwise the data are entered for the year of formation. This is done to examine prior
events’ impact on coalition formation in term of both size and ideological parameters.
The second block of data is entered for the first year after formation provided that the
government has been formed prior to mid-year; otherwise the same year is considered.
This is to establish the impact of first year events as well as dominant party power index,
coalition’s size and ideology of government on its stability or durability. The third block
of data is entered for the last year of government or the year before termination; the same
year is considered when coalition ends after mid-year. This is established in order to
determine whether a pattern exist that impact government’s termination (Table 3.17).

Data Structure
Annual Data Selection

Month of Government
1st to 5th
6th to 12th

The year before
formation

First year after
formation

The year before
termination

Last Year
Same Year

Same Year
Following Year

Last Year
Same Year
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This doctoral dissertation identifies key aspects that have contributed to the
formation and duration of Israeli coalition governments.

Most importantly, it

differentiates between two historical periods that have shaped Israeli coalition politics.
Prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the election of the 7th Israeli Knesset in 1969,
Israeli political parties formed consensual and inclusive coalitions in response to
economic, immigration, and external pressures. Low levels of party competition and the
dominance of Mapai in the Israeli Knessets further contributed to the formation of large
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Post-1969, following the gradual decline of Labor’s electoral dominance,

Israeli parties became further polarized and more competitive.External, economic,
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pressures, in addition to

and

increased partycompetition, undermined

consensual coalition formations. These factors were also relevant to the durability of
alliances.

Deteriorating economic, immigration, and external conditions as well as

increased party competition have contributed to the shortfall of coalitions.
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